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  198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2
  See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 4-7, 157-65
(1993); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1, 2-4 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873-74 (1987).  Historians of Lochner-
era jurisprudence have differed as to the precise origin of perceived limits on state power. Compare, e.g., FISS,
supra, at 46-49, 158-59 (arguing that the state's limited powers derived from its limited purposes under Lockean
social contract theory) with, e.g., Siegel, supra, at 78-90 (arguing that Lochner-era jurists viewed state power as
constrained by traditional common-law principles derived initially from natural law) with, e.g., Michael Les
Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293, 298 (1985) (arguing that perceived limits on state power were grounded
in classical economic notions of "liberty" and prohibited only "class" or interest-group legislation) with, e.g.,
ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1960) (arguing that Lochner represented naked
judicial activism on behalf of the propertied elites).  For purposes of this Article, however, it is sufficient to note
that all four explanations rest, ultimately, on a belief in the primacy of private property and private ordering, and in
the illegitimacy of social actions that appeared to redistribute property or wealth.
3
   See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937); see also FISS, supra note 2, at 6-8, 181; Benedict, supra note 2, at 305-14.
4
  See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-5 to -7 (2d ed. 1988) (describing
the doctrinal and political reasons for the Lochner doctrine's demise). But see RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 277-82 (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
CONSTITUTION 23, 11025 (1980) [hereinafter SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES]; Norman Karlin, Back to the Future:
From Nollan to Lochner, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 627 (1988); Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 453 (1985) [hereinafter Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner]; Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due Process
and the Preservation of Competition, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91 (1983); Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights:
The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363 (1990); see also Anthony S.
McCaskey, Comment, Thesis and Antithesis of Liberty of Contract: Excess in Lochner and Johnson Controls, 3
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 409 (1993) (advocating an intermediate level of economic due process protection). Cass
Sunstein has argued, however, that central elements of the Lochner Court's analytic framework underlie much
current thinking about individual rights. See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 875.
2
Ninety-three years ago, in Lochner v. New York,1 the Supreme Court struck down a
maximum-working-hours law for bakers as an impermissible invasion of employer-employee
liberty of contract and, by implication, of the employer's property rights in his business.
Lochner came to symbolize, and was vilified for, a vision of state power as rigidly
circumscribed by the operation of judicially-determined laws of social ordering.2 By the late
1930s, the Court had changed course and accepted that the states' police power — or, in the
case of Congress, the commerce power — encompassed even protective regulation of the
parameters of the private employment contract.3 Within the modern legal academy, "Lochner"
has become an epithet used to characterize an outmoded, over-narrow way of thinking about
state and federal economic regulation; it goes without saying that hardly anybody takes the
doctrine it represents seriously.4
In fact, however, the economic vision embodied in Lochner is alive and well on the
digital frontier. Its premises — the sanctity of private property and freedom of contract, the
sharply delimited role of public policy in shaping private transactions, and the illegitimacy of
5
  See CHRISTOPHER BURNS, INC., COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT AND THE NII: REPORT TO THE ENABLING
TECHNOLOGIES COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS 17-21, 29-36 (1996); Tom W. Bell,
Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 557 (1998); Charles Clark, The Publisher in the Digital World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
NEW TECHNOLOGIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE KNOWRIGHT ‘95 CONFERENCE 85, 99 (Klaus Brunnstein & Peter Paul
Sint eds., 1995); I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217; Robert P.
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 1293 (1996) [hereinafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules]; Robert P. Merges, The End of
Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
115 (1997) [hereinafter Merges, The End of Friction?]; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the
ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Copyright
Preemption]; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary].
6
  See Bell, supra note 5; Hardy,  supra note 5; Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 5;
Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5; O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5.  The "progress" and
"access" criteria are widely accepted as the test of any regime of entitlements in creative and informational works.
The "progress" criterion is constitutionally-mandated. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to
grant intellectual property rights "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"). The "access" criterion
follows from it, both because "progress" is of little value unless its fruits are made available to the public, and
because knowledge is cumulative, so that the public availability of creative works promotes further progress.  See,
e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 98-
101 (1997); Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1995); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325,
326-27 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEXAS L. REV.
989, 993-99 (1997); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996) (arguing that society should
also consider the opportunity cost created by the copyright regime, measured in terms of other, non-creative
activities that might produce greater social welfare). This Article does not challenge the progress and access criteria,
but only the means by which the cybereconomists argue they are most effectively pursued. 
3
laws that have redistributive effects — undergird a growing body of argument and scholarship
concerning the relative superiority (as compared with copyright) of common law property and
contract rules for protecting and disseminating digital works.5 In their contemporary
incarnation, these premises are embedded in the rhetoric of economic efficiency. In place of
social contract theory, their proponents argue from purportedly neutral, scientific truths about
the way markets in general, and information markets in particular, operate.
These truths, I shall argue, are nothing of the sort. Rather, they are "just-so stories" that
mask the need for first-order social welfare choices about the sort of information society we
want to have. Their proponents, whom I christen the "cybereconomists," argue that the most
efficient legal regime, measured by its success at inducing the creation of digital works and
increasing consumers' access to information, is that which permits copyright owners to
maximize control over the terms and conditions of use of their digital property.6 However, the
economic case they build is anything but convincing. It is based on an essentialism about the
nature of "contract" and "market" that is manifestly unsuited to mass-market transactions, on a
reflexive and unsubstantiated distrust of the legislative process as compared with the market,
and on assumptions about the nature of "property" and the best ways of managing it that are
7
  Economics is, of course, a social science, and one which as a matter of historical record has no great
claim to predictive accuracy. For that matter, historians of science and technology have long recognized that science
and technology themselves are not value-free. See, e.g., JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John
Wilkinson trans., 1973); BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (Catherine Porter trans., 1993); LEWIS
MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION (2d ed. 1963); cf. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (arguing that our perceptions of scientific “facts” are shaped by the paradigms that we
employ to make sense of them).
8
  See infra text accompanying notes 13-23, 161-71 (discussing the relation between freedom of contract
and property rights in Lochner-era jurisprudence).
9
  See, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, UNITED STATES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 49-53, 58-59, 64-66, 70-72, 79-84, 177-92, 230-32 & app. (1995) [hereinafter NII WHITE PAPER]
(outlining vision of digital copyright regime under which copyright owners are free to contract around copyright's
limited entitlements, and proposing legislation designed to implement this vision); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections
on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 165-66 &
n.17 (1997) (describing Clinton Administration's efforts to secure international treaty provisions similar to its
proposed domestic legislation); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134 (detailing
differences between Administration's vision of copyright and existing copyright law). For a discussion of the
domestic legislation ultimately adopted, see infra text accompanying notes 283-85.
4
wholly unproven and arguably unjustified in the case of creative and informational works.
Taken together, the cybereconomists' arguments and proposals amount to ideology, not
science.7 Designing the optimal regime of rights in digital works requires, instead, explicit
choices about the degree of author/publisher control, and the extent of freedom from such
control, that society finds desirable. 
Part I of this Article describes the economic models now proffered as the basis for
defining rights in digital works, and explores their striking resemblance to the system of social
ordering described and advanced in the Supreme Court's Lochner-era decisions. The ghost of
Lochner is not invoked lightly, nor with intent to belittle. Lochner represented a particular
ideal of social ordering, premised on a seamless convergence of the private-law institutions of
property and contract to provide a zone of legal insulation for market outcomes.8  In the
physical world, that vision has long been compromised by evidence of market failures that all
but the most die-hard Chicago school economist cannot help but acknowledge. The
cybereconomists' argument, in essence, is that cyberspace more closely approximates the
conditions necessary for perfect markets, and that under these conditions, a legal regime based
primarily or even exclusively on the private-law institutions of property and contract is
appropriate. This argument, moreover, has found favor with government policymakers, who
have used similar reasoning to frame legislative and treaty recommendations.9 It is both fair
and important to ask whether en route to their conclusions, the cybereconomists have
corrected the Lochner Court's methodological lapses, or simply reproduced them.
Part II demonstrates that the cybereconomists' debt to the social ideology of Lochner
runs deep. Their proposals turn out to be grounded in identical beliefs about the conceptual
10
  This metaphor is borrowed from Robert Merges. See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 136
(likening reduced transaction costs in the digital medium to the absence of friction in "pure" Newtonian mechanics).
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primacy of private property and private ordering and the illegitimacy of "redistributive,"
market-distorting legislation. As a result, their models are neither scientific (in the sense of
describing an ineluctable reality) nor neutral, but rather normative and contingent on the very
same institutions and arrangements whose absolute efficiency they seek to prove. Their failure
to conceive of contract as anything less than voluntary and (definitionally) private, or of
property as anything less than complete control, blinds them to the socially constructed nature
of the existing mass market for creative works and prevents them from seriously considering
whether a regime based on limited ownership rights might be more effective at promoting
access and progress. I argue that in light of the special nature of creative and informational
works and of creative and intellectual progress, there is substantial reason to believe that a
limited-ownership regime is better suited to furthering these goals.
Part III begins the project of developing a stronger, more defensible economic model
for digital intellectual property rights. As a tool for understanding information markets, the
neoclassically-grounded economic theory to which the cybereconomists subscribe is fatally
incomplete. In particular, critiques of the neoclassical paradigm supplied by institutional,
welfare-theoretic, and political economists have identified several important factors that
should inform efforts to determine the optimal system of rights in digital works. First, Part III
explores the dynamics of bargaining power in the consumer mass market for creative and
informational works and suggests that, in light of the predominantly reactive nature of
consumers' power to affect markets, consumers are more likely to attain relative equality of
bargaining power in the legislative arena. Part III then considers the relationship between the
legal regime governing rights in digital works and overall social welfare. It demonstrates that
allowing content owners to internalize the uncompensated benefits generated by creative and
informational works under a limited-entitlements regime would result in underproduction of
works that produce significant social benefits. The resulting decrease in social welfare must be
offset against any increased value that would be realized through market exchange. The
question whether such a regime would be preferable to the current one cannot be answered
except by reference to a normative conception of social welfare. Moreover, this choice
implicates preferences about the conditions of individual and social self-definition that are not
capable of expression and effectuation through the market. In light of these considerations, it
would be entirely rational to conclude that a regime of limited entitlements is optimal.
Finally, Part IV considers, and rejects, the cybereconomists' implicit contention that the
relatively "frictionless" nature of transactions in cyberspace is a technological imperative that
dictates redefining digital property rights in the neoclassical mold.10 Technology and society
constitute each other; if we have not yet developed an alternative technological paradigm for
defining and administering rights in digital works, it is because we have not been asking the
right questions. I conclude that both the legal regime governing rights in digital works and the
technology for implementing it should be determined with reference to expressly chosen social
11
  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
12
  See Siegel, supra note 2, at 23-36 (defining conceptualism and its public-law analogue, "constitutional
conceptualism," which looked to the written Constitution as the source of the applicable concepts and categories).
13
  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905); Fiss, supra note 2, at 159-60; Siegel, supra note
2, at 8-12.
14
  See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59-61; see also, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding
maximum-hours legislation for miners in light of that occupation's "peculiar hazards and perils"); Fiss, supra note 2,
at 173-74.
15
  See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57; see also, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908) (upholding
maximum-hours legislation for women because "woman has always been dependent upon man," and because "there
is that in her disposition and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of [her] rights" to liberty of
contract); Fiss, supra note 2, at 174-79 (arguing that the Court found Muller an easy case "because women were not
6
priorities. Under a broader conception of economic theory and of social welfare, society may
legitimately choose to retain and institutionalize a limited-entitlements regime for digital
works.
I. THE CONVERGENCE OF ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES AND NATURAL RIGHTS
Any comparison of turn-of-the-century substantive due process jurisprudence and the
contemporary digital "rights management" movement must begin by acknowledging that they
differ in several important respects. First and foremost, the question of government power that
was so central to Lochner does not arise because congressional power to define rights in
creative works is express.11  Debates over the appropriate scope of copyright protection focus
on how, not whether, government power should be exercised. In addition, the distinctive brand
of conceptualism characteristic of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal reasoning,
which conceived of the law as a system of abstract concepts and categories "capable, more or
less, of deductive application" to resolve particular disputes, is, deservedly, a thing of the
past.12 What is striking is that, despite these differences, the economic regimes asserted as
natural and neutral by the Lochner Court on the one hand, and by contemporary copyright
owners and economics-oriented copyright scholars on the other, are so remarkably similar.
The central question in Lochner concerned the scope of a state's police powers. Then,
as now, the states could legislate on matters concerning the safety, morals, health, and general
welfare of the public; however, each of these areas was conceived as narrow and highly
specific.13 To qualify as health-related (the particular police power at issue in Lochner), a law
ordinarily had to pertain to the health of the public as a whole; a law protecting a specific class
of workers was legitimate as a health law only if it could be shown that the occupation was
particularly unhealthful.14 Alternatively, a class-specific law might be valid as a labor law if it
could be shown that the workers engaged in it were uniquely unable to protect themselves,
thus justifying their treatment as "wards of the state.”15  A majority of the Court concluded that
viewed as [co-equal] members of the community that constituted the state").
16
  See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59-61.
17
  See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64; see also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557 (1923) (describing
a minimum wage statute as "a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person,
for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility"); Benedict, supra note 2, at 305-08 ("[T]he
state plainly was interfering on the behalf of one of the parties to a bargain, insofar as unfettered bargaining based
on the supply of and demand for labor would have led to a different outcome."); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 877-79
("Because the only available public justifications were insufficient, the minimum wage statute [in Lochner] was
invalidated as an interest-group deal, reflecting nothing other than political power."); G. Edward White, Revisiting
Substantive Due Process and Holmes' Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 88 (1997) (describing Lochner-era
due process decisions as predicated on "the principle that no legislature could enact 'partial' legislation, legislation
that imposed burdens or conferred benefits on one class of citizens rather than the citizenry as a whole").
18
  See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. II §§ 135, 222 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1970) (1690).
19
  See supra note 2. Compare Fiss, supra note 2, at 158-59 (suggesting that these limits were derived
directly from social contract theory), and White, supra note 17, at 105-06 (same), with Siegel, supra note 2, at 78-
90 (arguing that perceived limits on state power were derived only indirectly from "natural law," and that Lochner-
era jurists turned to traditional common-law concepts and distinctions to give content to the limits).
20
  See Benedict, supra note 2, at 298-301; White, supra note 17, at 105-06.
21
  See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 2, at 304 (describing categories of cases in which the Lochner-era Court
upheld economic regulation); Harry N. Scheiber, Private Rights and Public Power: American Law, Capitalism, and
the Republican Polity in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 823, 836-47 (1997) (book review) (describing
debate among historians about the extent to which economic regulation for the "general welfare" was the accepted
norm).
7
bakers as a class were neither particularly vulnerable nor especially unhealthy. Accordingly, it
reasoned, upholding the maximum-hours legislation on health grounds would work a dramatic
expansion of the states' authority to interpose protective regulation in the workplace.16 This the
Court refused to do. Instead, it held the law invalid, and suggested that the state's real intent
was to interfere with the results of private bargaining — presumably, for redistributive or
interest group purposes.17
The Lochner Court's narrow conception of the state's role derived, ultimately, from the
Enlightenment vision of the state as constituted via the social contract for limited purposes.18
Within this vision, legislative authority to shape default rules for social conduct encompassed
only the specific terms of the original compact.19 In significant part, the compact was defined
by principles of classical economics, which held that government should not interfere with the
"natural" laws of supply and demand.20 In reality, turn-of-the-century governments undertook a
broad variety of economic legislation pursuant to their recognized authority to promote the
"general welfare.”21 Outside the bounds of this general regulatory authority, however, the
state's role was limited to policing private property rights and enforcing private agreements,
22
  See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 194 (1992) ("Every effort to interfere with outcomes — to judge overall social justice by results —
inevitably subverted the legitimacy of the market process as a neutral and apolitical arbiter of the just distribution of
wealth."); Benedict, supra note 2, at 311-14; White, supra note 17, at 94-100.
23
  See LOCKE, supra note 18, at bk. 11, § 222; Fiss, supra note 2, at 46-49; Benedict, supra note 2; Siegel,
supra note 2, at 78-81; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 887-92; White, supra note 17, at 105-06; see also supra note 2.
For a modern exposition of this view, see EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 4 ("The implicit normative limit upon the use of
political power is that it should preserve the relative entitlements among the members of the group, both in the
formation of the social order and in its ongoing operation.").
24
  See BURNS, supra note 5, at 15-21, 31-35; PETER WAYNER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION (1997);
Jon Bing, The Contribution of Technology to the Identification of Rights, Especially in Sound and Audio-Visual
Works: An Overview, 4 INTL. J.L. & INFO. TECH. 234 (1996); Clark, supra note 5, at 97-101; Mark Stefik, Letting
Loose the Light: Igniting Commerce in Electronic Publication, in INTERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, MYTHS, AND
METAPHORS 219 (Mark Stefik ed., 1996) [hereinafter Stefik, Letting Loose the Light]; Mark Stefik, Shifting the
Possible: How Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 138
(1997) [hereinafter Stefik, Shifting the Possible]; Daniel J. Gervais, Electronic Rights Management Systems
(ERMS): The Next Logical Step in the Evolution of Rights Management (on file with author) [hereinafter Gervais,
The Next Logical Step]; International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organizations, Committee on New
Technologies, Digital Rights Management Technologies (visited Sept. 14, 1998) <http://www.ncri.com/articles/
rights-management/ifrro95.html>. The most comprehensive investigation of the possibilities and implications of
digital rights management technologies is that being conducted by IMPRIMATUR, a consortium of European
universities, publishing interests, authors' organizations, and telecommunications providers. For information about
IMPRIMATUR, see Imprimatur (last modified Oct. 6, 1998) <http://imprimatur.alcs.co.uk>. For the archive of
reports generated by the project, see Project Documents (last modified Sept. 24, 1998) <http://www.imprimatur.
alcs.co.uk/download.htm#finyear>.
The term "click-through" (or "click-wrap" or "web-wrap") license refers to a contract created by requiring the would-
be purchaser of a digital work to accept various usage restrictions, via a series of mouse "clicks," before granting access
to the work. Representatives of various copyright-related industries are now drafting a new Article 2B for the Uniform
Commercial Code that would render click-through licenses for digital works valid and enforceable whether or not the
terms were actually disclosed before payment. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES § 2B-208 (Annual Meeting Draft July
1998) (available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/Library/ulc/ucc2b/2b98.htm>); infra text accompanying note 77. 
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both of which were conceived to be inherently prepolitical. "Class" legislation, which altered
the economic playing field to the perceived benefit of some and the detriment of others, was
regarded as an impermissible invasion of fundamental economic liberty.22 In short, turn-of-the
century jurists and legal scholars viewed the market as the primary engine of social ordering,
and believed that the state existed to facilitate the market.23
The emerging market for digital works displays a similar emphasis on private ordering
of entitlements and obligations. This development is made possible by the growing use of
"click-through" contracts for the online delivery of digital works and by new "rights
management" technologies that will allow copyright owners to set unilaterally and enforce
automatically the terms and conditions of access to digital content.24  These new technologies
radically change the copyright landscape. Copyright laws were created, at least in part, to
address a market failure arising from the public-good characteristics of creative works of
25
   As defined by economists, "market failure" refers to circumstances in which voluntary market exchange
cannot achieve the socially optimal allocation of resources. "Public goods" are goods that can be consumed without
depletion (non-rivalrous consumption) and that can be withheld from nonpaying beneficiaries only at prohibitive
cost (non-excludability). Because non-excludability reduces incentives for private provision, public goods often
present market failure problems. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40-41 (2d ed. 1997);
cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 1813), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1286, 1291-
92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984):
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the
action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long
as he keeps it to himself, but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of
everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no
one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. . . . Inventions then cannot,
in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from
them as an encouragement to men to produce ideas which may produce utility. . . .
Creative and informational works approach the status of pure public goods in the digital environment, where the
marginal cost of producing and transmitting a copy approaches zero.
Other sources of market failure include monopoly, externalities arising from market transactions, and
information asymmetries that preclude socially optimal transactions or distort market behavior. See COOTER &
ULEN, supra, at 38-41.
26
  See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 98-100; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1700-04 (1988); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989). But see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970);
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1,
14 (1988) (suggesting that "much of the perceived need for protection in early analyses in fact arose from or was
reinforced by the fact of large 'economies of scale' in publishing (augmented by high levels of uncertainty) rather
than the 'public goods' problem").
27
  Examples include copying for research or classroom use, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994), copying for
private home use, see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); excerpting for
purposes of comment or criticism, see, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); parody, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); and the
decompilation of computer software to discover uncopyrightable ideas and methods of operation, see 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1994); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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authorship.25 By guaranteeing authors certain exclusive rights in their creative products,
copyright seeks to furnish authors and publishers, respectively, with incentives to invest the
effort necessary to create works and distribute them to the public.26 Digital technologies allow
more effective fencing of intellectual property, and thus cure some of the market failure
problems associated with creative and informational works — although, as I will argue in Part
III, they have the potential to create market failures of a different sort.
Most obviously, digital copyright management systems (CMS) will enable copyright
owners to enforce automatically many of the rights afforded them by copyright law. In
addition, because digital technologies reduce licensing costs, it will become increasingly fea-
sible to levy fees for various uses of copyrighted works that the law has regarded as "fair" and
that members of the public currently enjoy at no charge.27 An important strand of copyright
28
  See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF
COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 170, 224 (1994); Bell, supra note 5; Wendy J. Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the
Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993).
29
  See Princeton Univ. Press, Inc., v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (photocopying for classroom use); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(photocopying for research use); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 178-79, 202, 216-24; Richard P. Adelstein & Steven
1. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary
Perspective, 5 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 209 (1985); Bell, supra note 5, at 581-84; Gordon, supra note 28, at 1619-21;
Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 130-34; Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 24, at 146-47; see
also Fisher, supra note 26, at 1669-72 (observing that a broadly inclusive approach to the market-impact inquiry
"will almost always tilt in favor of the plaintiff").
30
  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); BURNS, supra note 5, at 34-35; Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 24, at
145-46. But see Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that attempted
contractual extension of copyright term was misuse and rendered copyright unenforceable); infra note 84
(discussing application of copyright misuse doctrine to digital CMS practices).
31
  See 17 U.S.C. §107; Cohen, supra note 9, at 175-58, 179-83. 
32
  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991); Cohen,
supra note 9, at 175-78, 179-83; see also Litman, supra note 6 (elaborating the role of a robust public domain in
providing the building blocks for ongoing creative progress).
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scholarship conceives the fair use doctrine as a response to a market failure resulting from
prohibitive transaction costs; as a matter of law, moreover, fair use depends in part on findings
about market impact.28 Thus, many commentators and some courts have concluded that the
scope of fair use online should be narrowed wherever new technologies or licensing
mechanisms enable markets to form.29
Ultimately, digital CMS will allow content owners to insist on greater protection than
copyright law would afford. For example, in the nondigital world, the first sale of an object
embodying a copyrighted work exhausts the copyright owner's exclusive distribution right;
digital CMS will enable the copyright owner to extend control over distribution indefinitely —
in theory, even for works whose term of copyright protection has expired.30 Digital CMS also
will allow copyright owners who desire it to abrogate fair use entirely — for example, by
requiring payment for any excerpting of a digital work regardless of the reader's purpose, or by
conditioning access to the work on acceptance of a contractual provision prohibiting
parodies.31 Finally, copyright owners will be able to implement"contractual restrictions
prohibiting reuse of the ideas, facts, or functional principles contained in a work — all
elements that copyright law expressly leaves unprotected in order to stimulate further
creativity — or prohibiting reuse of formerly copyrighted expression that has fallen into the
public domain.32
33
  See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act:
Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 224-27 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2281 and 2280]; id. at 204-12
(statement of Allan R. Adler, Vice President for Legal and Governmental Affairs, Association of American
Publishers); id. at 68-77 (statement of Robert W. Holleyman II, President, Business Software Alliance); id. at 212-
16 (statement of Gail Markels, General Counsel and Senior Vice-President, Interactive Digital Software
Association); id. (statement of Tom Ryan, CEO, SciTech Software, Inc., on behalf of the Software Publishers'
Association); id. at 156-61 (statement of Allee Willis, songwriter, on behalf of Broadcast Music, Inc.); National
Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7-15 (1996) [hereinafter Hearing on S, 1284] (statement of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive
Director, Creative Incentive Coalition); NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 180-203 (1996)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2441]; id. at 69-79 (statement of Barbara A. Munder, Senior Vice-President, The
McGraw-Hill Cos.); id. at 2530 (statement of Frances W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast Music, Inc.); id.
(statement of Richard Robinson, Chairman, President, and CEO, Scholastic, Inc., on behalf of the Association of
American Publishers); id. at 21-24 (statement of Jack Valenti, Chairman and CEO, Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc.); Creative Incentive Coalition, Resources: Key Questions Answered (visited Sept. 27, 1998)
<http://www.cic.org/resources/faq.htm>; NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 10-12, 177-78, 230.
34
  Compare NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 84 ("The Working Group rejects the notion that copyright
owners should be taxed — apart from all others — to facilitate the legitimate goal of 'universal access."'), and
Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 134-35 (characterizing the fair use doctrine as essentially
redistributive), with Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557 (1923) (describing a minimum wage statute as "a
compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition there
rests upon him no peculiar responsibility"); see also Gordon, supra note 28, at 1632 (applying the "subsidy" label to
judicially-decreed findings of fair use where licensing theoretically would be possible); cf. Jane C. Ginsburg,
Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY. 1, 15 (1997) (arguing that fair use redistributes value
"from those who purchase copyrighted works at full price"). Section II.B.2, infra, demonstrates that the argument
from redistribution is misguided because it assumes the central point in dispute: that the copyright owner was
entitled to expect remuneration for the use in question. Regarding Ginsburg's injured purchasers, see infra text
accompanying notes 335-42 (discussing the public good aspect of the fair use privilege).
11
Copyright owners maintain that different rules are necessary in cyberspace because,
absent technological protection, it is so easy to make and distribute unauthorized copies of
digital content. Rules that undermine their control over their creative property, it is argued,
will reduce, or even destroy, their incentives to distribute creative works digitally.33 Sounding
uncannily like the Supreme Court of the Lochner era, copyright owners and their supporters
contend that translating public-law doctrines that benefit users, such as first sale and fair use,
to the digital environment would require them to subsidize the reading public.34
Given the foregoing, one might expect that copyright owners would look to Lockean
intellectual property theorists to support their claims to broad rights management authority.
Although the Constitution expressly authorizes only a limited grant of exclusive (i.e.,
property-like) rights to authors, the Enlightenment notion that property and contract predate
the social contract might nonetheless prove useful to those copyright owners seeking greater
control over their digital content than current copyright law allows. In fact, although some
scholars have advanced a Lockean justification for intellectual property rights, they have
interpreted the Lockean proviso that "enough and as good [be left] for others" to require a
35
  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1560-72 (1993) (quoting and discussing Locke, supra
note 18, at bk. 11, § 27); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 319-25 (1988);
cf. Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1081, 1094-95 (advancing similar
interpretation to explain limitations on patent duration and scope).
36
  Neoclassical economic theory, closely associated with the Chicago school of legal economic thought,
holds (among other things) that society is composed of rational, utility maximizing individuals; that these
individuals will seek to better their positions through voluntary market exchange as long as the marginal benefit
outweighs the marginal cost; that the most reliable measure of expected utility is the amount an individual is willing
to pay for a particular exchange; that perfectly competitive markets are the most efficient vehicles for coordinating
these wealth-maximizing exchanges; that perfectly competitive markets will seek equilibrium as prices respond to
the laws of supply and demand; and that markets are presumptively perfectly, or near-enough-perfectly, competitive.
See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM
1318, 57-60 (1997); see also Robert A. Solo, Neoclassical Economics in Perspective, in THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 41, 48-55 (Warren J. Samuels ed., 1993); infra text accompanying note 206 (discussing
additional elements of the neoclassical model). Numerous critics within both economics and law have charged that
the neoclassical market model, while possessed of considerable theoretical elegance, is descriptively inadequate and
institutionally myopic. For representative critiques from within the discipline of economics, see, for example,
DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
POLICY (1989); Ezra J. Mishan, The Folklore of the Market: An Inquiry Into the Economic Doctrines of the Chicago
School, in THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra, at 95; Warren J. Samuels, Welfare Economics,
Power, and Property, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (Warren J. Samuels & A. Allen
Schmid eds., 1981); [hereinafter Samuels, Welfare Economics]; Warren J. Samuels, Further Limits to Chicago
School Doctrine, in THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY [hereinafter Samuels, Further Limits], supra, at
397; Solo, supra, at 48-55; Charles K. Wilber & Jon D. Wisman, The Chicago Schook Positivism or Ideal Type, in
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra, at 79; see generally MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra
(describing the various schools of legal-economic thought). Foundational critiques by legal academics include C.
Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 32-41 (1975), Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979),
Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980), and
Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
Neoclassically-grounded legal scholars' strong predisposition toward the use of private-law models for
intellectual property rights is evident in other areas of intellectual property law as well. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 108 (1990); Edmund W. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); see generally Mark A. Lemley,
Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 873, 896-98 (1997) (reviewing JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996))
("The rise of property rhetoric in intellectual property cases is closely identified . . . with a particular economic view
of property rights."). As Part II discusses — and as the discussion of Lochner-era beliefs about "class" legislation,
see supra text accompanying notes 18-23, also suggests — the convergence of neoclassical "law and economics"
and Lockean social contract theory is no coincidence; despite its claims to quasi-scientific neutrality, the
neoclassically-grounded economic approach to copyright law practiced by the cybereconomists is firmly rooted in a
particular ideology of social ordering. See also Hadfield, supra note 26, at 41-45 (observing that one school of
economic thought about copyright "tracks the complete property aspect of the natural rights rationale"); Neil
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robust public domain and a copyright grant that is limited both in duration and in scope.35 In
contrast, it is intellectual property scholars of the neoclassicist economic persuasion who
express the strongest and most unequivocal support for digital copyright management regimes
based on private-law contract and property rights.36
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 310 n.109 (1996) (noting the
convergence between economic and natural rights-based justifications for copyright); see generally Baker, supra, at
33 (discussing the convergence of utilitarian and libertarian justifications for market ordering); H.H. Liebhafsky,
Price Theory as Jurisprudence: Law and Economics, Chicago Style, in THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, supra, at 237, 239-40 ("The Chicago 'price theory as jurisprudence' approach is a curious mixture, not a
compound, of particles of logical positivist methodology suspended randomly in a mythical or secular natural law
philosophy."); Solo, supra, at 42-47, 45 ("[T]he economist acts the part of the pure scientist, but he plays the role of
a moral philosopher. His value judgments are not purged, but hidden.").
As used in this Article, "neoclassical," "neoclassicist," and "neoclassically-grounded" encompass economic
approaches based on offshoots of neoclassical theory, including "neoinstitutional" economics, see infra note 50, and
neoclassical market theory as modified by the Hayekian model of dynamic competition, see, e.g., Linda A.
Schwarzstein, An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1049 (1994).
37
  See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,
545-46 (1923).
38
  See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 62, 70-71; cf. William W. Fisher III, Property
and Contract on the Internet, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (demonstrating how price discrimination
can allow copyright owners to increase their overall profits while charging discount prices to certain consumers);
Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 845 (1997) (same).
39
  See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 79 (describing the "freedom of contract"
approach to copyright preemption issues); id. at 81-91 (endorsing a predominantly market-based solution to the
copyright preemption problem). Copyright protection for a work is described as "thin" when the work consists
primarily of uncopyrightable elements such as facts, ideas, and methods of operation, which competitors are free to
copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
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Both Maureen O'Rourke and Tom W. Bell see contract as presumptively more efficient
than copyright at promoting the dissemination of creative works. Just as the Lochner-era Court
reasoned that private ordering would benefit workers by leaving them free to bargain for the
employment terms of their choice,37 O'Rourke and Bell argue that the shift to a contract-based
"usage rights" regime will benefit information consumers by increasing their access to digital
works and reducing the costs of such access. O'Rourke suggests that these savings will accrue
as the result of price discrimination; content owners will charge private individuals lower rates
in exchange for subjecting them to use restrictions.38 She further suggests that, particularly
when copyright protection is thin or unavailable, the option of using contract to recoup initial
investment in information products may be the decisive factor in ensuring that a work is
produced and placed on the market.39
Taking a different approach, Bell attempts to show that the fair use exception to the
exclusive rights afforded by copyright is more expensive, and therefore inefficient, than
consumers realize. He argues that information is never truly free; rather, a would-be user of
copyrighted material must incur search costs to find material, exchange costs if she decides a
license is necessary, and uncertainty costs if she decides it is not. Digital networks and CMS
technologies minimize the first two categories of costs and eliminate the last; the result, Bell
40
  See Bell, supra note 5, at 580-81, 585-88. As Bradford DeLong and Michael Froomkin demonstrate, in
the current digital environment the assumption that digital networks will invariably reduce search and exchange
costs is highly problematic. See J. Bradford DeLong & A. Michael Froomkin, The Next Economy?, in INTERNET
PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Deborah
Hurley et al. eds., forthcoming 1998) (last modified Apr. 11, 1997) (available at
<http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/newecon.htm>); see also Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note
5, at 116 (characterizing the assumption of lowered transaction costs as an "oversimplification"); Dan L. Burk,
Muddy Rules for Cyberspace 18-20 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); infra text accompanying
note 148. However, the Digital Object Identifier (DOI) project, if successful, may reduce search costs substantially
for many creative and informational works. The project, begun in 1994 by the Association of American Publishers
to design and implement a system for assigning unique digital identifiers to digital works and maintaining a
centralized database to serve as a locator, is currently in the startup stage. See Bill Rosenblatt, The Digital Object
Identifier: Solving the Dilemma of Copyright Protection Online, 3 J. ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING (Dec. 1997)
<http://www.press. umich.edu/jep/03-02/doi.html>; Digital Object Identifier Foundation, Digital Object Identifier
System (visited Nov. 4,1998) <http://www.doi.org>. The DOI technology is designed to operate at the publisher's
desired level of granularity; sections or components of works may each have their own unique identifier if the
publisher chooses. See Paula Berinstein, DOP A New Identifier for Digital Content (visited Oct. 10, 1998)
<http://www.infotoday.com/ searcher/jan/story4.html>.
41
  Bell, supra note 5, at 561.
42
   See id. at 588-89.
43
  But see id., at 615-17 (suggesting that copyright owners who choose to contract around these default
rules could be required to forego copyright remedies in the event of breach).
44
  See Hardy, supra note 5. Elsewhere, Hardy has argued that strong entitlements are what the framers of
the Constitution envisioned. See I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World, 1
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 137 (1995) <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/vlil/hardy.html>. As discussed infra note 154, I
disagree with his interpretation.
45
  See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 557 (1923).
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contends, is better for everyone.40 As he puts it, "[a]lthough consumers might have to pay fees
that the fair use defense would excuse in other media, they would in return gain better access
to better information.”41 He further argues that the increased value realized by copyright
owners as a result of usage fees will be passed on to consumers as publishers compete to
market their products.42
Trotter Hardy takes the arguments made by O'Rourke and Bell even farther. While
both Bell and O'Rourke would retain copyright as a source of default legal rules,43  Hardy
argues that (at least in cyberspace) copyright should be abandoned altogether in favor of
strong, undivided property entitlements.44 Just as the Lochner-era Court reasoned that
minimum wage laws "amount[ ] to a compulsory exaction from the employer,”45 Hardy
believes that the public law of copyright imposes unnecessary transaction costs and
uncompensated positive Externalities on copyright owners, thereby undermining incentives to
46
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 254-58; I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U.
PITT. L. REV. 993, 1025-26 (1994) [hereinafter Hardy, Proper Legal Regime].
47
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 252-54 (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347-48 (1967), and Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1348-49
(1993)); see also Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 29, at 212-15.
48
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 242-52, 254-60.
49
  These are the scholars whom O’Rourke describes as adhering to a “public domain” view of copyright
rather than a “freedom of contracts” view.  See O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 78-79; see also,
e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998); Elkin-
Koren, supra note 6; Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest. Choir Directors, Copy Machines,
and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996); Kreiss, supra note 6; David Lange,
Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147; Jessica Litman, Revising
Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, Revising Copyright Law];
Litman, supra note 6; Michael J. Madison, "Legal- Ware": Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 1998); Netanel, supra note 36; L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Samuelson, supra note 9, at 134. O'Rourke's more recent work aligns her more
closely with Merges in this respect. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual
World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 695-97 (1998).
50
  Historians of economics have identified two "new" institutionalist schools of thought. See, e.g.,
THRAINN EGGERTSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 5-9 (1990). As defined by Eggertson, "new
institutional" theorists reject the core principles of the neoclassical economic model — "stable preferences, the
rational-choice model, and equilibria" — while "neoinstitutional" theorists retain the neoclassical core. See id. at 5-
6; see supra note 36; see also MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 36, at 101-56 (differentiating between
"institutional" and "neoinstitutional" schools); cf. Netanel, supra note 36, at 312-13 (discussing areas of
commonality between neoclassical and "new institutional" economics, without distinguishing among schools of
institutionalist thought). Merges does not appear to recognize this distinction, but cites theorists from both schools.
However, his analysis of the appropriate legal regime for rights in digital works is predominantly neoclassical in
orientation. See infra text accompanying notes 133-53.
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produce creative works.46  Drawing on the work of Harold Demsetz and Robert Ellickson,
Hardy argues that the system of public entitlements established by current copyright law may
be conceived as a form of common ownership.47 Because the new rights management
technologies make it relatively inexpensive to set and police the boundaries of digital
intellectual property, and because the ongoing public process of copyright lawmaking is so
cumbersome and costly, he asserts that pure private ownership would be a more efficient
method of managing our culture's creative resources.48
Robert Merges's work attempts to bridge the no-man's-land between neoclassically-
grounded cybereconomists like Hardy or Bell, on the one hand, and copyright scholars who
prefer a public law approach (those who, for example, see a role for fair use beyond market
failure) on the other.49 Merges analyzes private ordering in the market for digital works at both
transactional and institutional levels. Borrowing from an offshoot of neoclassical economic
theory called neoinstitutional economics,50 he posits that copyright owners, if left to their own
devices, will develop efficient collective institutions for valuing, managing, and licensing their
51
  See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5.
52
  Id. at 1328.
53
  See id. at 1308-17.
54
  See id. at 1328.
55
  Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126.
56
  Id.
57
  See id. at 134-35; see also O'Rourke, supra note 49, at 696 (approving Merges's suggestion as applied to
Internet hyperlinks, and suggesting that the choice of redistributive exceptions be informed by non-economic
considerations).
58
  See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126-27; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra
note 5, at 83-87 (proposing criteria of disclosure and market-measured "reasonableness" for enforcement of
standard form contract provisions that conflict with copyright).
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intellectual property rights.51 These voluntarily constituted "collective rights organizations"
will develop procedures for pricing the rights they administer and remitting royalties to
members, and will represent a simple, coherent menu of prices and other terms to licensees.”52
Merges argues that government is inherently ill-equipped to undertake these tasks,
because it has no reliable means of valuing intellectual property, because legislated license
terms are comparatively inflexible, and because the legislative process is subject to capture by
interest groups.53 Moreover, he believes that the licenses administered by collective rights
organizations will be "closely akin" to compulsory licenses, in that they will be available to
anyone willing to pay the required price and accept the required terms.54 Thus, he concludes
that legislated compulsory licensing of digital information — in other words, replacement of
copyright owners' current property entitlements with liability rules — is neither desirable nor
necessary. Merges further argues that many, if not most, contractual extensions of copyright
are "relatively benign.”55 It follows that copyright owners ordinarily "should be free to craft
contracts as they see fit.”56
Both Merges and O'Rourke are troubled by the vanishing role of fair use in digital
media, however. Merges's proposed solution, viewed through the prism of Lochner, is an
interesting one: He suggests expressly acknowledging fair use as a redistributive measure, and
legislatively exempting certain classes of users from generally applicable market-driven
rules.57 This suggestion is reminiscent of the Lochner Court's "wards of the state" reasoning; it
reads as though Merges is attempting to reconcile his clear feeling that some exception is
needed with an unspoken intuition that an exception articulated in doctrinal terms may bring
down the entire market-based edifice. Far better, under the circumstances, to single out classes
of users and leave the topic of privileged uses unbroached. Moreover, it appears that both
Merges and O'Rourke would enforce contractual waivers by privileged users in most cases.58
59
  Hardy does not address this question.
60
  See Bell, supra note 5, at 591, 607 & n.222; see infra note 75. Bell appears to reserve judgment on
whether there might be a role for public policy once the market has reached a consensus as to the optimal type(s) of
contract. See id. at 614-17.
61
  See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5,
at 80. Indeed, the characterization of non-negotiable and essentially uniform mass-market license terms restricting
use of intellectual property as "private legislation" originates with Merges. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual
Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1611-13 (1995) (book
review) (citing Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 629 (1943)). However, Merges's current approach to determining when standard form contract terms fall
within this category is highly restrictive. See Merges, supra, at 1612-13; infra text accompanying notes 223-26, 260-
62. For further discussion of the "private legislation" approach to standard form contracts generally, see infra note
79. 
62
   See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126; O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note
5, at 541-55; see also O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 82-84, 88-89 (suggesting that a mass-
market license term that conflicts with copyright could be held invalid if it is not “reasonable” given market
conditions).  In contrast, Bell argues that even if a copyright owner is shown to have market power, its use of digital
CMS will still produce efficiency gains for the public.  See Bell, supra note 5, at 588-89 n.142.
63
  See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 83-87. The current trend is against requiring such
disclosure. See infra text accompanying note 87 (discussing the approach to disclosure of contract terms taken by
proposed UCC Article 2B).
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O'Rourke, Bell, and Merges differ as to whether and when public policy might be
permitted to override private contractual orderifig of rights in digital works.59 For Bell, the
answer appears to be that courts and legislators should intervene in the market only in cases
that meet the stringent common law standard of unconscionability.60 O'Rourke and Merges
stake out a position that is slightly more complicated. Both believe that, in the context of the
consumer mass market, unconscionability may inhere in particular contract terms that are so
pervasive as to amount to private legislation.61 However, they would find this condition
satisfied, and allow courts to invalidate such terms, only if the copyright owner or group of
copyright owners has antitrust market power.62 In addition, O'Rourke offers qualified support
for a rule requiring conspicuous disclosure of contract terms that diverge from copyright.63
In sum, the world envisioned by copyright owners and by the new breed of
"cybereconomists" looks a great deal like the one implicit in the pronouncements of the pre-
New Deal Supreme Court. Private ordering is paramount, and restrictions imposed by the pub-
lic law — whether based on concerns of health and safety or those of access and fair use —
are few and narrowly cabined to avoid concerns about impermissible wealth redistribution and
distortion of "natural" market outcomes. The difference is that the philosopher's "is" has
become the engineer's "ought" backed up with the prescriptive force of rationality. Judicially
decreed immutable principles of social ordering have given way to assertedly objective ap-
plication of economic laws to plot the optimal trajectory for legal change. Of critical
64
  Cf. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 31-34 (1996) (suggesting that conceptualism
about "property" leads both logically and rhetorically toward acceptance of universal commodification); Pierre
Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 WIS. L. REV.
919, 933-45 (arguing that the "law and economics" movement has adapted Coase's vocabulary and analytical tools
to serve its own normative and political ends).
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importance, then, is whether the proffered models for managing rights in digital works are as
comparatively efficient as they purport to be. I turn now to that question.
II. THE NEW CONCEPTUALISM
The cybereconomists present their private-law models for digital property rights as the
logical products of neutral, incontestable axioms. Upon closer inspection, however, the
economic arguments they assert are neither especially neutral nor particularly compelling.
Rather, they embody a socially determined "natural law" of the market that takes the private-
law institutions of property and contract as exogenous. Although the conceptualism of the
Lochner era no longer dominates legal thought, the mode of economic analysis practiced by
the cybereconomists, and implicit in the arguments offered by copyright owners to support
strengthening their proprietary rights, rests upon a conceptualism of a different sort. "Con-
tract," "market," and "property" — the efficient building blocks of the new social order —
have talismanic significance, with the result that private-law forms of regulation are advocated
absent any proof that they would produce the best regime, or even a good one, for
disseminating information and promoting ongoing creative progress.64
This Part examines the economic arguments for a private-law approach to digital
intellectual property, and finds them unconvincing. Section ILA scrutinizes the
cybereconomists' claims about the presumptive efficiency of contract as a vehicle for
allocating rights in digital works. It concludes that the existing consumer mass market fails to
satisfy the cybereconomists' own criteria for efficiency, and that they have not provided us
with any meaningful way of comparing the existing, demonstrably imperfect market with the
concededly imperfect legislative process. Section II.B examines their arguments about the
importance of private-law property rights and rules, and concludes that they fail to prove that
strong property rights will maximize digital works' value to society. To the contrary,
evaluation of the cybereconomists' arguments about value maximization in the context of
creative and informational works suggests that a limited-entitlements regime is likely to be
more effective.
A. Constructing Consent
The cybereconomists' belief in the superiority of contract for allocating usage rights in
digital works rests on two points. First, they argue that granting more control to the purveyors
of digital works will make creative and informational works more accessible in the long run
(which, it is assumed, will result in more progress) as the natural result of competition in the
65
  See Bell, supra note 5, at 587-90, 601-08; Hardy, supra note 5, at 236-60; Merges, Contracting into
Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1328; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 81-87; see also Merges,
The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 120-28; see generally Lemley, supra note 6, at 1044-47 (delineating Chicago
school argument that the market will promote creative progress by allocating improvement rights to those who value
them most highly); Netanel, supra note 36, at 321-24 (describing neoclassically-oriented theorists' commitment to
"legal marginalism").
66
  See Bell, supra note 5, at 607-08; Hardy, supra note 5, at 254-58; Merges, Contracting Into Liability
Rules, supra note 5, at 1308-17.
67
  This is an extremely charitable assumption. As discussed further in section II.B, infra, there is no
particular reason to believe that creative ability will always correlate with ability to pay market price for
improvement rights, or that owners will be equally willing to license all types of improvements. See also Lemley,
supra note 6, at 1048-61; Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?, supra note 28 (acknowledging that market
approach may not work well for parodies).
68
  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 186-93.
69
  See id.; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (1972); Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 108; see also supra
note 25 (defining "market failure"). Other requirements include rational, utility-maximizing parties, zero transaction
costs, perfect information, and a sufficiently large number of buyers and sellers that no party has market power. See
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 186-93; see also supra note 36.
70
  See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 99; NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 51, 58-59; see also O'Rourke,
Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 487-95 (discussing typical software license terms); David A. Rice, Public
Goods, Private Contract Prohibitions and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Provisions
Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 552-67 (1992) [hereinafter Rice, Public Goods] (same).  
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consumer market.65 Second, they assert that the legislative process is comparatively unsuited
to accomplish these ends because it is coercive and controlled by special interests.66 Neither of
these points survives more thorough scrutiny. Even assuming that a market based on
voluntary, informed bargaining over rights in digital works would work as the cyber-
economists say it would,67 the conditions for such bargaining do not exist in the market we
have. As a result, it is impossible to say with certainty that the market would be better at
promoting access and progress than the existing system of public ordering via the legislative
process.
Two fundamental requirements of the neoclassical model of social ordering through
private exchange are knowledge of contract terms and meaningful (i.e., voluntary and fully
informed) assent.68 Both are necessary (though not sufficient) requirements for an "un-
regulated" market to reach the efficient equilibrium point; the absence of either or both may
signal a market failure justifying some form of adjustment.69 Under the proposed digital CMS
regime, however, consumer transactions relating to digital works will bear little resemblance
to the paradigmatic bargained-for exchange. Instead, much like the typical software purchase
today, they will be governed by standard form "licenses" that include provisions regarding
permissible and impermissible uses.70 Digital CMS enable the use of such "click-through"
The application of "license" terminology to digital works is contested. In the nondigital world, the
purchaser of a book does not assume ongoing contractual obligations; quite the opposite. Under copyright law, the
initial sale of a copy embodying the copyrighted work exhausts the owner's rights to control the use or disposition of
that copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349-51 (1907). To avoid the
first sale doctrine, software developers have attempted to characterize the initial transaction as a license of usage
rights rather than a sale. See, e.g., O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 487-95; Rice, Public Goods,
supra, at 552-67; David A. Rice, Digital Information as Property and Product. U. C C Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 621, 624-26, 632-34 (1997) [hereinafter Rice, Digital Information]. Taking their cue from software
developers, major copyright owners' associations and developers of digital CMS have adopted licensing terminology
as the frame of reference for transactions in digital works. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 99; Gervais, From
Rights Trading to Electronic Publishing, supra note 24; see also Madison, supra note 49 (manuscript at 36-60)
(describing the increasing prevalence of “shrinkwrap” licensing practices, both among software developers and
among publishers of more traditional works). Most courts, however, have preferred to apply a functional test that
asks whether the transaction looks like a one-time sale of a copy, despite assertions that one party intended it to
create an ongoing relationship. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Techs., 939 F.2d 91, 98-100 (3d Cir.
1991); Arizona Retail Sys. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 762-66 (D. Ariz. 1993); Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1244 n.23 (1995) (collecting cases). But
see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (holding shrinkwrap license terms
that restricted ongoing use of product enforceable); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Easterbrook, J.) (same). The forthcoming Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code rejects the majority
viewpoint and adopts Judge Easterbrook's, treating most shrinkwrap license terms as enforceable restrictions that
render the consumer's use subject to the copyright owner's ongoing control. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual
Meeting Draft July 1998), supra note 24, at Preface, Pt. 2: Basic Themes; Rice, Digital Information, supra, at 629-
31, 634-36.
71
  See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
72
  See Michael M. Greenfield, The Role of Assent in Article 2 and Article 9, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 289, 290-
93, 302-04 (1997); John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1447, 1453-56 (1994).
73
  See U.C.C. § 2-204, 2-207, 2-305 to -310, 2-314, 2-316 (1989).
74
  See U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3)(a).
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contracts to require acceptance of usage restrictions for any type of work that is made available
online.71 A critical question is whether this sort of transaction, in aggregate, can or will
produce the near-perfect, self-equilibrating market that, for the neoclassically-grounded
economist, constitutes the pinnacle of social ordering. Merges does not address this question;
O'Rourke, Bell, and Hardy use specious logic to evade it.
One does not need to be a neoclassical economist to understand that requiring
individual negotiation of every term in a consumer contract would be prohibitively expensive.
This is precisely the sort of problem that the Uniform Commercial Code was created to ad-
dress.72 It does so by recognizing two categories of terms — roughly, more and less important
ones — and by setting higher standards for disclosure of more important, or "material,"
terms.73 Both types of terms are, however, presumptively enforceable if the applicable
disclosure standards were met.74 The UCC does authorize refusal to enforce terms that are
75
  See U.C.C. § 2-302 & cmt. 1 ("The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise,
and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." (citation ornitted)); see, e.g.,
Siemens Credit Corp. v. Newlands, 905 F. Supp. 757, 765 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Even if a contract term fails the test
of procedural unconscionability, an 'unbargained for' term will only be denied enforcement if it is also substantively
unreasonable."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (characterizing unconscionable
contract terms to be such "as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other") (quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889)).
76
  See, e.g., NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (N.D. Okla. 1997);
Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Bedford Computer Corp.,
62 B.R. 555, 566-67 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129 (1985). Many other
courts have simply applied Article 2 to computer software cases. See sources cited supra note 70.
For the most recent draft of Article 2B, see <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>.
77
  The current draft of Article 2B is much less consumer-friendly than Article 2. See infra text
accompanying note 87; see also Cohen, supra note 49, at 1096-1118; Memorandum from Profs. Jean Braucher and
Peter Linzer to Members, American Law Institute (May 5, 1998) (available at
<http://www.ali.org/ali/braucher.htm>) [hereinafter Braucher/Linzer Memorandum]. It is not entirely clear whether
the current draft of Article 2B is the version that will be adopted. Originally, the draft was scheduled for a final vote
by the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) at the NCCUSL's July 1998 annual
meeting. However, the American Law Institute (ALI), which has the power of final approval, expressed serious
reservations, as did many other commentators. See, e.g., Letter from Prof. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director, ALI Ad
Hoc Committee on Article 2B, to Gene N. Lebrun, President, NCCUSL, and Charles Alan Wright, President, ALI
(Mar. 26, 1998) (available at <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/ghmar98.html>); Braucher/Linzer Memorandum,
supra; David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract Into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999); Pamela
Samuelson, Does Information Really Have to Be Licensed?, 41 COMM. ACM 15 (Sept. 1998)
<http://sims.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/acm_2B.html>. In response to the criticism, the NCCUSL took the unusual
step of agreeing to consider additional comments and proposals submitted within three months after the annual
meeting. The drafting committee will meet again in November 1998 to consider whether additional revisions are
warranted, and final votes by the NCCUSL and the ALI have been postponed until mid-1999. See American Law
Institute, Schedule of Adoption and Drafting Committee Meetings (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.2bguide.com/schedule.html>. In addition, because much of the impetus for the current version of
Article 2B has come from the computer software industry, some representatives of other copyright industries have
suggested that the scope of Article 2B be narrowed to cover only computer software and electronic information
products. See Letter from Simon Barsky, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, Motion Picture Association, to
Carlyle Ring, Jr., Chair, Article 2B Drafting Committee (Apr. 29, 1998) (available at
<http://www.SoftwareIndustry.org/issues/guide/docs/conn0429.html>). As of this writing, the NCCUSL's response
to this suggestion is unknown.
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unconscionable, but the threshold for unconscionability is high.75 Although some courts and
commentators have expressed doubt as to whether Article 2 of the current UCC applies to
computer software sales, a new Article 2B is being drafted to cover transactions in intellectual
property and76 other intangibles. Thus, it seems likely that consumer transactions in digital
works eventually will be governed by uniform provisions roughly analogous to those
governing sales of goods.77 For purposes of this discussion, the important thing to understand
about the UCC is that it represents a regulatory solution to a perceived market failure, adopted
in recognition that high transaction costs foreclosed the kind of particularized assent that both
78
  See Greenfield, supra note 72, at 291-92, 302-14.
79
  Indeed, this is true of any socially-enforced regime of contract law. See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus
Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990). It is particularly
true of mass-market, standard form contracts, however. Scholars within the fields of both law and economics have
characterized the standard form contracts that the UCC enables as "private legislation" — de facto legislation
produced by private firms pursuant to a delegation of authority from the state, via the legal rules governing the
formation and enforceability of such contracts. See Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-
Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 468 n.15, 484-91 (1974); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-Making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 538-42 (1971); see also Samuels,
Further Limits, supra note 36, at 397, 438-39. Goldberg observes that such contracts also can be characterized —
perhaps more palatably for those of a neoclassical bent — as the result of investments in the political/legislative
arena by firms, "for the purpose of keeping certain activities (that is, those covered by standard form contracts) in
the private market arena." Goldberg, supra, at 484 n.49; see also infra text accompanying notes 253-70 (considering
the interplay between private interests and legal institutions in determining the rules that govern mass-market
contracts). Merges recognizes the private legislation dynamic, but contends that contract terms do not attain this
status unless their purveyor has market power. See Merges, supra note 61, at 1612-13; Merges, The End of
Friction?, supra note 5, at 126; supra note 61. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 253-59, however, the
private legislation dynamic does not require market power.
80
  See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
81
  See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5747-48; Lemley, supra note 70, at 1282; Rice, Public Goods, supra note 70, at 602-04.
82
  See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130-32, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745-48; Dennis S. Karjala,
Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 511, 524, 527-28, 537-39 (1997);
Lemley, supra note 70, at 1282-83; Rice, Public Goods, supra note 70, at 603, 607. For this reason, a work need not
actually be copyrightable to fall within the subject matter of copyright for purposes of § 301, as long as it is a type
of work to which copyright might apply. If the Copyright Act withholds protection from such works, then states
may not grant them copyright-like protection. See, e.g., National Basketball Assn. v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841
(2d Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).  
The question whether the Copyright Act preempts certain provisions in licenses for digital works is really
two questions. The first question, discussed in the text, is whether state contract law can be considered to establish a
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the law and neoclassical precepts required for a contract term to be enforceable.78 The
resulting market may or may not function efficiently as compared with other possible regimes,
but it does not function according to the pure neoclassical model, and its constituent transac-
tions cannot plausibly be described as fundamentally private.79
How does copyright law interact with this state-based regulatory regime? Section 301
of the Copyright Act preempts state law rights that are "equivalent" to any of the exclusive
rights afforded by copyright.80 Although Congress's exact intent regarding section 301's effect
on contract rights is uncertain, it seems clear that Congress did not intend the Copyright Act to
displace state contract law generally.81 It seems equally certain, however, that Congress did not
intend to allow the states to establish alternative, universally applicable regimes of property-
like protection for works falling within the subject matter of copyright.82 Moreover, even if
regime of "equivalent" rights for purposes of § 301. The second question — whether the Copyright Act preempts
state laws other than those covered by § 301 — is more complicated. Compare Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280, 288 (1995) ("The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies' . . . that
Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any
possibility of implied pre-emption.") with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) ("When
Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly
addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to
state authority there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt statelaws from the substantive provisions' of
the legislation.") (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)). One court has given the
Copyright Act broader preemptive scope, but without discussing whether § 301 precludes that result (and, indeed,
without discussing § 301 at all). See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding
preemption of a standard form contract provision prohibiting reverse engineering).  Myrick's rebuttable presumption
is easily defeated here. Since it is clear that when Congress enacted § 301, it did not consider the wholesale
displacement of copyright via self-enforcing, standard form digital contract terms, § 301 should not operate to bar
implied preemption of such contracts. See Cohen, supra note 49, at 1129. Ultimately, however, the implied
preemption inquiry does not matter much, because the intellectual property clause of the Constitution may require
preemption even if the Copyright Act does not. See infra note 83.
83
  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991) (holding that denial of copyright protection for facts is constitutionally compelled because facts must remain
in the public domain); Cohen, supra note 49, at 1130-33; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 155 n.22 (1992); David L. Lange, The Intellectual
Property Clause in Trademark Law: An Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We
Ought To Care, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 225-44 (1996); David L. Lange, Copyright and the Constitution in
the Age of Intellectual Property, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 119 (1993); Karjala, supra note 82, at 533-34, 539-41; L. Ray
Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair
Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385, 394-96 (1992); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The
Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259 (1995); Marci A. Hamilton, The Dormant Copyright
Clause (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); cf. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at
73 n.108 (expressing agnosticism on the question "what the constitutional inquiry would add to § 301"); O'Rourke,
supra note 49, at 696-97 (suggesting that constitutional considerations require preemption of standard form
"license" terms barring World Wide Web linking).
84
  See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 76-77; O'Rourke,
Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 519-23; see also National Basketball Assn., 105 F.3d at 848-53 (applying
the "extra element" test to a state law misappropriation claim and discussing collected authorities on the scope of
§ 301 preemption). But see Rice, Public Goods, supra note 70, at 615 ("The measure of equivalence is not literal.
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Congress did so intend, the intellectual property clause of the Constitution arguably would
exert independent preemptive force.83
Relying on this distinction between particular contracts and universally-applicable
proprietary regimes, courts and commentators attempting to decide whether copyright law
preempts inconsistent contract terms have characterized legitimate contract restrictions as
involving an "extra element" of breach of promise or a "special relationship" between
copyright owner and consumer that is distinct from the copyright owner's rights against the
world.84  Recently, the Seventh Circuit interpreted this test in a way that indicates its support
Claim elements additional to those of copyright infringement do not prevent preemption unless . . . the extra
elements make the state claim qualitatively different.").
In addition, the Fourth Circuit has held that an attempted contractual extension of the term of copyright
constitutes misuse and renders the copyright (as opposed to the contract term) unenforceable. See Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); see also DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc.,
81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that on remand, infringement defendant might show that plaintiffs
contract term effectively prohibiting reverse engineering of unpatented microprocessor cards amounted to copyright
misuse). The Lasercomb court did not discuss preemption, and the connection between preemption and misuse
remains largely unexplored in the legal literature. David Rice notes the overlap and suggests that under Lasercomb,
a finding of preemption under § 301 might lead to complete unenforceability of the copyright. Rice, Public Goods,
supra note 70, at 550-51; see also Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 124-25 (noting potential nexus
between the misuse and preemption doctrines). Mark Lemley argues that the copyright misuse doctrine will be
increasingly useful as a complement to preemption law, because it allows courts to invalidate restrictive contract
terms in particular cases without having to hold the restrictions preempted in all cases. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Federal Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan.
1999).
85
  See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447 (1996).
86
  See supra text accompanying notes 24-32; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis
Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 167 (1997) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Protection of Databases]; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Walls?: Speculations on Literary
Property in the Library of the Future, 42 REPRESENTATIONS 53, 62-63 (1993) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright
Without Walls?] (“[I]f copying could be electronically tracked or prevented, no 'third parties' to the contract would
exist."); see also Cohen, supra note 9, at 181-83 (arguing that a copyright owner cannot unilaterally create a
"special relationship" with the entire world); Karjala, supra note 82, at 529-31 (arguing that mass-market standard
form contracts do not contain the "extra element" of bargaining).
Under proposed Article 2B of the UCC, this distinction vanishes entirely, because license restrictions would
bind third parties. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998), supra note 24, § 2B-507; cf.
id. at Preface, p. 9 (explaining drafters' decision not to carry over Article 2's provision for the unenforceability of
property rights against a bona fide purchaser for value, see U.C.C. § 2-403 (1995), on the ground that such a
provision would be inconsistent with licensors' federal intellectual property rights). As Jane Ginsburg notes, this
approach effectively converts a contract right into a property right. See Ginsburg, Protection of Databases, supra, at
167. She notes, however, that contract and copyright remedies may differ, and argues that because contractual
protection supplies incentive to invest in the creation of noncopyrightable information, mass-market contract terms
inconsistent with copyright limitations should not be preempted without further policy analysis. See id. at 167-68. In
contrast, Merges argues that extending standard form contract terms to third parties is inappropriate, but that
property rules should fill the resulting gap in protection. See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 120-21
(arguing that the concept of privity, while "stretch[ed]" in the mass-market context, should retain some meaning).
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for a regime based primarily on market ordering. It held that a mass-market shrinkwrap license
met the requirements of voluntary assent and non-universality because the defendant consumer
remained free to return the product and seek better terms elsewhere, and because the license
would not bind an individual who found a copy of the work lying in the street.85 As justifica-
tion for market ordering, however, the court's reasoning is unconvincing. Works protected by
digital CMS cannot be copied or otherwise accessed by unauthorized third parties, so it is
irrelevant that the licenses would not bind them if they did gain access.86And the opportunity
to engage in comparison shopping, so important to the court in theory, does not seem
87
  See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998), supra note 24, §§ 2B-111, -112(b)-
(c) & cmts. 2, 5; Braucher/Linzer Memorandum, supra note 77; Cem Kaner, Restricting Competition in the
Software Industry: Impact of the Pending Revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code 5 (last modified Nov. 11,
1997) <http://www.badsoftware.com/nader.htm>; cf. DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 40 (documenting finding that
many online vendors of music compact discs withhold price information from comparison shoppers); Burk, supra
note 40, at 19 (discussing implications of the DeLong and Froomkin study for arguments that digital commerce will
be near-costless). Instead, the proposed draft would afford consumers who enter into mass-market licenses a limited
rescission right after purchase but before use. See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998),
supra note 24, § 2B-112(b)-(c) & cmts. 2, 5.
88
  
Why will not competition among producers protect the contract term taker as
well? ... [T]he cost of acquiring and processing information on contract terms is
much greater than for price; unless the firm intentionally makes the particular
term an important selling point - as is sometimes the case with the length or
inclusiveness of the warranty -few, if any, customers will perceive the existence
of variations in terms. Any movement toward contractual equilibrium due to the
aggressive bargain-seeking of a few customers will be slow indeed ....
Goldberg, supra note 79, at 485; see also Slawson, supra note 79, at 530-31, 540-41. The neoclassical
economist might respond that this simply proves that most consumers do not care enough about the terms in
question to bother with additional research, but this assumes the very point in dispute. The question of consumer
perceptions is further complicated by the fact that producers may not routinely enforce particular terms that
consumers might find oppressive. See Goldberg, supra note 79, at 485 n.53. Digital rights management technologies
change this aspect of the equation, but it is not clear whether we may expect to see different consumer behavior as a
result. As Goldberg observes, efforts to model the standard form contract have been hampered considerably by the
fact that the neoclassical market model simply ignores it, or assumes that the requirements for a voluntary, fully-
informed contract are in fact met. See id. at 483-84; see also Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at 438-39. For
an effort to model producer-consumer dynamics in mass markets for creative and informational works more
accurately, and to incorporate into the model institutional considerations relating to standard form contracts, see
infra section III.A.l.
89
  See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 77.
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particularly attractive if one must purchase each product to learn the terms governing its use.
Proposed UCC Article 2B would validate for all digital publishers the current practice of
software publishers not to disclose their terms prior to purchase, creating obvious practical
difficulties for even the most determined comparison shoppers.87 Moreover, there is a sub-
stantial difference between shopping for price — something that many consumers of mass-
marketed products do, and do well — and shopping for terms, which is much more difficult .88
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, O'Rourke recognizes that there is a real question whether
the circumstances surrounding a standard form, mass-market contract justify the inference of
the "extra element" that is needed to escape preemption.89 Her answer to this question,
however, is market-conceptualism as high art. She argues, first, that an inference of
voluntariness is justified if the market is functioning efficiently, forgetting that the UCC was
adopted to allow the market to function in the absence of such particularized knowledge and
90
   See id. at 83-87 (arguing that a market may be "efficient" even if most parties are uninformed); see also
Bell, supra note 5, at 601-08.
91
  See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 83-89 (arguing that efficient — i.e., competitive
— markets protect even uninformed parties by equilibrating around reasonable terms); O'Rourke, Drawing the
Boundary, supra note 5, at 541-55; 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994). Bell and Merges make similar arguments. See Bell,
supra note 5, at 588-89 n.142; Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126. As Goldberg observes, this sort
of reasoning obscures fundamental questions about consumer knowledge and desires. See Goldberg, supra note 79,
at 485; supra note 88.
The whole point of copyright is to give owners at least some market power. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra
note 6, at 98-100 (discussing the "deadweight loss" aspect of copyright protection); Fisher, supra note 26, at 1700-
04 (same); Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 33944. Exactly how much power is an empirical question, the answer
to which probably will vary for different types of works. See infra text accompanying notes 218-26. Nonetheless,
§ 301's reference to "works" matters. Recognizing the inconsistency with § 301, O'Rourke argues that § 301 is
"mechanical" and that authority to conduct a market analysis should be inferred to avoid preemption of "many"
standard form license terms that conflict with copyright. See O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 87-
88.
92
  Unless, of course, one is prepared to apply an external normative standard of "reasonableness" — which
the neoclassical market model claims not to do. See supra note 36.
93
  See Rice, Public Goods, supra note 70, at 564-65 (observing that the UCC was developed "to allocate
product failure and performance risks" between the parties, not to determine rights in the subject matter of the
contract). For this reason (as O'Rourke recognizes), the objection that consumers do not expect to bargain over price
misses the point. While one might cheerfully accept the need to pay a standardized price for Coca-Cola, no court
would enforce a shrinkwrap contract that imposed an obligation not to reverse engineer it. See O'Rourke, Copyright
Preemption, supra note 5, at 80-81.
94
  This question is considered further infra in section III.A.
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assent.90 As to universality, she suggests that a standard form contract restriction is not
universal, or quasi-legislative, unless it is "unreasonable" to think that the parties would have
bargained to it — even though section 301 speaks of rights in works, not power in markets,
and even though it is incoherent to speak of reasonable bargains without voluntariness.91 Use
of the neoclassical conception of contract to bootstrap voluntariness and "reasonableness" in
this setting strains logic to the breaking point.92 For O'Rourke, it seems, "contract" means fully
informed and voluntary as to nearly every term even when the law stipulates that it need not
mean either of those things in fact to be enforceable. As a result, she overlooks the possibility
that what is good enough to establish enforceability under the UCC and the antitrust laws,
which are broadly concerned with maintaining functioning markets, may not be good enough
to avoid pre6mption by copyright law, which has other, more substantive concerns.93  The real
question is whether a regime that makes it easier for publishers unilaterally to impose usage
restrictions that conflict with copyright is better suited than copyright to optimize access and
progress.94 O'Rourke does not say; like the Lochner Court a century ago, she is too busy
explaining that unilaterally imposed contract terms do not really exist.
95
  See Bell, supra note 5, at 607-08 (“Insofar as th[e fair use] doctrine represents a ‘bargain’ between
copyright owners and the public — a popular fiction — it epitomizes the kind of take-it-or-leave-it offer that foes of
adhesion contracts so dislike.”  (footnote omitted)); Hardy, supra note 44, ¶¶38-39 (characterizing the Copyright
Act as “specifying what are essentially the actual quite specific terms of large classes of ‘bargains’ over the use of
intellectual property”); see also O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 78-79, 83-84 (arguing that an
“immutable rules” approach to copyright is undesirable because “the impersonal workings of the market” protect
even uninformed parties.).
96
  See Bell, supra note 5, at 608.  
97
  See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1991). 
98
  See, e.g., THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, eds. 1962); THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley, et al. eds. 1988).  But see Farber & Frickey, supra note 97, at 24-
33, 49-60 (summarizing empirical work that undercuts the strong public-choice hypothesis); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legislation, Well-Being and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 88-89 (1990) (same); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN
SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994)
(arguing that the theory has not been empirically validated and that most studies purporting to do so are
methodologically unsound); cf. THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF POLITICS
RECONSIDERED (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 1995) (collecting responses to Green and Shapiro). 
99
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 254-58; Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1306-17.
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Relying on this curiously circular presumption of voluntariness in the mass market for
digital works, Hardy and Bell contrive to turn the tables on copyright completely. They argue
that it is copyright law that constitutes the onerous standard form contract and market ordering
that constitutes the flexible, policy-sensitive instrument.95 This feat of lexical legerdemain
allows them to disavow rigid boilerplate regimes that are unresponsive to individual or
consumer desires while simultaneously endorsing private standard form contract regimes as
the product of “empower[ed] mutually consenting parties.”96 The “market” is the realm of
consent, while the legislative process is the realm of interest-group oppression.  This approach
has conceptual roots in both public choice theory and institutional economics.  Ultimately,
however, neither branch of economic theory justifies the conclusion the cybereconomists
reach.  Their insistence that the market is the better forum for achieving copyright’s goals rests
on no firmer basis than the Lochner Court’s instinctive distrust of attempts to alter the existing
balance of bargaining power.
The central thesis of public choice theory is that government actions are rarely, if ever,
designed solely to serve a monolithic public interest.  Rather, the various outputs of the
political process, including legislation, regulation, and enforcement, are shaped by the rent-
seeking efforts of powerful and well-organized constituencies.97 In its strongest form, public
choice theory characterizes the legislative and political processes as entirely, or almost
entirely, defined by interest-group concerns and compromises.98  This perception underlies
Hardy’s description of copyright legislation and Merges’ depiction of the rate-setting process
under the legislated compulsory license for sound recording rights.99 Nor is it entirely
100
  See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989)
[hereinafter Litman, Copyright Legislation]; Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 29 (1994) [hereinafter Litman, The Exclusive Right]; Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 49, at
19 (1996).
101
   See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 8-9 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); EGGERTSON, supra note 50, at 275-77; see
generally Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 98-106 (summarizing literature).
102
   See, e.g., RANDALL BARTLETT, ECONOMICS AND POWER: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN RELATIONS AND
MARKETS 203-06 (1989); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960); EGGERTSON,
supra note 50; Goldberg, supra note 79, at 473-74; Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice Theory, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1229-30 (1994). Demsetz also makes this argument. See Harold Demsetz,
Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969) (characterizing the comparison of
imperfect institutions against ideal alternatives as the "nirvana approach"). Gillian Hadfield notes, however, that
Demsetz did not practice what he preached, and failed to "weigh the costs of the [private property] system against
its benefits." Hadfield, supra note 26, at 43. Instead, he presumed "the operation of a perfectly competitive market."
Id. at 43-44.
It is worth noting that the litigation process that polices the market is itself also vulnerable to a public-
choice critique. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review? , 101
YALE L.J. 31, 68-71, 80-87 (1991) (arguing that public choice analysis can be extended to the judiciary); Marc
Galanter, When the Haves Come Out Ahead, 9 L. & SOCY. REV. 95, 98-104 (1974) (arguing that litigants who are
repeat players and have the resources to do so will seek to shape the rules and the law in ways that favor their
interests).
103
  Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 99 (“Much of the public choice literature is filled with anecdotal
evidence of great legislative failures, such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.  But such failures are no different, and
probably no more frequent, than the economic market’s Edsels . . . .”); id. at 100 (“[P]olitical failure (substantial
divergence between private gain and social gain) has never been shown to be more widespread in political markets
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inaccurate; as Jessica Litman has documented, over the past several decades the path of
copyright legislation has been defined largely by the major copyright industries.100
As the new institutional economics would counsel, the cybereconomists compare the
legislative process with the market and market-generated collective licensing institutions, and
find the market superior. Both legislative and market actions reflect the pursuit of self-interest,
but the self-interest manifested in the market is (so the reasoning appears to go) uncomplicated
by distorting interest group effects, undiminished by administrative costs, and subject to the
market's wealth-maximizing power of correction.101 But that is disingenuous, and far too
simple. First, the comparison is misdirected. The legislative process may (indeed must) be
imperfect, but it does not follow that the market is always preferable. An equally important
lesson of institutional economics is that all real-world institutions, including market-based
ones, are imperfect, and that it is real-world institutions that must be compared.102 As
discussed above, the market we have is not the pure neoclassical market the cybereconomists
posit. Without closer attention to the imperfections present in the existing consumer mass
market, even a strong public-choice hypothesis does not demonstrate that the market is the
preferred forum for determining copyright policy.103
than market failure (substantial divergence between private gain and social gain) in economic markets.”); Mark
Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 232-34 (1988) (arguing that claimed inefficiencies generated by legislation
must be compared “with the inefficiencies generated by an inegalitarian nonredistributive regime”); Stearns, supra
note 102, at 1240-45 (demonstrating that in some circumstances, legislatures can efficiently correct for inefficient
Arrovian “cycling” in markets).
104
  See, e.g., BARTLETT, supra note 102, at 141-66, 195; BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 70; ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 14-15 (1990); C. Edwin
Baker, Posner's Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis of Law, 12 GA. L. REV. 475, 486 (1978);
Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1214 (1991); Victor
P. Goldberg, On Positive Theories of Redistribution, 11 J. ECON. ISSUES 119,121-22 (1977); Kelman, supra note
103, at 231-34; Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, supra note 36; Samuels, Further
Limits, supra note 36, at 397, 406-07, 421-22; Cento G. Ve1janovski, Wealth Maximization, Law and Ethics — On
the Limits of Economic Efficiency, 1 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 5, 6 (1981); see also Samuels, Welfare Economics,
supra note 36, at 9, 45-48 ("[N]ot only does the Pareto-analysis assume the existing income and wealth distribution,
working rules, power structure and so on, but it tends to assume their propriety."); cf. Steams, supra note 102, at
1240-45 (arguing that legislatures may be the most efficient fora to determine ex ante "how a market should best
operate to facilitate private transactions").
As Lloyd Weinreb reminds us, "copyright is itself an intervention in the market, rather than, as it so often is
made to appear, the 'natural' way of doing things." Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1150, 1240 (1998).
105
  See supra text accompanying note 47; cf. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom,
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1996) (describing the origins of and
justifications for common law doctrines that rest collective property rights in the "unorganized" public).
106
  See BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 118-21, 134-43, 165-81 (modeling the effects of alternative
entitlement structures and demonstrating that the efficient equilibrium point depends on the starting point). The
original insight is, of course, Coase's. See Coase, supra note 102.
29
Second, and more important, the comparison is incomplete. Market ordering and
government oversight are complementary, not mutually exclusive, choices. Market ordering
presupposes some ex ante distribution of entitlements.104 The cybereconomists take existing
entitlements as given, and do not inquire as to the welfare effects of alternative entitlement
structures. For example, we might consider formalizing the public's fair use entitlements — an
approach that, ironically, is suggested by Hardy's "divided ownership" model.105 This is a
choice that would matter; it may well be that in the perfect, costless world, the market for
digital works would reach the same equilibrium point regardless of initial entitlements, but we
do not live in such a world, and the equilibrium that is reached will depend on where we start
out.106 A regime in which the public has property-like entitlements in certain uses of creative
and informational works might be preferable, distributively speaking, to a regime in which
107
  See Baker, supra note 36, at 6-7, 28-31 (arguing that the socially optimal regime must be determined in
part by distributive considerations).
108
  This question is considered in more detail infra at text accompanying notes 125-53, text accompanying
notes 310-42, and text accompanying notes 358-74.
109
  See RADIN, supra note 64, at 102-22.
110
  See supra text accompanying notes 28-29; cf. RADIN, supra note 64, at 95-104 (describing and
rejecting the argument that the market paradigm necessarily exerts a "domino effect" on social policy).
111
  Two important recent decisions privileging the "market failure" view of fair use are Princeton
University Press, Inc. v. Michigan Document Service, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (reversing panel
decision that photocopying excerpts from copyrighted works for student coursepacks was a fair use, because
mechanism existed for licensing photocopying rights), and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d
913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that corporate employee's photocopying of journal articles for research purposes was
not a fair use where mechanism existed for licensing photocopying rights). An "incomplete commodification"
regime would recognize good reasons to decide both of these cases differently. Cf. Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining
the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 32-
48 (1997) (arguing that the vision of fair use advanced in Princeton University Press and American Geophysical is
inappropriately narrow). Another case that might be resolved differently is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569 (1994). There, the Supreme Court recognized that defendants’ rap parody of the song Oh, Pretty
Woman was the sort of "transformative" use of preexisting material that promotes the purposes of copyright, but
nonetheless suggested that infringement liability might attach if, on remand, the evidence suggested significant
demand for a non-parody, rap version of the song. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593-94. Under an incomplete
commodification regime, the transformative nature of parody and the high social value attached to critical
commentary would support an order of summary judgment for defendants.
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they do not.107 It also might promote the goals of access and progress more effectively than the
private-law model that the cybereconomists prefer.108
Alternatively, Margaret Jane Radin envisions a regime of "incomplete
commodification," which would acknowledge both market and nonmarket understandings of
entitlements and exchanges and expressly privilege nonmarket understandings in some
circumstances.109 In the particular case of copyrighted works, that regime might look very
much like the one we have now, but it would operate quite differently in practice. For
example, fair use cases would still be contested, but not the dual nature of the fair use doctrine
itself. Rather, parties to copyright disputes would understand and accept that the doctrine does
more than simply correct for market failure due to high transaction costs.110  In particular, the
mere fact that new technologies had enabled new markets to form would not preclude a
finding of fair use if nonmarket considerations of sufficient importance — such as educational
access or first amendment rights of criticism and comment — supported it.111
Either formalized public entitlements or incomplete commodification must come, of
course, via the legislative process, with all the potential for lobbying and logrolling that
112
  See, e.g., Merges, Contracting 1nto Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1308 n.29. "Incomplete
commodification" also might be decreed judicially. However, in the wake of the American Geophysical and
Princeton University Press decisions, this result seems increasingly unlikely.
113
  See Elhauge, supra note 102, at 49-59 (arguing that one cannot determine whether interest-group
influence is (to paraphrase Goldilocks) too big, too small, or just right without reference to some external normative
standard); Goldberg, supra note 104, at 122 (arguing that identifying certain entitlements as initial and others as
products of legislative redistribution "would be meaningful only if there were some set of 'fundamental natural
rights' that together determined the natural distribution of wealth"); cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 106-07 (noting
that in contrast to the original public choice theorists, whose work focused on description and explanation, those
associated with "Chicago School" law and economics have given the theory a normative slant, seeking to minimize
legislated wealth transfers). The implicit criterion that the legislative result not differ from the (presumptively
efficient) result the market would have produced is self-evidently untenable, for the reasons just discussed. See
supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
114
  See Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 100, at 305-21. For examples of recent and proposed
legislation expanding content owners' rights, see, e.g., No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2311 (1997)) (criminalizing certain acts of copyright infringement even where the alleged infringer
realizes no financial gain); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298 (West, WESTLAW
through 1998 Sess.) (extending the term of copyright protection by an additional 20 years); Digital Millenniurn
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304 (West, WESTLAW through 1998 Sess.) [hereinafter DMCA] (banning
technologies that could be used to circumvent digital rights management systems and imposing (though deferring)
liability for acts of circumvention); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998)
(creating a right against "misappropriation" of uncopyrightable collections of data); infra text accompanying notes
283-85 (discussing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in more detail). Authors' exclusive rights in copyrighted
works underwent a parallel expansion at the turn of the twentieth century. See Lunney, supra note 6, at 536-37 &
n.214.
115
  Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). Thus, as Michael Benedict documents, what began as a
principled distrust of the power of wealthy "factions" to subvert government became a reflexive aversion to
legislative action designed to aid any group, including — and, for some Lochner-era thinkers, especially — "the
ignorant and propertyless mass of urban voters." Benedict, supra note 2, at 306-10.
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process entails.112 But to characterize either arrangement as the illegitimate result of interest-
group pressure for that reason alone is facile. The cybereconomists offer no standard for
determining when proposals for legislative change are fairly representative of the broader
public interest, or for deciding how much interest-group pressure is too much.113 Moreover,
they neglect to note that the existing copyright regime, which over the past two decades has
allotted ever stronger entitlements to copyright owners, is itself a product of the legislative
process they decry.114 Stripped of grand-sounding economic justifications, this unquestioning
acceptance of the existing distribution of entitlements and bargaining power is Lochner pure
and simple. In striking down labor reform measures as impermissible “class" legislation, the
Lochner-era Court reasoned that "since it is self-evident that . . . some persons must have
more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of
contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result" of that freedom.115 In positing the
current distribution of ownership and bargaining power as natural, and proposals to limit
116
  See supra text accompanying note 104. This insight, too, dates back to the Lochner era. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 98-129 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 145-67,
194-98; Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1334-38 (1996); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Robert L.
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). It is particularly
true of intellectual property, which is in no conceivable sense "prepolitical." See supra text accompanying notes 18-
23.
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ownership prerogatives as inherently suspect, the cybereconomists make the same argument
and commit the same error. Declarations of entitlement are definitional, public acts and should
be understood as such.116 Taken on its own terms, the cybereconomists' process-oriented
critique offers no principled basis for preferring any particular socially-determined entitlement
structure over others.
In short, the cybereconomists' argument from contract principles reduces to the
propositions that market ordering is efficient because it is market ordering and that the
legislative process is inefficient because it is not. Without more, this hardly constitutes a
compelling case for replacing the public law of copyright with a regime based on the private
law of contract. Still remaining to be considered, however, is the contention that, assuming
efficient markets, the societal goals of access and progress are best served by according digital
publishers more complete control of their digital content.
B. Manufacturing Scarcity
The cybereconomists' approach to the question of optimal author/owner control reveals
a similar essentialism, and similar logical lacunae. Their proposal for a private-law regime of
digital intellectual property rights is based on a fiction about the invariant nature of "property"
and its relation to social welfare. Social welfare, in their view, is simply the sum of the wealth
generated by private transactions; therefore, the most efficient regime of entitlements in
creative and informational works is that which affords owners of such "property" the control
necessary for them to maximize its market value. Social efficiency — defined here as op-
timization of the access and progress desiderata — and allocative efficiency are synonymous,
or at least inseparably linked. Whether or not this thesis is valid as applied to other types of
property, the economic case for assigning strong, undivided property rights in digital works is
inadequate at best. Determining the optimal degree of author/owner control of digital content
requires careful consideration of what system of entitlements would be most effective given
the public-good nature of creative and informational works and the unpredictable pathways of
creative progress.
The strongest version of the argument for control is, of course, Hardy's. He advocates
simply abandoning the conceptual framework of copyright in favor of digital property rights
117
  See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
118
  Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 63 ("When ‘we’re all connected,’ no functional difference may exist
between a contract and a property right."). To the extent that they would recognize limitations on author/owner
control, Merges, Bell, and O'Rourke conceive those limitations in terms of abuse of the market process — e.g.,
unconscionability or the acquisition of antitrust market power — rather than as definitional restrictions that would
apply regardless of the owner's behavior or market position. See Bell, supra note 5, at 591, 607; Merges, The End of
Friction?, supra note 5, at 126; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 81-87; O'Rourke, Drawing the
Boundary, supra note 5, at 541-55. But see Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 134-35 (advocating, at
least in principle, a limited "fair use" exception to digital property rights for designated classes of users); supra text
accompanying note 57. This convergence of contract reasoning with property reasoning mirrors the Lochner-era
view that the system of social ordering should protect the market decisions of economic actors. See infra text
accompanying notes 161-71.
119
  See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1302-17; supra text accompanying notes
53-56; see also Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 120-21 (arguing that property rights are necessary to
protect content owners against third parties who may acquire copies of their works). On Hardy's and Merges's
discussions of the law and economics literature on the choice between property and liability rules, see infra text
accompanying notes 150-53.
120
  See supra text accompanying notes 44-56; cf. Netanel, supra note 36, at 308-10, 314-21 (describing
neoclassically-based model of copyright as a mechanism for achieving allocative efficiency, as well as a source of
incentives to create).
121
  See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351-52, 355-56
(1967). Similar reasoning underlies Edmund Kitch's proposed "prospect" approach to patents. See Kitch, supra note
36.
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expressly modeled on their private-law counterparts.117 In contrast, Merges, Bell, and
O'Rourke frame their assertions about control in the rhetoric of contract and public choice.
Ultimately, however, they contend that copyright owners should be afforded contract rights
broad enough to accomplish virtually the identical result urged by Hardy, for virtually identical
reasons.118 The similarity is underscored by Merges's unequivocal rejection of legislatively-
mandated "liability rules" in the intellectual property context.119 Accordingly, I shall use’ the
analytic framework supplied by Hardy, with some refinements supplied by Merges, to evaluate
the cybereconomists' "control thesis." Hardy and Merges use two different types of arguments
to justify a private-property regime: the assuredly low costs of transacting in and fencing
digital information, which (they argue) make strong property rights the most efficient vehicle
for allocating creative resources to their most highly valued uses, and the need for an effective
incentive structure to induce creative activity.120
1. Transaction Costs and Common Resources
To support his argument about transaction costs, Hardy relies on Harold Demsetz's
axiom that (given effective fencing techniques) dividing commonly-owned property into
privately-owned parcels is the more efficient way of maximizing its value.121 However,
Demsetz implicitly presumes both knowledge about effective long-term growth strategies and
122
  See Demsetz, supra note 121; see also Lemley, supra note 6 at 1048-65 (criticizing, in particular,
Kitch's prospect theory); cf. Weinreb, supra note 104, at 1239 ("[T]he elegance and persuasiveness of the [allocative
efficiency] argument depend on its remaining insistently hypothetical and abstract.").
123
  At the very least, the question becomes more complicated, since Hardy must demonstrate that the sum
total of negative externalities and/or decreases in productivity under his system would be smaller than the
"transaction costs" imposed under the current system.
124
  See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 116, at 1333-37; Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 109-13; Lemley, supra note
6, at 1048-65; Litman, Revising Copyright Law, supra note 49; see also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and
the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1091, 1104-24 (1995) (arguing that the purpose of copyright is not merely to disseminate works to the public as
consumers, but also to foster access to works by the public as creators, and that a maximum-protection regime does
not serve this purpose); Kreiss, supra note 6 (same); Litman, supra note 6 (same); Netanel, supra note 36 (arguing
that a purpose of copyright is to promote the deliberation and debate constitutive of a robust democratic public
sphere, and that a maximum protection regime does not serve this purpose); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social
Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996)
(same).
125
  This is far from clear. See, e.g., BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 12-18; OSTROM, supra note 104, at 1-28.
126
  See generally Demsetz, supra note 121. Demsetz does briefly mention patents and copyrights, but does
little more than offer the standard public-good/market-failure justification for affording any exclusive rights. See id.
at 359; supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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reduced costs of implementing these strategies under a private-ownership system.122 Thus, for
Hardy's model to be accurate, we must know what sort of access regime would maximize the
production and distribution of creative and informational works over the long term, and know
that assigning absolute property entitlements to copyright owners would lead to
implementation of that regime more cheaply. (Put differently, we must know that Hardy's
scheme would produce fewer significant long-term social costs, or greater long-term social
gains, or both.) If either of these conditions does not hold, the case for the putative efficiency
of Hardy's scheme vanishes .123 This is precisely what is disputed in the current debate over the
scope of copyright in digital works.124 Arguing that undivided entitlements are per se more
efficient simply assumes away the problem.
Assuming that Demsetz is correct about the superiority of a private-ownership system
in some cases,125 there are reasons to suspect that creative works do not satisfy the assumptions
required by the Demsetz model. Demsetz focuses on conservation of known, currently
existing resources — for example, fur-bearing animals or river water.126 The interests of
private property owners and of society in general may not be exactly identical in such cases —
for example, society may wish to conserve the population of fur-bearing animals over a longer
time span, or ensure that the river water remains suitable for a broader spectrum of uses — but
they may often coincide substantially. Copyright, in contrast, is concerned with stimulating the
production of new creative works; it does not seek only or even primarily to conserve existing
127
  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing limited grant of exclusive rights to promote "Progress").
128
  Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Toward A Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem
of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1042-43 (1990) (outlining the calculus that might lead society to
override private censorship of criticism).
129
  The likelihood of creative success, however defined, is extremely difficult to judge before the fact. Cf.
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1055-56 (noting that uncertainty as to the result may preclude an accurate assessment of the
gains from trade). This problem is particularly acute for the newest authors, who lack established reputations. New
authors may therefore have difficulty finding publishers or other backers willing to underwrite their requests for
"usage rights." Even if these problems of prediction could be overcome, moreover, the notion that ability to pay
provides a reliable and appropriate measure of a resource's value, or of the value of its intended use, has long been
discredited. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 36, at 9-20; Kelman, supra note 36, at 678-85; Leff, supra note 36, at 455-
58, 462-63, 478-80.
130
  See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir, 1997) (lawsuit
against satirist who used characters and scenes from plaintiff's popular "Dr. Seuss" books as a vehicle to comment
on the controversial O.J. Simpson trial), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (lawsuit by reclusive author against biographer who excerpted portions of author's letters),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987). Maxtone-Graharn v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (lawsuit by
abortion rights activist against anti-abortion activist who used excerpts of her work in a book arguing against
abortion rights), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); see also Lemley, supra note 6, at 1056-61 (discussing other
reasons that might lead existing copyright owners to refuse licenses for socially valuable improvements).
131
  As explained supra at text accompanying notes 24-32, digital rights management technologies make it
possible to decouple access and reuse rights. Thus, asserting control over reuse need not interfere with content
owners' ability to market their works to consumers. On the question of how "better" progress is defined, see infra
section III.B.2.
132
  I am far from the first critic of Demsetz's work to make this observation. See, e.g., BROMLEY, supra
note 36, at 175-83 (demonstrating that "productive" or monetary efficiency is only one of the issues that factor into
the determination of whether a particular rule or practice is socially efficient); ANDREAS A. PAPANDREOU,
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works for their own sake.127 Here, the interests of current copyright owners and of society may
diverge. Society may wish to recognize and accord privileges to new authors, whose works
may outsell, displace, or criticize those of existing authors.128 In addition, there is no particular
reason to believe that a new author's ability to pay for the right to use an existing work is a
good predictor of the quality of the eventual result, whether quality is measured in terms of
market success or by some other standard.129 Thus, it is at least conceivable that vesting
existing authors/owners with absolute control over the terms of access would deter or prevent
the creation of some valuable works that would be produced under the current system.130 If so,
the cybereconomists' "control-equals-access-equals-progress" syllogism is false; certainly, they
have not proved it to be true. Even if it results in increased consumer access to digital works, a
private-law regime designed to maximize control will not necessarily result in more or better
creative progress.131 The increase in the private benefits flowing to intellectual property
owners will not necessarily correspond to an increase in the social benefits flowing to the
public as a whole.132
EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 225 (1994) ("[I]nstitutional change does not require efficiency gains to be
initiated, it requires gains to the initiators of change, which may or may not coincide with an overall increase in
wealth."); AMARTYA K. SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 288-90 (1982); Mishan, supra note 36, at 95,
103-05; see also BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 137-39 ("Judgments about social efficiency require that analysis be
conducted against the backdrop of some social welfare function and its implicit social utility function." (emphasis in
original)); Baker, supra note 36, at 6-7, 28-31 (arguing that "human satisfaction" is a function of distributive as well
as efficiency considerations); Veljanovksi, supra note 104, at 19 ("The only wealth-maximizing outcome that is
ethically attractive is the one based on a 'just' assignment of initial rights.") (emphasis omitted)).
133
  See PAPANDREOU, supra note 132, at 200-04 (arguing that because private benefit and social benefit
may diverge, Demsetz's approach will not necessarily lead to the formation of socially optimal institutions).
134
  See OSTROM, supra note 104.
135
  Id. at 26.
136
  See, e.g., Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1325-27, 1372-73. For this reason,
Merges's example of self-governing patent pools in the airplane and automobile industries, in which inventors,
consumers, and future inventors are likely to be drawn from the same small group of repeat players, says little about
the desirability of collective licensing arrangements for copyrighted works, for which there is no comparable
guarantee. See id. at 1342-52; cf. GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 24-28,116 (1989)
(identifying as the stakeholders in institutional design only those groups with claims to property rights). In contrast,
technologist Mark Stefik has proposed the establishment of a Digital Property Trust, composed of representatives
from both the copyright industries and consumer groups, to oversee digital rights management policies and
practices. See Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 24, at 156-58; Mark Stefik & Alex Silverman, The Bit and
the Pendulum: Balancing the Interests of Stakeholders in Digital Publishing, 7 AM. PROGRAMMER 1, 13-14 (1997).
137
  In very general terms, an externality is a cost or benefit generated by an exchange but borne or received
by third parties, and therefore not taken into account by the parties themselves. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25,
at 38-40. More precise definitions vary; for discussion of definitional issues and of the externalities generated by
transactions in creative and informational works, see infra section III.B.1.
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Merges's proposal for collective institution-building by copyright owners does not
offer a way out of this difficulty. Such a collective is no more guaranteed to safeguard the
interests of future authors, and thereby serve society's interests, than are individual copyright
owners.133 To support his argument that private copyright management collectives are the
efficient solution to the problem of administering transactions in creative works, Merges relies
on economist Elinor Ostrom's study of the evolution and operation of institutions for
collective management of commonly-owned property.134 Ostrom focuses on the benefits of
collective governance for community members who want access to a shared resource, and
expressly excludes from consideration "situations in which participants can produce major
external harm for others.”135 Merges likewise emphasizes the potential of collective
institutions to foster cross-licensing and other cooperative behavior among members.
Consumers and future creators figure in his analysis only as potential trespassers, not as parties
whose interests should be represented in the constitution and governance of these institu-
tions.136 Whether licensing collectives might produce negative externalities for these parties or
for society generally is a question that he does not consider.137
138
  See OSTROM, supra note 104, at 205-07, 211; cf. LIBECAP, supra note 136, at 21-23 (observing that a
large number or heterogeneity of competing interests will delay the creation of new institutions for allocating
property rights); id. at 116 (noting that distributional considerations frequently lie at the root of conflicts over
institutional development).
139
  See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1334-35.
140
   See United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
("BMI"), as amended, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); United States v. The American Socy. of
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ("ASCAP II"); United States
v. The American Socy. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1941 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
("ASCAP"). 
The California water districts studied by Ostrom also operate under judicial decrees, but Ostrom finds it
significant that the participants themselves initiated legal proceedings in order to structure their own bargaining
process. See OSTROM, supra note 104, at 110. That was not the case with ASCAP and BMI. See BMI, 1966 Trade
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 83,324; JOHN RYAN, THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 92-100
(1985) (discussing ASCAP decree).
141
  See BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 83,325-26; ASCAP II, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 63,754.
142
   See BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 83,325; ASCAP II, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 63,752.
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Relatedly, Ostrom suggests that collective institutions are more likely to be effective
over the long term if ownership privileges are restricted to a closed, relatively homogenous
group.138 The community of authors is neither closed nor homogenous — nor, presumably,
would we want it to be. Merges's discussion of performing rights societies (copyright
collectives that license public performance rights in musical compositions) is not to the
contrary. ASCAP and BMI, the two main performing rights societies in the United States,
together have over 250,000 members and a "stable" of millions of works.139 However, neither
ASCAP nor BMI is a private institution in the sense that both Merges and Ostrom use that
term. Rather, both societies operate under antitrust consent decrees that govern their
membership, internal governance, and licensing practices.140 The decrees require ASCAP and
BMI to make membership available on a nondiscriminatory basis, to issue licenses to all who
request them, and to accept a judiciallydetermined reasonable fee (ASCAP) or a fee
determined by an arbitrator (BMI) in the event of a dispute.141 Most significantly, the decrees
prohibit ASCAP and BMI from holding or licensing any rights in copyrighted musical
compositions other than the public performance rights.142 These provisions suggest that the
government and the respective courts believed that allowing collective organizations control
over the entire bundle of rights in copyrighted works would be detrimental to competition. In
short, the example of ASCAP and BMI does not support Merges's thesis that privately-
governed collective institutions represent the optimal solution for licensing a broad range of
usage rights in copyrighted works.
Ostrom's research has only limited bearing on the problem of rights in creative works
for an even more basic reason, however. Ostrom explicitly distinguishes renewable but
potentially exhaustible common-pool resources — the focus of her study, and of Demsetz's
143
  See OSTROM, supra note 104, at 32-33; see also supra text accompanying note 25 (discussing public
good nature of creative works). Demsetz's seminal article speculates briefly about the implications of his work for
the system of intellectual property rights. See Demsetz, supra note 121, at 359. In later works, he tackled the issue
of property rights in information more directly; however, he did not answer or even address the concerns raised
here. See Demsetz, supra note 102; Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293
(1970); see also Hadfield, supra note 26, at 41-45 (concluding that Demsetz's work "does not take us far in the
analysis of appropriate public policy with respect to intellectual products" because he does not address the problem
of imperfection in markets).
144
  See OSTROM, supra note 104, at 32-33, 46-50, 90-92.
145
  See id. at 32; Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1236
(1996) ("[U]nlike land, intellectual property offers no potential for a tragedy of the commons."); supra note 25.
146
  Cf. BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 78-79 ("The issue is not one of being efficient or inefficient in the
abstract, but of being efficient or inefficient with respect to a particular purpose or objective."); id. at 148-83
(demonstrating that the efficient equilibrium point depends on the initial distribution of entitlements, which must be
determined with reference to social efficiency" rather than mere "productive efficiency").
147
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 229-32, 241-42; Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at
1303-06.
148
  See Burk, supra note 40, at 18-20; DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 40.
149
  Hardy, supra note 5, at 229-32, 241-42 (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 69).
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theorizing — from true public goods, such as the creative works at issue here.143  Because
common pool resources are subject to depletion through overuse, a system of entitlements
must address both provision (replenishment) and appropriation issues.  Based on her research,
Ostrom concludes that conditioning appropriation rights on provision obligations is the most
effective longterm strategy for conservation and renewal.144 In contrast, appropriation poses no
direct threat of depletion of a public good, which by definition is both non-excludable and
non-rivalrous; a public good benefits all without depletion.145 A regime designed to ensure
provision of a particular public good might use appropriation rights as an incentive, but need
not do so. Certainly, it need not assign providers complete, undivided appropriation rights —
that is to say, it need not treat the good as a common pool resource or, as Hardy would have it,
a private good — especially if society concludes that a limited-entitlements regime would do a
better job of inducing provision. The possibility that authors, if given undivided property
entitlements and left to their own devices, might create efficient rights-management
institutions says nothing about whether they should be given undivided property entitlements
in the first place.146
Both Hardy and Merges also rely, in different ways, on the conventional wisdom that
lowered transaction costs favor property rules to encourage bargaining.147 In fact, it is not so
clear that digital networks will lower transaction costs in all cases.148 But the argument is
flawed in any case. Hardy relies largely on Calabresi and Melamed's important but preliminary
exploration of differences in entitlement structures.149 This ignores a substantial recent litera-
150
  See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of
Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Liability Rules]; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1994)
[hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Property
Rules]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley,
105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Reply]; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980).
151
  See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 150, at 1029-30, 1032-33; Merges, Contracting
into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1304 n.22. Kaplow and Shavell dispute this conclusion. They agree, however,
that liability rules may induce efficient nonconsensual use of a disputed resource, particularly when bargaining is
impossible. See Kaplow & Shavell, Reply, supra note 150, at 223-24. They also agree that divided property (as
opposed to liability) entitlements may produce more efficient trade than undivided entitlements. See Kaplow &
Shavell, Reply, supra note 150, at 222 n.5; Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 150. Both conclusions
are potentially relevant to mass-market transactions in intellectual property. Cf. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1069-70
(discussing the operation of divided property entitlements in the patent system). Merges does not address them.
Merges has been more receptive to the concept of dividing entitlements to facilitate bargaining with respect to
patents. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 94-97 (1994); see also id. at 106 (distinguishing copyright-related transactions on the
ground that high transaction costs are the only barrier to consensual exchange).
152
  See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1303-06. Merges cites Kaplow and
Shavell for the proposition that in some cases, a liability rule may inefficiently require the holder of a limited
resource to make payments to "multiple takers" in order to retain control of the resource. See id. at 1305 n.23 (citing
Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 150, at 765-66). As discussed above, however, intellectual property
is a public good, so the Kaplow and Shavell reasoning, which presumes rivalrous use, does not apply. See supra text
accompanying notes 143-46. Ayres and Talley agree that undivided property entitlements might be the appropriate
choice in cases presenting incentive problems. See Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 150, at 1084-
85. However, it is not at all clear that such problems exist in the case of creative and informational works. See infra
text accompanying notes 159-60.
153
  See Netanel, supra note 36, at 335 & n.228. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that nonconsensual taking
under a liability rule may not be efficient when owners, on average, place higher idiosyncratic value on the resource
than do takers. See Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 150, at 760-63; supra note 151. In the case of
creative and informational works, however, the value realized by the "owner" is not the only, or even the most
important, measure of the value realized by society. See supra text accompanying notes 121-32; infra section
III.B.1.
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ture suggesting that the choice between property rules and other types of rules depends on a
number of factors, of which transaction costs is only one.150 Merges undertakes a more
thorough review of the current literature, and in particular the conclusion of Ian Ayres and Eric
Talley that liability rules are more likely to encourage efficient bargains in cases of
information asymmetry.151 He concludes that property rules are preferable where intellectual
property is concerned, because they allow intellectual property owners to maximize their
monetary return (and thus, also, their incentives to create new works).152 However, he neglects
to explain why this result is desirable. If society believes that limiting author/owner control of
digital works will promote progress more effectively, a legal regime that enhances control
would be unwise.153
154
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 230 (defining "property" as conferring a right of exclusion) (citing
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 69, at 1092); Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1305
(expressing dismay at the prospect that, under a liability rule, there would be "many people who might be in a
position to take an entitlement").
To bolster his appeal to essentialism, Hardy argues that his sense of "property" is the sense in which the
framers of the Constitution understood it. But this argument proves too much; the framers may well have
understood "property" as Hardy describes, but they authorized Congress to grant only "exclusive [r]ights" for
"limited [t]imes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Hardy, supra note 44, 137; see also Hamilton, supra note 83;
Meredith L. McGill, The Matter of the Text: Commerce, Print Culture, and the Authority of the State in American
Copyright Law, 9 AM. LITERARY HIST. 21 (1997). A full exploration of the original intent underlying the patent and
copyright clause is a subject for another article.
155
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 254-57; Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5, at 1308-17;
see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1685-85 (1989). One could argue
just as easily that it is the public that is the property owner, since the public stands in the relation of remainderman
to the copyright "owner's" life (plus 50) tenancy, and since it is the public's remaindered interest that justified the
creation of the life tenancy in the first place. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); McGill, supra note 154 (concluding that historical evidence suggests
copyright was originally conceived as a "temporary alienation of public property").
156
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 222-29.
157
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 220-28; see also Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 29, at 214-15, 234-35.
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In sum, for Hardy and, it seems, for Merges, all "property" axiomatically requires the
Blackstonian right of absolute exclusionary power in order to attain its highest value.154 Thus,
they are able to characterize the legislative process that shapes the public law copyright as a
wasteful cost of transacting rather than a necessary cost of production.155 There is one piece of
the puzzle remaining, however. Although they are primarily concerned with demonstrating
that private-law rules will maximize allocative efficiency, the cybereconomists also make
arguments about the relationship between control, monetary return, and creative incentives.
Understanding the basis for their conceptualization of property, and the reason that they fail to
recognize the potential societal interest in limiting author/owner control, requires
consideration of these arguments as well.
2. Incentives and Redistribution
Hardy asserts that his proposed expansion of copyright owners' legal entitlements is
simply an adjustment to maintain the size of the owners' overall "pie" of incentives. He notes,
in particular, that the "slice" of protection formerly afforded by the difficulty and expense of
producing high-quality copies has shrunk due to the ease of copying digital files.156 Hardy
argues that any decrement in copyright owners' aggregate protection against copying will
reduce the market value of their works, which in turn will reduce their incentives to create new
works — which, of course, will result in less progress, and ultimately less access as well.157
The clear implication of all this is that expansion of legal entitlements is necessary to avoid a
redistribution of economic value from copyright owners to the public, with potentially
158
  See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 134-35; see also O'Rourke, supra note 49, at 696;
supra text accompanying note 57; cf. Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 15 (endorsing Merges's description of fair use).
159
  See supra text accompanying notes 121-32.
160
  See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1410 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (summarizing testimony of numerous academic authors "that they write for professional
and personal reasons" and "that the receipt of immediate monetary compensation such as a share of licensing fees is
not their primary incentive to write"); cf. Breyer, supra note 26 (arguing that the additional incentive provided by
copyright is not necessary to the survival of the book publishing and computer software industries); Weinreb, supra
note 104, at 1232-33 (making the same argument); EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD FLASTE, WHY WE DO WHAT WE
DO: THE DYNAMICS OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY (1995) (summarizing empirical research showing that "[i]ntrinsic
motivation is associated with richer experience, better conceptual understanding, greater creativity, and improved
problem solving" than extrinsic motivation); Weinreb, supra note 104, at 1234-36 (same); John Kay, The
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 13 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 337 (1993) (suggesting that in many cases the
monetary value of a copyrighted work to the public will bear no relation either to the "moral worth" of the work or
to the incentives that led the author to create it). The exact role that copyright plays in inducing production of
creative and informational works is an unanswered empirical question.
Hardy argues that the motivations of those who create for nonmonetary reasons need not be factored into
the incentives analysis because these individuals will continue to create new works regardless of changes in the law.
See Hardy, supra note 5, at 221-22. This argument assumes, first, that works created solely for monetary reasons are
as important to "progress" as other works. Given the vast number of important works produced within the college
and university system, which operates under a different incentives structure, that assumption seems unwise. See
Breyer, supra note 26, at 287, 309; cf. Lunney, supra note 6, at 561-69 (arguing that the copyright system perversely
awards the greatest protection to the least valuable works); infra section III.B.1 (discussing the externalities
generated by creative and informational works, and the consequent risk of underproduction of those works that are
most socially valuable). It also ignores the possibility that changes in the legal rules governing access to and control
of works, specifically those preventing or sharply limiting unpaid access by scholars and students, may alter existing
social patterns of creation. See infra section III.B.I.
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catastrophic consequences. Nothing could seem more reasonable. Similar reasoning leads
Merges to characterize his proposal for limited privileges for certain classes of users as
essentially redistributive.158
In fact, however, this reasoning rests on two unsupported, and unsupportable,
assumptions. First, it assumes a direct, linear relationship between market value and
incentives, and thus (again) makes maximization of creative works' monetary value the sole
measure of copyright's efficacy at inducing progress. As discussed above, maximizing a work's
post-creation value to the copyright owner will not necessarily maximize its value to
society.159 The argument that the law will encourage the most progress by maximizing a work's
prospective market value is equally unpersuasive. The cybereconomists cite no evidence that
monetary reward is the sole source of inducement to create new works, and there is much to
suggest that nonmonetary incentives are equally, if not more, important in some cases.160
Second, and more significant, the argument from redistribution assumes that the author
or publisher of a digital work has the right to pursue and control any monetary return that the
work may be made to generate, and may claim "property" even in the inchoate possibility of
161
  See HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 150-51; Siegel, supra note 2, at 7-8; see also Robert Brauneis, "The
Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 624-27 (1996); White, supra note 17, at 93-96.
162
  See Benedict, supra note 2, at 304-05, 327-28; Brauneis, supra note 161, at 625; Siegel, supra note 2,
at 7-8; supra text accompanying notes 18-23,
163
  Brauneis, supra note 161, at 624-27, 630; see also HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 145-51; Siegel, supra
note 2, at 8-12, 64.
164
  See supra text accompanying notes 18-23. 
165
  See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) ("'Included in the right of personal
liberty and the right of private property — partaking of the nature of each — is the right to make contracts for the
acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and other
services are exchanged for money and other forms of property."' (quoting Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14
(1915)); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328-30 (1921) (holding that statute prohibiting labor injunctions "de-
prives the owner of the business and the premises of his property without due process"); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 172-73 (1908) (invalidating law barring firing of union members on ground that both employee and
employer had rights of liberty and property todecide acceptable terms of employment); Brauneis, supra note 161, at
671; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 280 ("Restrictions on hours or wages are without question limitations upon
the power of the employer to dispose of property.").
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monetary gain. From there, it is a short step to the conclusion that a regime that would prevent
owners from exploiting emerging or even unforeseen markets enabled by new technologies is
not only inefficient but also unjust. Yet this understanding of property is historically and
theoretically contingent; it is neither a necessary nor an invariably efficient feature of a scheme
of property — much less intellectual property — rights.
The understanding of property as the right to appropriate any possibility of profit dates
from none other than the Lochner era. For most of the nineteenth century, jurists and legal
scholars understood constitutionally-protected "property" to mean "vested" rights only.161
Legislation restricting prospective uses of property, if generally applicable, was presumptively
legitimate.162 Gradually, however, as the growing variety of intangible, commercial interests
made real property-based tests of ownership seem increasingly irrelevant, courts began to
reconceive property as having an ahistorical, and thus implicitly forward-looking, character
derived from an "ideal boundary" between the owner and society.163 Within this vision,
property rights and freedom of contract were inextricably related. Both originated in the
prepolitical sphere and thus outside public control.164 Full enjoyment of one right necessarily
entailed the other; interference with business was interference with property, and vice versa. In
the line of cases that have come to be known as the Lochner cases, the Court used the rhetoric
of contract and property interchangeably.165 Social contract theory and notions of economic
166
  See HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 145-51, 160-64 (demonstrating that abstraction and dephysicalization
of "property," and increasing use of market expectation to define its scope, led to an "infinitely expandable"
conception of property that arguably prohibited any restrictions on use). The contemporaneous legal realist attack on
the expectation-based understanding of property is well documented in HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 145-67. Among
modern legal scholars, C. Edwin Baker and Frank Michelman, in particular, have challenged the understanding of
"property" as denoting a zone of absolute freedom from interference with economic expectation. Michelman
demonstrates that the Constitution designed by the framers reflects and was intended to serve distributive as well as
antiredistributive concerns. Property was both a source of security against government and a precondition for the
effective exercise of democratic self-government. See Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1325-34 (1987). To the extent that "exposure to superior
private power can ... leave people without the material independence or competence required for effective
citizenship," these conceptions of property are in tension, for "material independence" can be guaranteed only by
government action that is in some formal sense redistributive. See id. at 1335-36. Michelman concludes that the
constitutional law of property can best serve the political ideals embodied in the Constitution by finding a pragmatic
way to mediate between the two conceptions. See id. at 1350.
Baker disaggregates "property" into the various functions it serves, and argues that any constitutionally
cognizable right against government interference extends only to those functions essential to human liberty. See C.
Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986). He
includes among these functions the use of one's property for one's own welfare and "personhood," but not its use to
dictate the allocation of resources within society, or to control exchange relations with others. See id. at 744-73.
Decisions regarding the rules for resource allocation — of which the rules of exchange are, properly speaking, a
subset — are, he argues, "inherently collective" decisions. See id. at 749-50. In particular, because exchange confers
a form of sovereignty over others, individuals have no liberty interest in unfettered rights of exchange. See id. at
752, 770. Baker identifies the "allocative" and "exchange" functions of property as central to the argument for a
return to Lochner-style constitutional protection of economic liberty. See id. at 767-69, 774.
167
  248 U.S. 215 (1918) ("INS").
168
  But cf. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 37-41 (1996) (discussing INS as archetype of the "commodity" approach to information);
HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 203 (describing INS as "a significant example of judicial efforts to come to terms with"
the implications of an abstract, expectation-based understanding of property); Aoki, supra note 116, at 1314-32
(linking expansive approach to intellectual property rights to laissez-faire liberalism and its ideology of the primacy
of private property).
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laissez faire thus combined to create a climate in which legislative interference with
(definitionally) private control of economic resources was presumptively suspect.166
The definition of intellectual property as profit potential also dates from the Lochner
era. It has largely escaped comment that International News Service v. Associated Press,167 in
which the Court defined news as quasi-property based on a misappropriation theory, was a
Lochner-era case.168  INS concerned the copying of concededly uncopyrightable news items
from publicly accessible bulletin boards maintained by Associated Press member newspapers.
As in the contemporaneous "substantive due process” cases. the Court reasoned from the fact
of marketability to the construct of property.  Asserting that any other result would undercut
incentives to gather the news, it held that the AP was entitled to prevent a competing news
169
  See International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239-40. 
170
  See International News Serv., 248 at 245-46.  The property rule was of limited duration — the
injunction prohibited the competition from appropriating the news while it still had economic value to the AP — but
it was a property rule nonetheless.
171
  See, e.g., National Basketball Assn. v. Motorola, Inc. 105 F.3d 841, 852-54 (2d Cir. 1997); United
States Golf Assn. v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 1984); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 178-79 (1992) (criticizing
the INS Court’s equation of “value” with “property”).  
172
  See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D, 822; cf. Fisher, supra note
38, at 31-33 (describing rationales for legal imposition of “compulsory terms” in contracts, including those relating
to the use of private property).
173
  Formally speaking, the touchstone of neoclassical analysis is the Pareto criterion, and the requirement
of Pareto-optimality is anti-redistributive by definitio, in that no one may be made worse off than before.  See
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 23, at 12; Calabresi, supra note 104, at 1215.  In practice, this criterion has been
relaxed by adoption of the Kaldor-Hicks test, which allows redistributive policies that increase overall social
welfare if the gainers could compensate the losers, whether or not compensation is actually paid.  See COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 25, at 41-42; Calabresi, supra note 104, at 1221-22; Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 65-67.  As to
wealth transfers designed to benefit the poor (inevitably the Kaldor-Hicks losers), practitioners of neoclassically-
grounded, Chicago school law and economics argue that courts should not attempt such transfers because legislative
wealth transfers are more efficient.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistrubting Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).  When confronted with
redistributive legislation, however, they then argue that legislation is inefficient for the reasons demonstrated by
public choice theory, see supra text accompanying notes 97-101, and that only the common law as enforced by
judges is truly efficient.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§8.1-3, 19.1-3 (4th ed.
1992).  Moreover, both in theory and increasingly in practice, such uncompensated, legislatively-sanctioned
transfers stop at the boundaries of entitlements classified as “property.” See e.g., Dolan v., City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 565 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm.,
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agency from reaping where it had not sown.169 Automatically upon reaching this conclusion,
the Court assigned to the AP what Hardy and Merges would recognize as a right protected by a
property rule; it ordered that the competitor be enjoined from using the news at all without the
AP’s permission.170  Although some courts have sought to limit INS — and avoid copyright
preemption — by imposing a requirement of competitive injury, such a requirement merely
serves to underscore the fact that under the INS approach, property rights (which implicitly
confer absolute control over use) are a function of economic expectation, rather than the
reverse.171  The cybereconomists’ appeal to incentives falls squarely within this tradition.
In the modern, nondigital world, property entitlements are not conceived quite so
broadly.  The right to control one’s land does not include the right to create a nuisance, even if
that would create the greatest profit, and the right to control one’s apartment building does not
include the right to discriminate on the basis of race.172  These limits, moreover, are entirely
consistent with a variety of “law and economics” approaches to the underlying problems. 
Although the rule against uncompensated redistribution and the definition of property as profit
potential are foundational principles of neoclassically-grounded economic analysis of law,173
483 U.S. 825 (1989); First English Evangelical Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
174
  See Polinsky, supra note 150, at 1080-85.  
175
  Cf. Baker, supra note 166, at 759, 767-69 (arguing that constitutional protection should not extend to
those aspects of property that would determine the allocation of resources, or “would affect the social world ina
manner that make other people’s contrary choices irrelevant”); Dan Thu Thi Phan, Note, Will Fair Use Function on
the Internet?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 214 (1998) (“Thinner property rights do not mean the divestiture of all
ownership . . . The law recognizes that property, like copyright, is described and circumscribed by a set of societal
concerns . . . .”).  Such a choice presupposes a non-market-based approach to specifying the relevant social welfare
function.  On that question, see infra section III.B.2.  
176
  For a preliminary analysis of the effects of externalities in information markets and their implications
for design of the socially efficient bundle of entitlements in digital works, see infra section III.B.   
177
  See Horwitz, supra note 22, at 145-51 (delineating necessary implications of an expectation-based
theory of property rights); cf. Baker, supra note 166, at 751-53 (arguing that a broad conception of “property”
confers sovereignty on property owners); Brauneis, supra note 161, at 700 (“The problem with continuity is that it
equally preserves the wicked and the good.”); Gordon, supra note 171, at 179 (“[P]aralysis, rather than increase in
social wealth, more likely will result from granting rights against any change that may cause harm to someone.”);
Michelman, supra note 166, at 1335-36 (same). 
178
  See Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at 447-49.
179
  See, e.g., Bell, supra note 5, at 585-90.
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we might conclude that nuisance laws and antidiscrimination restrictions are justified because
the negative externalities the prohibited conduct would impose outweigh any incremental
benefit derived from increased incentives.174  Alternatively (stepping now into the
institutionalist mainstream), if in our view the efficient soceity is one without housing
discrimination or air pollution, we might conceive of “property” simply as not including the
right to discriminate or the right to pollute.175  Hardy and Merges do not consider whether
either analysis might apply to digital works.176  Their maximum incentives thesis is simply the
Lochner-era stricture against redistribution of profit potential translated into economic terms.
The argument against redistribution of profit potential effectively precludes recognition
of a societal interest in limiting author/owner control of things denominated “property.”  Self-
evidently, this broad property-as-profit rule protects the status quo distribution of entitlements
and wealth; a right insulated by a penumbra of monetary expectation will be relatively
impervious to legislative change.177 The scope of such a property right can only expand.  Thus,
this understanding of property inevitably enables the aggrandizement of existing entitlement
— more often than not at the expense of third parties whose current practices or privileges,
because not considered "property," are not perceived as obstacles.178 The cybereconomists
justify their proposed regime as a mere efficiency enhancement that will improve the position
of some at no detriment to others.179 The fact of controversy, however, tends to suggest
otherwise; if the proposed change were really Pareto-optimal, there would be no reason for
180
  See Calabresi, supra note 104, at 1220. Arguably, interested parties might oppose Pareto-optimal
changes if they felt they could do even better by petitioning the relevant legislative body for special favors. This
argument, however, is unlikely to be fruitful as long as it leaves the central question — how to tell when parties are
engaged in "rent-seeking" — unaddressed. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
181
  See Calabresi, supra note 104, at 1229-31.
182
  Hardy, supra note 5, at 226-28; see, e.g., Litman, The Exclusive Right, supra note 100, at 40-43;
Samuelson, supra note 9, at 134.
183
  The cybereconomists' focus on price discrimination lends further support to this conclusion. See, e.g.,
Bell, supra note 5, at 589 n.142; O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 62, 70-71; see also GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 28, at 8; Demsetz, supra note 143, at 301-04 (advocating price discrimination as a tool for enabling the
private production of public goods such as information); cf. Fisher, supra note 38, at 25-30, 35-36 (arguing that
price discrimination by copyright owners will enhance social welfare in many, though not all, cases). "Price
discrimination" is nothing more than a technique by which a producer may attempt to capture all of the consumer
surplus generated by a particular product. "In the ideal case of perfect price discrimination, every customer is
charged her maximum willingness to pay for the items she purchases." Meurer, supra note 38, at 869; see also id. at
877 (predicting that digital rights management technologies "will create a windfall of profit for copyright holders");
Bell, supra note 5, at 589 n.142. The key underlying assumption — that it is good policy to allow producers of
creative and informational works to do this — goes unquestioned.
184
  See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
185
  See Goldberg, supra note 104, at 122-23.
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anyone to oppose it.180 Disputes over proposed changes arise precisely because some such
changes do impose costs; they are not movements toward the Pareto frontier but movements
along it, with (re) distributive consequences.181
Digital works are a case in point. Hardy's "pie" is incomplete, in that it omits the slice
consisting of "no-protection," or entitlements belonging to the public — a slice not currently
conceived as “property" in the same sense as the interest belonging to the copyright owner.
Consequently, he need not consider that his other three slices — legal entitlements, contracts,
and special-purpose technical restrictions — are expanding at the public's expense, rather than
simply compensating for the lower protection afforded by the "state-of-the-copying-art." 182
Invoking the antiredistributive animus that characterized the Lochner era obscures the fact that
the redistribution worked by digital rights management technology, and advocated by its
defenders, is from the public to copyright owners, not the other way around.183 There is a
constituency that would be damaged if Hardy's proposals were adopted — and, hence, a need
for Bell's argument that information that costs money is cheaper than information that does
not.184 The Emperor's new clothes are wondrous, indeed.
In a sense, however, characterization of a new technology or legal rule as redistributive
is question-begging. Redistribution cannot be defined without reference to initial entitlements,
and it is nearly always the scope of those entitlements that is contested.185 The rhetoric of
redistribution simply masks the underlying dispute. Thus, for example, copyright owners
186
  Compare, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2281 & 2280, supra note 33, at 204-12 (statement of Allan R. Adler,
Vice President for Legal and Governmental Affairs, Association of American Publishers), and NII WHITE PAPER,
supra note 9, at 14-17, 73-84, with, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2281 & 2280, supra note 9, at 243 (statement of Douglas
Bennett, President, Earlham College, on behalf of the Digital Future Coalition), Digital Future Coalition, Collected
Position Papers, Letters, and Press Releases, (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://www.dfc.org/>, Litman, The Exclusive
Right, supra note 100, at 40-43, Samuelson, supra note 9, and Richard Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The
Public Must Prevail, 75 OR. L. REV. 291 (1996). See also Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in
Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 596-97 & n.52 (1997).
187
  See supra text accompanying note 143.
188
  Or, more precisely, scarcity is a precondition for property, which is a precondition for markets. See,
e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 10; Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,
1 ECONOMICA 30, 31 (1934) ("[P]roperty rights in patents and copyrights make possible the creation of a scarcity of
the products appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained.").
189
  See G.J. MULGAN, COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL: NETWORKS AND THE NEW ECONOMIES OF
COMMUNICATION 119-20 (1991) ("To be a tradeable good, which adds value and offers return on investment,
information must behave like a commodity."); Rice, Public Goods, supra note 70, at 562 ("Contract creates scarcity
and enforcement of contract corrects for inherent non-excludability."); see generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 71-73 (1944) ("The commodity fiction ...
supplies a vital organizing principle in regard to the whole of society ... namely, the principle according to which no
arrangement or behavior should be allowed to exist that might prevent the actual functioning of the market
mechanism on the lines of the commodity fiction."). 
190
  See BOYLE, supra note 168, at 51-58; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright. The Metamorphosis
of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE  L.J. 455; Lange, supra note 49, at 147; Litman, supra note 6.
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contend that they have always had the legal right to prevent private noncommercial copying,
but could not enforce it; educational and library organizations counter that in fact copyright
owners have never had this right and cannot enforce a nullity.186 But (as Hardy and Merges
recognize) the debate about rights in digital works is not about what rights members of the
public have had in the past, although that information is certainly relevant as evidence of
social values and preferences. It is about what rights they should have in the future.
Here it is worth returning to Ostrom's careful distinction between common-pool
resources and public goods.187 True public goods, once created, are not scarce, yet the
cybereconomists propose to treat them as if they were. What could possibly justify such an
approach? The answer, quite simply, is that scarcity is a precondition for markets.188 Copyright
owners wish to create markets for all ratable uses of digital works. Therefore, creative works,
which until now have defied the commodification that is the cornerstone of a market-based
system, must become commodities.189
Calling something a commodity, however, does not necessarily make it one. To begin
with, the market and the law must confront the insuperable difficulty of determining exactly
what is owned. To the extent that creativity is cumulative, it eludes attempts to set authorial or
ontological boundaries.190 Put differently, the boundaries of the authorial work and the literal
191
  The cybereconomists do not appear to challenge this longstanding principle.
192
  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the
Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993). According to Chon, at its origin copyright was
premised in part on the notion that there exist objective criteria of a work's intrinsic merit. See id. at 114-22. Chon
rejects this notion, but also rejects market-based criteria of value. Instead, she offers a "'post-modern" view of the
progress criterion as shaped by social practices and human needs. See id. at 123-44; see infra text accompanying
notes 363-74 (exploring the non-market dimensions of progress).
193
  . See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1902):
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may
be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would
have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied
to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Cf. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998) (showing that judges in
copyright cases do in fact make judgments about artistic merit, and arguing that these judgments and the standards that
inform them should be expressly acknowledged).
194
  For further discussion of the limitations and potential consequences of relying solely on the market to
measure the value of creative and informational works, see infra text accompanying notes 332-42.
195
   POLANYI, supra note 189, at 71-75. Polanyi wrote: 
Now, in regard to labor, land, and money such a postulate cannot be upheld. To allow the market
mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment ... would
result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity "labor power" cannot be shoved about,
used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens
to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man's labor power the system would,
incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity "man" attached to that tag.
Id. at 73; see also Solo, supra note 36, at 55-56 (characterizing land, labor, and capital as the "disappearing quanta"
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boundaries of the copy that embodies it do not coincide; the latter encompass much that the
former do not. Facts, ideas, and unoriginal constructs incorporated into a work remain part of
the public domain.191 From an instrumental perspective, moreover, the commodity approach to
digital intellectual property is substantially at odds with the reason for protecting creative
works. The "progress" justification for copyright is not neutral as to issues of creative merit.192
(Although courts eschew judgments of artistic merit in determining copyrightability, ot at least
say they do, this merit-neutral stance is expressly intended to serve meritocratic as well as
market ends.193) It follows that the sole test of a work's merit is not its success in the market,
and that prospects for success in the market are not the sole determinant of a work's
publishability.194 Thus, the market must contend with the recurring assertion of non-
commodity definitions of value.
As Karl Polanyi demonstrated more than fifty years ago, commodity constructs are apt
to prove uncooperative when applied to "fictitious commodities" — factors incompletely
determined by commodity attributes.195 Such constructs make markets possible, but
of the neoclassical model); RADIN, supra note 64, at 107-10 (characterizing regulation of the labor and housing
markets as a socially enforced "incomplete commodification" intended to preserve a space for human flourishing).
196
   See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); POLANYI, supra note 189, at 77-110; RADIN, supra note 64, at 108;
Fisher, supra note 26, at 1768-74.
197
  See Polanyi, supra note 189, at 77-110; Radin, supra note 64, at 108; see also, e.g., Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 84; Bell, supra note 5, at 607-08; cf. O'Rourke, supra
note 49, at 696 (noting that eligibility for Merges's proposed "redistributive" fair use exemptions will need to be
determined in part by noneconomic factors).
198
  See supra text accompanying note 57.
199
  Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 638-39
(1996) ("'Sufficient incentive,' is something less than 'perfect control."').
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simultaneously introduce tension into the market system. Where the harsher consequences of
commodification are unacceptable, society attempts to introduce stabilizing measures — for
example, minimum wage laws and/or welfare grants to mitigate the starvation that serves as
incentive to labor; rent control laws to lessen the impact of the laws of supply and demand on
the housing market; and fair use privileges to prevent the commodification of creative works
from impoverishing education and public debate.196 These countermeasures in turn incur
criticism for their disruptive effect on the market and their inconsistency with market
principles.197
The resulting debate, however, cannot resolve the underlying tension, because it is
focused on the welfare measure and never really addresses the initial determination to
commodify. One need not be clairvoyant to foresee a similar reaction to Merges's proposed
"redistributive" fair use exemption for favored classes of users if the cybereconomists'
proposals succeed, nor to predict that no resolution of that issue will be fully satisfying as long
as the tension underlying the commodification of creative works remains unaddressed.198 A
successful intellectual property regime must mediate the tension between commodity and non-
commodity definitions of value in creative works, not ignore it.
Incentives to create and limits on author/owner control are not mutually exclusive, as
the argument from redistribution might lead one to think. Rather, they are complementary
means for triangulating "progress." The trick is to balance the two, and neither assertions
about redistribution nor formulaic prescriptions for maximizing allocative efficiency will help
us.199 The cybereconomists' arguments about the superiority of common-law property rules are
dictated by their initial assumptions about what “property" is and ought to be. A useful
economic model for digital intellectual property rights must begin elsewhere. 
* * *
200
  See Hadfield, supra note 26, at 43-45 (observing that the modern literature on the economics of
copyright has not tackled the problem of developing a rigorous alternative to the Demsetz model); cf. Robert
Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 611, 612-15; Neil K. Komesar,
Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional Choice, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 465, 466-67. Arguably, a
more interdisciplinary, contextualized approach to the economic analysis of law simply returns the field to its roots
in the work of the legal realists and institutional economists of the 1920s and 1930s. See Hadfield, supra note 26, at
36-39 (discussing an alternative strand in the economic literature on copyright that traces back to the work of
Arnold Plant, who focused on the relation between copyright and overall social welfare (citing Arnold Plant, The
Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167 (1934))); see also Victor P. Goldberg, Commons,
Clark, and the Emerging Post-Coasian Law and Economics, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 877 (1976); Steven J. Medema,
Wandering the Road from Pluralism to Posner: The Transformation of Law and Economics in the Twentieth
Century, 30 HIST. POL. ECON. (forthcoming 1998).
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Their claims of economic certainty notwithstanding, the cybereconomists fall well
short of demonstrating that a private-propertyand-contract-based regime of rights in digital
works would best promote access and progress. To decide whether a particular goal is best
served in the "public" or the "private" (i.e., market) arena, we must assess so-called market
institutions in their real-world, demonstrably imperfect forms, and must weigh the full range
of possible alternatives. To begin that inquiry by presupposing voluntary particularized
consent to standard form contract terms and presuming the illegitimacy of (further) legislative
intervention — just as the Lochner Court presumed voluntary, particularized consent to re-
strictive labor contracts and conceived legislated labor standards as the product of interest-
group pressure — is to predetermine the result. Similarly, the argument for undivided
entitlements proceeds from economic ideology, not logic or neutral science. Because they
begin with a particular, contingent understanding of "property," the cybereconomists do not
consider whether other models might be more effective at inducing production and
dissemination of public goods generally and creative and informational works in particular. As
currently constituted, the economic case for recognizing unlimited contract rights and
undivided entitlements in digital works is weak. More is required to justify abandoning the
public law of copyright. Part III attempts to lay the groundwork for a richer, more
contextualized understanding of the relationship between legal institutions and information
markets.
III. ON MODELING INFORMATION MARKETS
As we have seen, reliance on essentialized notions of "contract," “market," and
"property" elides important empirical and policy questions about the extent of the monopoly
that society should afford creators of digital works — questions that a more sophisticated
model would consider. This is not necessarily an argument against the utility of the economic
analysis of law, but an argument that law and economics in the neoclassical mode is too
narrow and far too simplistic to yield a meaningful solution to the problem of digitar
copyright. If it is to be undertaken, the economic analysis of copyright law should draw on the
full panoply of resources that the discipline of economics has to offer.200
201
   See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 136.
202
  See J.L. HEILBRON, ELEMENTS OF EARLY MODERN PHYSICS 2-11 (1982). Perhaps this is less
coincidental than it appears. A focus of debate in the emerging school of socioeconomics is the extent to which the
scientific method can survive the reductivism characteristic of neoclassical economics. See, e.g., Ashford, supra
note 200.
203
  See DANIEL J. KEVLES, THE PHYSICISTS: THE HISTORY OF A SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IN MODERN
AMERICA 155-69 (1977); see generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970). The process of paradigm revision in the field of physics is ongoing. See DAVID LINDLEY, THE END OF
PHYSICS (1993).
204
   As used here, "best" simply means the process most likely to yield the results that the parties want, or a
mutually acceptable compromise.
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The field of economics is not monolithic, and the neoclassical market model is, as one
might expect, only part of the story. Merges likens the new digital CMS regimes to a
frictionless, or "Newtonian" system of licensing rights in digital works.201 This metaphor is
more apt than he may have realized. Newtonian mechanics dominated scientific thinking for
two and a half centuries — coincidentally, the same period during which the classical
liberalism of the Enlightenment flourished.202 The Newtonian paradigm, however, proved
insufficiently complex to describe the real world, and eventually was displaced by the more
precise constructs supplied by Einstein, Heisenberg, and others.203 Similarly, the received
wisdom of neoclassical economic theory is (and has long been) under challenge on many
fronts, including several of potential relevance to the market for digital information.
The project of constructing an adequate economic model for digital intellectual
property rights is complex. As Part II suggests, the model must address two related sets of
questions. First, it must determine whether the existing consumer mass market offers the best
forum for defining information policy and establishing the scope of entitlements in digital
works.204 Section III.A analyzes digital rights management contracts and technologies in
context, as the latest move in an ongoing contest between content owners and consumers
regarding endogenous definition and enforcement of the legal entitlements and exemptions
provided by copyright law. Given the predominantly reactive nature of consumers' power in
the market, the inexorable nature of this particular enforcement technique, and the institutional
constraints imposed by standard form contracting law and practice, it concludes that
consumers are more likely to experience a relative equality of bargaining power in the
legislative arena. This suggests that consumers would do well to be skeptical of proposals for
allocating rights in digital works within the parameters set by the existing market.
The second set of questions that the model must address concerns the relationship
between creative and informational works and social welfare. What kinds of value do such
works generate? Even if the market process is otherwise fair, are market measures the most
accurate means for assessing and optimizing creative and informational works' overall value to
society? Section III.B analyzes the uncompensated positive externalities produced by transac-
205
  See, e.g., BARTLETT, supra note 102, at 66-68, 195-96, 204-06; SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS,
DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM (1986); SAMUEL BOWLES & RICHARD EDWARDS, UNDERSTANDING CAPITALISM:
COMPETITION, COMMAND AND CHANGE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 16-18 (1985); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE
ANATOMY OF POWER (1983); PAPANDREOU, supra note 132, at 216; A. ALLAN SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER, AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1978); William M. Dugger, Power: An Institutional
Framework of Analysis, 14 J. ECON. ISSUES 897 (1980); Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36. A universally-
accepted lexicon for describing and theorizing about power has yet to emerge, however.
206
  In its purest form, neoclassical economic theory is centrally concerned with price and its
responsiveness to supply and demand. See supra note 36. Law and economics in the neoclassical mode modifies
this model by positing that changes in other terms of the exchange will be reflected in the good's price. As Neil
Netanel observes, however, the price model has often proved too simple and narrowly focused to bear the weight of
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tions in creative and informational works, and concludes that these externalities represent a
significant source of social value and that many (if not most) of them would be underproduced
by a fully market-based regime. The choice between that world and the one we have now has
profound implications for the processes of individual and collective development and self-
definition. Many of these processes occur outside the market, in ways the market cannot
measure. It follows that we should not make the choice between a fully market-based regime
and a regime of incomplete entitlements without considering the nonmarket as well as the
market preferences of citizen-consumers.
A. Bargaining Power and Choice in Information Markets
Just as Einstein challenged the Newtonian model by recognizing the dimension of
time, institutional, welfare-theoretic, and political economists have challenged the neoclassical
paradigm of the market as the realm of unconstrained private choice by recognizing the
dimension of power. In the neoclassical model, power — whether over people or over markets
— is absent. Exchanges of all types are presumed to be voluntary; departures from this norm
are called "market failures" and are presumed to be rare. For an increasing number of modern
economic theorists, in contrast, both formg of power are endemic to capitalist market
systems.205 From this perspective, an intellectually defensible market model must acknowledge
and inquire about power asymmetries and their consequences in both market and legislative
arenas, and a socially defensible information policy must take power asymmetries into
account. In the context of mass-marketed digital works, this inquiry suggests that consumers
are likely to be disadvantaged in either arena, but that the disadvantages that consumers
encounter in the legislative forum are less insurmountable.
1. Contested Exchange and the Power to Switch
A central tenet of neoclassical economic theory is that consumers have freedom to
enter and exit markets for consumer goods. As a consequence, if consumers refuse to buy a
particular product or service, producers will reconfigure the product or service — by lowering
the price, by changing product attributes, or by some combination of the two — in order to
maximize profits.206 Thus, consumer preferences exercise considerable, in indirect, power over
"complex real-world public policy issues.”  Netanel, supra note 36, at 311 n.113.  See also supra text accompanying
note 88 (discussing the information problems that undermine efforts to evaluate non-price contract terms).
207
  See supra text accompanying notes 65-94; Bell, supra note 5, at 588-89, 601-08; O’Rourke, Copyright
Preemption, supra note 5, at 81-90.  
208
  Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Contested Exchange, New Microfoundations for the Political
Economy of Capitalism, 18 POL. & SOCY. 165, 177 (1990).  
209
  See id. at 177-78. 
210
  Id. at 184, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).  
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the overall pattern of supply.  As section II.A discussed, the cybereconomists (and at least one
court sympathetic to their project) extend this model to the terms and conditions imposed by
digital CMS, and argue that copyright owners will abandon or modify terms to which
consumers refuse to agree.207 However, they overstate the actual extent of consumer
knowledge and consent.  The legal rules governing such exchanges make it difficult for
consumers of mass-marketed products and services to act like the rational, utility-maximizing
comparison shoppers that the model presumes.  Understanding the power dynamics of
information markets requires a more nuanced, context-specific approach, one that takes into
account the complexity of information products and transactions, the limited range of roles
available to consumers, and the ways in which existing legal and market institutions further
constrain those roles.
One promising avenue of inquiry is the theory of “contested exchange” developed by
political economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis.  Bowles and Gintis challenge the
neoclassical assumption of perfect, costless, exogenous enforcement of market exchanges by
identifying certain types of exchange for which such enforcement is infeasible.  Of particular
relevance here are exchanges in which “the contested attribute can be measured only
imperfectly or at considerable cost” and those in which “the number of contingencies
concerning future states of the world relevant to the exchange preclude writing a fully
specified contract.”208 Such exchanges, they reason, will be contested , meaning that the party
concerned with a particular attribute of contingency will develop or attempt to develop
endogenous mechanisms of enforcement.  For example, to extract the desired work effort from
an employee, an employer may make continued employment contingent on a satisfactory level
of performance.209
Endogenous enforcement activities do not invariably signal a power imbalance.  First,
such activities may be mutual.  Robert Ellickson’s model of norm enforcement among
neighbors in close knit communities is an example of this situation, which Bowles and Gintis
term “bilateral power.”210 Second, unilateral endogenous enforcement will fail if the other
party (for example, the employee) is indifferent as to this particular exchange (for example,
continued employment versus losing this particular job), as the neoclassical model
211
  At a given price, the level of indifference between this particular transaction and any other transaction
will be a function of the substitutability of other products or services — i.e., whether and to what extent the subject
matter of the transaction is uniquely suited to meet the buyer’s needs — and of the elasticity of demand for the
subject matter of the transaction — i.e., whether demand is a linear correlate of price or is driven by other factors,
such as hunger or the need for shelter.  See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 25, at 24; see infra text accompanying notes
218-26. 
212
  See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 208, at 178-81.  
213
  See id., at 182-83.  A nonclearing market exists when some participants who wish to transact at the
market price cannot do so, and the market does not respond by adjusting to a point at which supply equals demand. 
See supra note 36.  For example, the persistence of unemployment in the labor market, despite willingness of the
unemployed to work at — or even below — the market wage, indicates failure to clear.  See Bowles & Gintis, supra
note 208, at 172-81.  Because “[n]o actor is capable of improving his or her position by altering a variable over
which he or she has control,” the market is in competitive equilibrium; however, neoclassical assumptions about the
relationship between supply and demand at the equilibrium point do not hold.  See id. at 82.  The party in the
favorable position in a nonclearing market is on the “short side” of the market.  See id. at 183.  In labor markets, this
party usually will be the employer; however, some classes of employees — for example, highly skilled professionals
in a growth sector of the market — may wield short-side power.  See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Vacant Cubicles–A
Special Report: Software Jobs Go Begging, Threatening Technology Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at A1.  
214
  Some consumers, of course, are likely to respond by attempting to develop technological means of their
own to defeat digital CMS. Recently, copyright owners attempted to convince Congress to declare all such
circumvention technologies illegal.  That struggle and its implications for the contested exchange model offered in
this Article are discussed infra in section III.A.2. 
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presumes.211 Bowles and Gintis demonstrate that, at least in the labor market, this is not the
case.212 Most workers are not indifferent to losing their jobs, and this indicates a power
asymmetry between employer and employee.  The employer, who is on the short side of a
nonclearing market, has power over the employee and may use the threat of sanctions to affect
his or her behavior; generally speaking, employees lack equivalent power to dictate the terms
of the exchange.213
From the copyright owner’s perspective, transactions in digital works are contested
exchanges.  It is impossible to know how individuals will use works, and often difficult to
predict how copyright standards such as fair use will apply.  Using the legal system to police
all uses of copyrighted works would be infeasible because of the great expense and difficulty
of monitoring individual use.  Digital rights management contracts and technologies are the
prototypical endogenous enforcement mechanism, and there do not seem to be comparable
enforcement mechanisms available to most consumers.214
Assessing the distribution of power in information markets is more difficult. As noted
above, the conventional economic wisdom regarding producer/consumer markets holds that, at
least when there are no limits on the quantity of goods produced (indisputably the case where
215
  See, e.g., Herbert Gintis, The Power to Switch, in UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM: ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS
IN HONOR OF JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH 65 (Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 1989); supra note 206. Depending on the
product and the range of available alternatives, consumer behavior may be slightly more complex. Where there are
few close substitutes for a product, or where consumers have a degree of product loyalty, consumers initially may
prefer "voice" to "exit." See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
216
  See Gintis, supra note 215.
217
  See BURNS, supra note 5, at 16, 36.
218
  Cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 110 (arguing that copyrighted works should not be treated as
interchangeable commodities in economic models).
219
  It is worth noting that the public-goods rationale for copyright protection accepts that granting the
copyright monopoly will result in a certain amount of "deadweight loss" — that is, that there will be consumers who
wish to transact in the work, but at a price lower than the monopoly price. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at
99. In other words, the right to charge supracompetitive prices is built into the structure of the market for
copyrighted works. It has been argued that this statutory monopoly usually does not translate into market power in
the economic sense, and current antitrust policy reflects this belief. See Guidelines of Apr. 6, 1995, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 113,132, at 20,734; Bell, supra note 5, at 588-89 n.142; Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse
Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1298-99 (1991).
However, the question requires further study. What is the relevant market? How is the substitutability of intellectual
products to be judged? Is any one book about American history, or any one Pulitzer Prize-winning novel, or any one
comic book, as good as any other? For a preliminary exploration of these questions, see Fisher, supra note 26, at
1700-03.
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digital works are concerned), consumer purchasing behavior disciplines the market.215 Gintis
himself has characterized this "power to switch" as a critical determinant of power in the mar-
ket for consumer goods, and has argued that mass-market transactions are best understood as
contested exchanges in which the contested attribute is product quality and consumers have
short-side power.216 In fact, there is some indication that copyright owners are nervous about
their ability to impose technological controls to the full extent that they would like.217 A
preliminary inquiry suggests that it is too early for unqualified optimism, however.
First, the extent of consumer indifference to particular transactions in creative and
informational works is an empirical question that requires investigation. It may be incorrect to
assume that the market in copyrighted works behaves like the markets for consumer goods
such as bread, toothpaste, and vacuum cleaners — or, at least, to assume this in all cases.218
Arguably, some works are more interchangeable, and some types of consumers more discrimi-
nating, than others. Consumers of popular fiction, for example, may recognize more
substitutability than consumers of academic works — or perhaps that is gross elitism, and
perhaps far less substitutability exists among, say, the works of Jackie Collins, Danielle Steel,
and Judith Krantz than among the hypertrophic byproducts of the tenure process. The point is
that there is insufficient information from which to generalize either that the market for
creative and informational works exhibits a high degree of substitutability or that it does not.219
The elasticity of demand for information products also is an open question, and may well vary
220
  Researchers investigating consumer responses to an eight-month-long newspaper strike in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, found that some of consumers' informational needs were filled by other news media, particularly
television. Thus, for example, consumers felt themselves to be well-informed about the candidates in the upcoming
presidential and senatorial elections. They were less aware, however, of candidates for congressional seats and of
local news, sports, and cultural events. See JEFFREY J. MONDAK, NOTHING TO READ: NEWSPAPERS AND ELECTIONS
IN A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 61-67 (1995); Associated Press, Missing News: Pittsburgh Readers Weather Newspaper
Strike, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 12, 1992, at E4; Bob Hertzel, Pirates Merely a Rumor: In Pittsburgh,
Newspaper Strike Has Cut Flow of Information, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 9, 1992, at E3; Reuters, Bad
News: Pittsburgh Mourns Loss of City's Struck Papers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 27, 1992, at 3B. In light of
my arguments about the constrained nature of consumer sovereignty, infra text accompanying notes 221-50, it is
worth noting that the strike directly affected only one of Pittsburgh's two major daily newspapers. Pursuant to a
previous agreement, the other newspaper suspended publication during the strike. See Jeff Barker, Pittsburgh Copes
With Life Without Newspapers: Gaps Are Filled During Strike in Subtle, Significant and Bizarre Ways, BUFFALO
NEWS, Sept. 6, 1992, at A7.
221
  In the mid-1980s, Borland used this strategy to great advantage and discovered that consumers were
willing to pay a higher price for unprotected software. See Paul B. Carroll, On Your Honor: Software Firms Remove
Copy-Protection Devices, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1986, at 86; Philip Elmer-DeWitt, A Victory for the Pirates?
Software Firms Abandon Their Key Defense Against Illegal Copying, TIME, Oct. 20, 1986, at 86.
222
  See General Terms and Conditions for use of the Lexis-Nexis Services (visited Sept. 25, 1998)
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com/lncc/about/terms.html>; West Group Notice of Copyright and Trademarks (visited
Oct. 19, 1998) <http://www.westgroup.com/westhome/copyright.htm>; Contract Between West and University of
Pittsburgh School of Law (on file with author). The prohibition on reverse engineering found in most mass-market
software "licenses" also is remarkably uniform. See, e.g., O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 490-
500. Uniformity does not necessarily indicate economic optimality, moreover. A recent theoretical literature
exploring standardization in corporate contracting practices demonstrates that such standardization can occur for a
variety of reasons unrelated to efficiency, including learning and network externalities and strategic behavior. See,
e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 715-16 (1997); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of
Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997). The implications of this literature for "boilerplate" in the
consumer mass market remain to be explored.
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for different types of works or different types of content.220 Even where consumers are
indifferent as between two different works of the same general type, such as newspapers,
romance novels, or word processing programs, they may feel it important to purchase some
work that falls within that category. Further research is needed to determine whether and to
what extent demand for creative and informational works is independent of their market price.
There is also insufficient information from which to conclude that, in a mature market,
vendors of substitutable products will compete to offer less restrictive access terms. In rapidly
evolving markets, such as the market for personal computing software, new entrants can gain
substantial market share by offering their products without copy-protection, or as unrestricted
shareware.221 In sharp contrast, although the two dominant providers of online legal reference
materials, West and Mead Data Central, compete vigorously on price and service, they seem to
have a firm sense of their shared interest regarding more serious matters such as the scope of
subscribers' contractual rights to use and reuse digital content. Their standard form restrictions
on reuse are remarkably similar.222
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  See Merges, The End of Friction?, supra note 5, at 126; Merges, supra note 61, at 1611-13; O'Rourke,
Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 82; O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 5, at 541-55.
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of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
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227
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Software Firms End Copy Protection, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1986, (Wash. Bus.), at 13 [hereinafter Reid,
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To the extent that a particular work is unique in an economic sense (as opposed to
merely "original"), or that demand for a particular type of work is independent of price and
other terms, it will be the publisher who has the power to dictate the terms of use. Here, the
analysis offered by Merges and O'Rourke illustrates the conceptual limits of the neoclassical
model. They appear to regard works as fungible commodities and do not address
substitutability or elasticity issues. They do recognize the concept of market powei in the
antitrust sense, and even extend that concept to encompass oligopoly that results in substantial
uniformity of the terms of access to digital content.223 Consistent with the received
neoclassical tradition, however, they seem to regard either form of market power as the
extraordinary case.224 This is puzzling; economists have recognized for nearly one hundred
years that where technology creates significant economies of scale, markets tend toward
dominance by a few large players.225 In recent years, many of the major copyright industries
have undergone enormous consolidation.226 If "market success" is defined as a perfectly
competitive, atomistic market comprised of independent transactions in fungible commodities,
it may be that (at least for information markets) market failure is the rule, not the exception.
The neoclassically-grounded understandings of market power and consumer
sovereignty also overlook the fact that power imbalances may arise in markets for reasons
other than market share. In particular, it is worth considering more carefully two oft-cited ex-
amples of consumers' power to affect product offerings in high technology markets. In the
mid-1980s, consumers' vehement unhappiness with software copy-protection devices — and
their persistent and creative efforts to defeat them — drove software manufacturers to abandon
the devices.227  More recently, the failure (or lack of success) of several widely-publicized fee-
Program, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1987, § 2, at 38.
228
  See, e.g., Iver Peterson, Wall Street Journal on Line: Readers Pay but Profits Remain Elusive, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at D8 (describing failure of Microsoft's on-line magazine, Slate, to generate paying
subscribers and uncertain future of Wall Street Journal's Interactive Edition); Jared Sandburg, Web Magazines'New
Battle Cry: Charge,, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1998, at Bl; E-mail from Timothy C. May to Recipients of List CO-E-
CONF (Nov. 7,1996) (on file with author) (proceedings of 25-person online focus group convened by the United
States Copyright Office, as part of its "Project Looking Forward," to discuss the future development of Internet
technology and its implications for copyright); infra note 229. But see infra note 243 (observing that both of these
ventures appear to be succeeding at their second attempts to charge subscribers).
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  Interestingly, these examples have been cited by commentators on all sides of the digital CMS
question. Opponents of the private-law approach to digital copyright use them to argue that consumers will (and
should) reject restrictions on their traditional fair use rights. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office
Be Obsolete in the Twenty-First Century?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 59-60 (1994). They join a cadre of
self-proclaimed "digerati" who assert that information cannot be fenced, and that in order to succeed as business
ventures, purveyors of information must attempt to differentiate themselves on quality of service issues. See, e.g.,
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age,
WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84; Stewart Brand, Finding A Balance in the Slippery Economics of an Information
Age:Depending On Your Perspective, Data’s Free — or Pricless, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,1987; Esther Dyson,
Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 236.  
If this latter group of critics is right, of course, digital CMS do not seem to have much of a future, and the
potential threat to user privileges traditionally afforded by the public law of copyright need not concern us greatly. 
The cybereconomists do not make (or, for that matter, address) that argument, but simply maintain or assume that
consumers will exercise their power to reject particular terms and conditions that they find unpalatable.  See, e.g.,
Bell, supra note 5, at 601-08; O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 81-89.  In fact, however, the
positions staked out by tinkers like Dyson and Barlow, on the one hand, and copyright owners and the copyright
owners and the cybereconomists, on the other, are not as different as they seem.  Perhaps because of their belief that
“information wants to be free,” Dyson and Barlow seem comfortable with the idea that purveyors of digital
information should enjoy broad contractual authority.  See Barlow, supra; Brand, supra; Dyson, supra.  The theory
seems to be that if contractual restrictions on the use of information acquired from any particular vendor cannot
impede the flow of information in society generally, there is no reason not to allow such restrictions.  That theory,
of course, presumes a perfectly functioning neoclassical market of the sort that dos not exist.  See supra section
II.A. 
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based Internet publishing ventures has led some commentators to argue that consumers will
reject pay-per-use schemes for access to digital content.228 Placed in context, however, these
two examples should lead us to question whether the scope of consumer power may be more
limited than has been acknowledged.229  Both episodes may represent little more than
skirmishes in a larger contest that content providers appear to be winning — aided in no small
part by the legal and market institution of the standard form contract, which ensures that
consumers and producers do not start out on the level playing field posited by neoclassical
theory.
The consumer rebellion against software copy-protection devices was both more and
less than the populist revolt that it has come to symbolize.  Although many consumers
objected to copy-protection on principle, others balked at the inconvenience and sheer
frustration the devices entailed.  This latter group included large numbers of corporate and
230
  See e.g., Carroll, supra note 221; Reid, Consumers Win, supra note 227; Reid, Freedom, supra note
227.  
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  See, e.g., Tim Frost, Tales From the Encryption Wars; CD-Secure2 Softwre: CD-Cops Disc Analysis
Software; DiscGuard Encryption Device; CopyLok Encryption Device, ONE TO ONE, Dec. 1, 1997.
232
  See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 221 (quoting complaints of personal computing manager at Coopers &
Lybrand).  
233
  See Reid, Consumers Win, supra note 227; Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 221.  In Hirschman’s terms,
these large corporate customers chose to combine ‘voice” with credible threats of exit.  See HIRSCHMAN, supra note
215, at 30-43.  A key factor in that decision may have been their sizable investments in software and employee
training.  See id., at 92-98 (predicting that high costs of entry may create a “loyalty” effect, which will incline
customers to try voice first in order to preserve their initial investment).  Because of their size, these customers’
threats posed a serious financial risk to software vendors.
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governmental consumers of software products.  Early copy-protection devices prevented users
from creating back-up copies of the floppy disks containing the original copies of the software
and, often, from loading purchased programs onto hard-disk storage for more efficient use.230 
In addition, some devices caused system crashes and peripheral device failures.231  These
problems spelled disaster for organizational users that relied on the copy-protected software to
run thier operations.232 Media coverage of the copy-protection debacle suggests that it was
these consumers whose protests mattered most to software companies.  Deciding factors in
many software companies’ decisions to abandon copy-protection were “the objections of the
big corporations — the kinds of places that tend to have a few hundred IBM PCs spread
around the company,” and the Department of Defense’s ban on the purchase of copy-protected
programs for its own internal use.233
After the software industry had conceded defeat, however, the Software Publishers’
Association undertook an aggressive campaign designed to convince its members’ corporate
customers of their visibility and vulnerability to copyright infringement lawsuits, and made
known that it”would welcome a case to prosecute.”234 Meanwhile, software firms began to
redesign the offending devices.  More recent efforts eliminate many of the undesirable side-
effects of the first-generation devices — for example, by using more durable CD-ROM media
to distribute software products, and encryption coupled with “licensed” authorized-user access
codes, rather than malfunction-prone jamming devices, to protect against copying235 Although
there is still considerable resistance to the idea of copy-protection among some consumer
communities, there is some evidence that these hybrid technological and contractual copy-
236
  See id.; Philip E. Ross, Cops Versus Robbers in Cyberspace, FORBES, Sept. 9, 1996, at 134; A License
You’d Like to Lose, PC MAG. Apr. 22, 1997, at 29; see also Coffee, supra note 234.  It is worth noting that the SPA
and another industry association, the Business Software Alliance, have continued to maintain an aggressive
enforcement stance.  See Susan Athey & John Plotnicki, Would the Software Police Find Your Company Guilty?,
45 J. SYS. MGT., Oct. 1994, at 32; Kelly R. Bowers, Piracy and Penance; How In-House Counsel Deal With
Software Piracy and Make Infringers Pay, 7 CORP. LEG. TIMES, May 1997, at 1; Software Publishers’ Assoc.,
Directory of Piracy/Releases (visited oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.spa.org/piracy/releases>.
237
  See Ken C. Pohlmann, Swashbuckled (digital video disc piracy), VIDEO MAG., Dec. 1, 1996. Despite
the opposition of the home recording industry, music producers successfully lobbied Congress to pass an
amendment to the Copyright Act requiring the installation of serial copy management technology on all digital audio
recording equipment and media. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1101 (1994).
238
  See Nicholas E. Sciorra, Self-Help & Contributory Infringement: The Law and Legal Thought Behind a
Little 'Black-Box,' 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 905, 925-26 (1993).
239
  See id. at 928-29.
240
  See E-Mail from Brian Kahin, Director, Information Infrastructure Project, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, to Recipients of List CO-E-CONF (Nov. 10, 1996) (proceedings of 25-person online focus group
convened by the United States Copyright Office, as part of its "Project Looking Forward," to discuss the future
development of Internet technology and its implications for copyright) (on file with author) ("Metered-use charging
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from Timothy C. May to Recipients of List CO-E-CONF (Nov. 10, 1996) (on file with author).
241
  See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Juan F. Riveros, Economics and Electronic Access to Scholarly
Information, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (Deborah Hurley et al. eds., forthcoming 1998); John Chung-I Chuang & Marvin A. Sirbu, The Bundling
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protection regimes are beginning to achieve market penetration among copy-protection
regimes are beginning to achieve market penetration among corporate customers.236
Experiments with copy-protection devices for other types of mass-marketed works
have yielded varying results.  Thus far, consumers have refused to buy digital audio tape
machines and media outfitted with serial copy management technology and prevents second-
generation copying.237 However, both machines and recording media cost substantially more
than their analog counterparts, and high-fidelity digital sound recordings are already available
on compact disc. Meanwhile, anti-copying devices are routinely incorporated into
videocassettes sold for commercial rental.238 Although anti-anti-copying devices exist, there is
no evidence suggesting that substantial numbers of ordinary consumers use them.239
The track record of pay-per-use models for digital publishing is better. Arguments that
all such models are destined to fail ignore the unequivocal success of online pay-per-use
services aimed at particular market segments — for example, legal and business databases
such as LEXIS-NEXIS, Westlaw, and Dialog.240 Experiments with different bundling and fee
structures for Internet delivery of specialized content to various technical and academic
markets are now underway.241 Library organizations are working to develop policies for
and Unbundling of Information Goods: Economic Incentives for the Network Delivery of Academic Journal
Articles, (visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.ini.cmu.edu/~sirbu/pubs.html>; see also Hal R. Varian, Pricing
Information Goods, (visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/people/hal/papers.htm>; Hal R.
Varian, Versioning Information Goods, (last modified Mar. 13, 1997)
<http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/people/hal/papers.htm> (discussing theoretical issues involved in designing a
pay-per-use regime).
242
  See Hal R. Varian, The Information Economy: How Much Will Two Bits Be Worth in the Digital
Marketplace?, SCI. AM., Sept. 1995, at 200, 201; Mary M. Case, Library Associations Endorse Principles for
Licensing Electronic Resources (last modified July 15, 1997) <http://www.arl.org/newsltr/194/licensing.html>.
243
  See Robin Pogrebin, For $19.95, Slate Sees Who Its Friends Are, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Dl
(reporting that Slate's second attempt to charge for subscriptions generated 17,000 paying subscribers in less than a
month); Sandburg, supra note 228 (noting that two years after the start of the Wall Street Journal's experiment, paid
subscribers to Interactive Edition have tripled and the service is expected to turn a profit in 1999). Moreover, the
failure rate for fee-paid online ventures must be assessed relative to the failure rate for print media ventures aimed at
the consumer mass market.
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  Bowles & Gintis, supra note 208, at 174.
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  See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Political Economy of Contested Exchange, in RETHINKING
POWER 196, 221 (Thomas E. Wartenburg ed., 1992).
246
  See BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 65-66 ("I am free to buy any of the nine brands of toothpaste that
happen to be on the shelf, or to buy none at all. But if I happen to like a different brand of toothpaste — one that
cannot obtain scarce shelf space because of any number of reasons — then I am not free to buy that brand of
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licensing and making available to patrons digital content provided on a pay-per-use basis, and
thousands of for-profit libraries of digital information already exist.242  This suggests that the
question is not whether rights management technologies will be adopted, but the precise forms
they will take in new market segments. Self-evidently, consumers will not pay for information
that is readily available elsewhere at no charge, but the World Wide Web is still in its infancy
as a commercial medium, and the search for business models that might enable Internet
publishers to capture some of the consumer surplus they generate is just beginning.243
What are we to make of these stories? (And why not simply conclude, along with the
cybereconomists, that consumers are becoming accustomed to, and maybe even starting to
like, rights management technologies and contractual pay-per-use regimes?) Consumer
sovereignty is, as Bowles and Gintis note, "a peculiarly toothless kind of sovereignty.”244 It is
structural only; individual consumers generally cannot initiate directed changes in the pattern
of supply.245 It is also largely reactive; "individuals are free not to enter some transactions" but,
unless they happen to be IBM or the Department of Defense, generally are not free to require
that specific products, services, or features be offered.246 To capitalize on the structural power
of aggregate demand in a conscious fashion, ordinary consumers must overcome significant
247
  See BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 65-66; see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33-36, 43-52, 124-31 (4th ed., 1971).
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   See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1000-01 & n.76 (1996) (noting that "effective lobbying for legal change
requires ... sustained investment of effort and resources, and some real-world infrastructure to coordinate that
effort"); OLSON, supra note 247, at 47 (defining communications costs to include costs required "to obtain an
agreement about how the burden will be shared and to coordinate the effort to obtain the collective good").
Digital networks also make it easier for disgruntled consumers to exercise "voice," see HIRSCHMAN, supra
note 215, because it is easier to publicize protests and boycotts widely. See, e.g., David White, Telefonica to Cut
Rates After Protest, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at 24 (describing successful consumer-organized protest against
telephone rate hike in Spain); Leslie Miller, Dion Concert Drawing Protests: Firm Sponsoring Singer's Tour Said
to Trade with Burma Regime, THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Aug. 21, 1998, at 5 (describing use of
Internet to organize a boycott of Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson's consumer products). Hirschman's
analysis suggests, however, that even so, only consumers who feel they have expended significant entry costs will
do so. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 215, at 41-42. For most works, particularly given the low prices the
cybereconomists predict, this perception is unlikely. In addition, consumers who would be inclined to protest must
still overcome the other institutional constraints described in this Part.
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  See BOWLES & EDWARDS, supra note 205; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 79-80, 82-91 (3d ed. 1950).
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  Cf. Goldberg, supra note 79, at 482-83 ("[T]he flow of information can be manipulated to influence
outcomes.... The obvious implication of this is that a group should allocate resources toward the manipulation of
information to induce favorable results.").
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collective action and information costs.247 The same technologies that contribute to the
absence of "friction" may mitigate these problems — by, for example, reducing the
communications costs that attach to organized protest activity — but they cannot eliminate
them.248 Moreover, as the example of software copy-protection technologies demonstrates, the
obstacles to sustained collective action multiply when the category "consumers" includes
multiple constituencies with different priorities.
Mobilizing consumer protest would be difficult enough if markets for particular
products tended to exist in the equilibrium states posited by neoclassical theory. Capitalist
markets, however, are dynamic. In order to produce profits over the longer term, firms must
innovate and adapt to changing marketplace conditions.249 The history of software copy-
protection suggests that if consumers dislike a product feature that is considered important to
an industry's long-term success, or to increased profits, firms are unlikely to give up without a
fight. They may seek to alter the feature to please important customers, but they also will try to
reeducate consumers as to, its desirability.250 In addition, because the major copyright indus-
tries have far fewer producers than consumers, it has been comparatively easy for producer
firms to engage in collective action of their own to promote their shared interests. Thus, for
example, just as the Software Publishers' Association has persuaded — or, depending on one's
point of view, coerced — some consumers to reevaluate software copy-protection, the
Association of American Publishers has taken a leadership role in developing and preaching
251
  See Hearing on H.R. 2281 and 2280, supra note 33, at 204-12 (statement of Allan R. Adler, Vice-
President for Legal and Governmental Affairs, Association of American Publishers); Hearing on H.R. 2441, supra
note 33, at 180-203 (statement of Richard Robinson, Chairman, President, and CEO, Scholastic, Inc., on behalf of
the Association of American Publishers); BURNS, supra note 5, at 59-62; Gervais, From Rights Trading to
Electronic Publishing, supra note 24. For a list of the other industry associations that have advocated the necessity
of digital CMS, see supra note 33.
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respectively. In contrast, the annual incomes of various Digital Future Coalition member organizations were:
Electronic Frontier Foundation, $1.1 million; Electronic Privacy Information Center (1997 data), $200,000; Home
Recording Rights Coalition, $94,000. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ORGANIZATIONS (1998); NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1995).
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intransigence, see infra section III.A.2.
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L. REV., ¶ 88 (draft 1997) <http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Working_Papers/97_Lessig_1/article.htm> ("[I]n fact,
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the virtues of digitalCMS.251 Consumer organizations have grown more skilled at sensing and
responding to industry initiatives, but are comparatively underfunded and understaffed.252
This structural producer-consumer imbalance is amplified by real-world legal and
market institutions that discourage consumer agency. As discussed in section ILA, the legal
rules governing standard form contracts presume consent to most terms in most cases, even as
they reduce the likelihood that consumers will know and understand the terms to which they
supposedly have agreed.253 As Victor Goldberg explains, this regime is not neutral. A societal
choice to delegate most commercial rulemaking to private actors in markets gives the edge to
those groups that organize most efficiently in markets — namely, private firms.254 Under such
a regime, moreover, "the firm's power does not depend on its being large within a particular
market.”255 In the non-digital world, the coercive nature of the standard form is mitigated by
the fact that many consumers simply ignore the restrictions.256 Digital rights management
technologies eliminate that option for most ordinary consumers. Consumers in aggregate may
have (potential) power, but the individual consumer has the "choice" of submitting to the
commands of the standard-form-as-code or doing without the desired work.257 It is not
'like' is not 'is.’”).
258
  See Goldberg, supra note 79, at 484-91; Samuels, Further Limits, supra note 36, at 422 ("Power
structure is a partial input and a partial output of the market."). Consumer advocacy groups have achieved more
success on the legislative front. See infra text accompanying notes 282-85.
Two consumer-driven developments that bear further watching, however, are Linux — a computer
operating system developed by a Finnish university student who was dissatisfied with the products then available on
the market — and the GNU project — a project to develop, share, and collaboratively improve non-proprietary,
"open-source" computer software. See Josh McHugh, For the Love of Hacking, FORBES, Aug. 10, 1998, at 94, Both
software systems trace their origins — and their growing popularity — to a dissatisfaction with proprietary models
for software development that emphasize intellectual property rights and discourage knowledge-sharing. See id.; Ira
V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1997). GNU
products, for example, are distributed under a "General Public License" that requires users to forgo proprietary
rights in their own modifications to the software and dedicate those modifications to the public domain. See Heffan,
supra.
For most ordinary consumers, Linux and the GNU products are esoterica. They require a certain amount of
effort and knowledge to obtain and install; proprietary systems such as Microsoft Windows, meanwhile, come pre-
loaded onto personal computers. See Nicholas Petreley, Down to the Wire: This Happy Linux Camper Is Crying a
River Over All the Political Infighting, INFOWORLD, Aug. 24, 1998. Since its inception in 1993, however, Linux has
earned extremely high ratings for quality and has achieved an installed base of approximately 5 to 10 million users.
See McHugh, supra, at 96; Robert F. Young, Sizing the Linux Market (last revised Mar. 5, 1998)
<http://www.redhat.com/redhat/linuxmarket.html>. While this number is small compared with the estimated 100
million users of Microsoft Windows 95, it has doubled every year. Compare Young, supra, at 6 with Microsoft
Corporation, Windows Momentum (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.microsoft.com/hwdev/presents/respec/melt98/ l_7jima/sld003.htm>. Unlike the vast majority of
Windows users, moreover, Linux and GNU users are fiercely loyal to the software and the principles for which it
stands. See McHugh, supra. Whether Linux and GNU can become significant competition for Windows in the
consumer mass market, and in the OEM licensing market that serves the consumer mass market, will be an
important test of information consumers' power to demand and receive different information products and different
approaches to intellectual property protection.
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  Of course, if utility is synonymous with wealth, as adherents of neoclassically-grounded law and
economics conveniently assume, this simply would mean that consumers do not value decreased control as much as
copyright owners value increased control, and that the market has reached the efficient equilibrium point. Making
wealth the measure of utility, however, grossly oversimplifies utilitarian theory and ignores substantial empirical
and theoretical literatures demonstrating that utility cannot be and is not assessed solely in monetary terms. See
supra text accompanying notes 132, 160.
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particularly surprising that, although consumers have been able to convince manufacturers to
rethink specific experiments with rights management technologies, they do not seem to have
succeeded in using market mechanisms to displace a research, development, and public
relations trajectory dedicated to implementing these techno-contractual regimes in the long
run.258 Indeed, it would seem entirely reasonable to hypothesize that once copyright owners
have developed reliable technologies and reached sufficiently broad consensus on the level of
control to be implemented, consumers may have difficulty using their "power to switch" to
obtain substantial or qualitative change — even if many consumers dislike rights management
technologies and fractional usage rights and believe that they would derive increased utility
from decreased author/owner control.259
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  See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 5.
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  See id. at 1319.
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pioneer Ted Nelson. See Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Intellectual Property Rights for Digital Library
and Hypertext Publishing Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237 (1993).
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Viewed in light of the doubly constrained nature of consumer sovereignty, Merges's
work is both a promising first step toward a model of exchange in information markets and an
excellent example of the dimensional limitations of neoclassically-grounded market models.
Merges's institutional focus underscores the significance of endogenous enforcement
mechanisms in determining market Structure.260 However, he stops short of exploring the
ramifications for power, and appears to presume that market forces will produce an
equilibrium of sorts among collective institutions.261 If every potential reader of a digital work
is also a creator and a member of one of the competing collective enforcement organizations,
this model might be appropriate.262 In practice, however, this is hardly likely to be the case.
Many (if not most) readers will participate in the dynamic process of endogenous enforcement
only in their reactive capacity, as consumers rather than as coequal architects of long-term
rights management strategies. In addition, Merges takes the existing legal and market
institution of the standard form as given, and as a result overlooks the power imbalance that
this institution fosters.
One might object, however, that characterizing consumers as purely reactive overstates
the case. The history of software copy-protection also teaches us that some consumers will
develop and market devices designed to defeat rights management technologies.263 Elsewhere,
I have argued that the law should not prohibit consumers from circumventing digital CMS to
defend privileges traditionally afforded under the public law of copyright, and that federal
copyright law and policy instead should be interpreted affirmatively to authorize such
conduct.264 Considered within the “contested exchange” framework, such technological
countermeasures are simply consumers’ way of attempting to restore “bilateral power” to the
contest. 265  This, however, does not seem to be the sort of market competition the
cybereconomists contemplate, and here the existing institutional framework of the standard
form contract becomes vitally important.  Under a private-law regime of rights in digital
266
  See Hardy, supra note 5, at 235-36; cf. I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web
Sites, 1996 J. ONLINE L. art. 7 ¶¶ 5-6 (1996) <http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/hardy/html> (suggesting that
undesired entry upon digital “property” could be viewed, by analogy to real property, as trespass).  For three years
copyright owners have been seeking legislation at the state level designed to accomplish precisely this result, along
with federal legislation that would make circumventing digital CMS illegal.  See Hearing on H.R. 2281 and 2280,
supra note 33.  See U.C.C. ART. 2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998), supra note 24, §§ 2B-208, -310, -
-714, -715; sources cited supra note 33.  Thus, copyright owners themselves do not seem to be relying purely on
markets to achieve their desired goals.  This observation and its implications for the cybereconomists’ argument
about the appropriate forum for social choice are discussed infra section III.A.2.  
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   See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 208, at 184; supra note 213.  
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  See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.  
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works, designed as a technological analogue of the standard form contract to which consumers
have grown accustomed (or inured) in other contexts use of consumer-developed technologies
to circumvent digital CMS would constitute a breach of contract.266  Under such a regime,
consumers’ power to contest the terms of exchanges in digital works in the market arena
would be substantially curtailed.
This line of reasoning, however, suggests a more general objection to modeling
transactions in digital works as “contested exchanges,” which arises within the model itself. 
Bowles and Gintis suggest that “superior” enforcement strategies may develop that would
eliminate short-side power and enable markets to clear.267 Arguably, even if publishers
currently have greater bargaining power than consumers, digital rights management
technologies will eliminate or mitigate this power.  As envisioned by copyright owners and
their supporters in the academy, digital CMS and the private law of contract will replace the
uncertain terrain delineated by fair use and other statutory exemptions with a menu of neatly
defined, individiually priced usage rights from which consumers may choose.268 There will be,
quite simply, nothing left to contest.  This description, however, conveniently overlooks the
fact that, from the user’s perspective, the central issue in the contest over usage rights is one of
institutional design — whether copyright owners should be allowed to adopt such technologies
of control, and the contract-based regime that they effectuate , at all.  From this perspective,
the evolving publisher-consumer struggle over copy-protection and pay-per-use technologies
has been one long contested exchange concerning institutional choice, the outcome of which is
still uncertain.
Bowles and Gintis observe that the more powerful party to a contested exchange will
attempts to select production technologies that maximize its ability to enforce its desired
standards, even though those technologies might not be the optimal ones by some other
measure.  Thus, for example, in certain sectors of the labor market, the assembly line
establishes quantitative, automatically-enforced standards for work performance; in others, the
technology of choice is the computer that measures words typed or grocery items scanned per
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rules of the game not seek further profits by altering the rules of the game as well — especially when its structure
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minute.269 Closer to the institutionalist mainstream, Goldberg observes that it is simply rational
for parties to seek additional profits by altering existing institutions to their advantage.270  The
digital rights management movement exemplifies this type of rational self-interest, but that
does not make it the best solution for society generally.  The fact that a technology may enable
market formation is not the sole criterion of merit; technologies also shape markets and
entitlements by creating some options and foreclosing others.271  We are back to the same
question that Hardy’s property-rights proposal raises, posed in a slightly different form: Do
digital CMS enable development of the socially optimal market structure — i.e., the one that
optimizes overall or social welfare?  The answer, once again, depends on the social-welfare
function that we are seeking to optimize.  Before turning to that question, however, it is worth
briefly considering how the process of collective choice through legislation affects, and is
affected by, the dynamic of contested exchange in the market of digital works.
2. Collective Action, "Rent-Seeking, "and Public Choice
The cybereconomists contend that the public-law regime of copyright and the
legislative process that produced it are inefficient and inherently coercive, and that rights in
digital works should be determined through voluntary, definitionally private, market trans-
actions.272 I have argued, however, that private ordering necessarily presupposes a prior public
commitment to recognizing and enforcing a particular distribution of entitlements. Attempts to
seek legislative change or clarification may, and often do, reflect attempts by economic
interest groups to capture the public process, but it does not follow that the existing regime is
entitled to any special presumption of legitimacy. An existing regime also may reflect the
results of earlier interest-group capture. Against the backdrop of contested exchange, it is only
reasonable to expect interest groups to use all available venues to advance their interests.273
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Copyright Act. It is conceivable that a private-law regime based solely on the use of contract to opt out of the
copyright system could be implemented via judicial refusal to hold such contracts preempted. See supra text
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When legislative change is sought, the real question is whether shared conceptions of social
welfare warrant reconsideration of the framework of entitlements and contract rules that
supports the existing market.
Copyright owners' current efforts to strengthen their existing rights suggest that they, at
least, are well aware that public and private realms cannot be so neatly separated. Consistent
with their philosophy of absolute ownership and control, and with Goldberg's predictions
about the causes and directions of institutional drift, organizations representing the major
copyright industries have for the last three years been seeking legislation from Congress that
would make technologies for circumventing digital CMS illegal regardless of their intended
use.274 Simultaneously, at the state level, many of the same organizations are pursuing
revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code that would make standard form contract terms im-
posed by digital CMS enforceable, even if they abrogate the balance established by copyright
law, as long as consumers have the opportunity to review the terms, and are required to
indicate assent, before first using the work.275 Proposed Article 2B of the UCC also would
expressly validate technological restrictions on access to and use of digital works, including
mechanisms that cut off user access to the work entirely in the event of a perceived breach.276
Although neither proposal addresses the ultimate question of copyright preemption, as a
practical matter either set of changes would go a long way toward establishing the private-law
regime that the cybereconomists propose. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how their private-
law model of rights in digital works could be implemented fully without some legislative
restructuring of the current system.277
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279
   See Peter H. Schuck, Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POLY.
REV. 553, 566-67 (1997); see also id. at 576 (noting that group size and funding are not the only advantages that
count).
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  The cybereconomists do not argue this expressly, but only that the legislative process is comparatively
costly and therefore less efficient than the market. As in the Lochner-era cases, however, the clear implication is
that legislation intended to protect "have-nots" is no less invasive of economic liberty - and indeed, very likely more
so - than legislation intended to protect "haves." See supra note 115.
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  See supra text accompanying note 100.
282
  See also Schuck, supra note 279, at 576-78 (cataloguing potential sources of advantage, other than
group size and funding, for interest groups in the legislative arena). Representatives of consumer groups have had
greater difficulty penetrating the UCC drafting process, which does not involve public officials. See U.C.C. ART.
2B: LICENSES (Annual Meeting Draft July 1998), supra note 24 (listing members of drafting committee); id. at Pref-
ace: Part I (describing drafting process); Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will
Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair To Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 81-93 (1997). The default rules that govern
consumer transactions also are one step removed from copyright concerns. It seems reasonable to suggest that with
each degree of removal, the benefits of collective action become more difficult for individual consumers to value,
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Public-choice analysis predicts that consumers will experience a comparative
disadvantage in the legislative arena. The public-choice critique of the legislative process
focuses on the power of small, well-organized interest groups to extract results more favorable
than they could obtain in the market. The theory posits that collective action is less likely to
occur when an interest group has many members and the benefits of proposed legislation
would be diffuse. Under those conditions, group members are likelier to conclude that the
costs of collective action outweigh the benefits, and/or to engage in opportunistic free riding
on others' efforts.278 Consumers are a paradigmatic example of this sort of group. To an extent,
predictions of consumer disempowerment are overstated; as Peter Schuck points out,
consumer advocacy groups have achieved legislative successes that defied the predictions of
public choice theory.279 Certainly, however, there is no reason to think that consumers are
more likely than copyright owners to exert undue influence over the content of copyright
legislation.280 As noted above, copyright owners have a long history of seeking, and receiving,
expanded rights and other special protections from Congress.281
Consumers' power to affect the positive content of rules governing the distribution of
entitlements may be greater in the legislative arena than in the market, however. As an initial
matter, we have seen that collective action also plays an important strategic role in the
consumer mass market; consumer groups face the same obstacles to organization in either
venue. But, as discussed above, consumer power in the marketplace flows largely from the
negative “power to switch" as exercised by individuals. Consumers cannot claim the right or
authority to participate in decisions about product development, or in the selection and
drafting of standard form contract terms, in the same way that they can assert a right to be
heard by their elected representatives.282 Second, just as digital communications technologies
with the result that the barriers to collective action are even harder to overcome.
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  See Angela Drolte Gregorits & Jennifer B. Lucas, Most Information Age Legislation Stalled By Lack of
Consensus, Hill Sources Say, 66 PAT., COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. 2259, 2261 (1997); Cohen, supra note 9, at
164-71; Digital Future Coalition, Collected Position Papers, Letters, and Press Releases (visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://www.dfc.org/>.
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   See Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048,105th Cong. (1997); Digital Copyright
Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997); Digital Future Coalition
(visited Oct. 11, 1998) <http://www.dfc.org/>.
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House on Aug. 4, 1998. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998); WIPO
Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997); Senate Approves Digital Copyright Act;
Similar Proposal Moving Through House, 66 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2710 (1998). The Senate version - essentially the
same as the version backed by copyright owner groups - would have imposed an outright ban on circumvention of
digital CMS, with a few narrow exceptions. The House version - essentially the version adopted - instead imposes a
two-year moratorium on the anti-circumvention provision and requires ongoing oversight by the Librarian of
Congress to determine the provision's impact on access to and fair use of digital works.  Compare S. 2037, supra, §
103 with H.R. 2281, supra, § 3; see DMCA, supra note 114. Although the Act includes a ban on circumvention
technologies that is not directly subject to the moratorium and oversight provisions, it also contains exceptions for
software reverse engineering and encryption research. See DMCA, supra note 114, at § 103. Finally, it provides that
the extra rights granted to copyright owners shall not be construed to "enlarge or diminish any rights of free speech
or the press for activities using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing products." See id. The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act is by no means an unqualified "victory" for consumers; for example, it does not
contain the across-the-board fair use exemption to the anti-circumvention provision that consumer groups had
proposed. See H.R. 3048, supra note 284; S. 1146, supra note 284. Nonetheless, the Act contains important
safeguards that were not in the bill as originally proposed.
Particularly in light of this example, it is important to stress the narrowness of the argument made in the
text. The claim is not that consumers have equal or even substantial bargaining power in the public arena, but only
that the potential exists in that arena, as it does not in the market, for consumers to exert power in a mode that is
other than purely reactive, and thus to shape policy. In that respect, consumers appear to be slightly better off.  Cf.
Goldberg, supra note 79, at 491 ("The point is that as badly as the consumer is likely to fare in the legislative arena,
he is likely to be relatively better off than if he were 'free' to negotiate voluntary agreements to determine liability.").
Ultimately, the distinction may not count for much; on that question, it is too soon to tell.
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can reduce consumers' collective action costs in markets, they also can reduce the costs of
collective action directed at government. Due to a combination of these two factors, the
Digital Future Coalition, a coalition of public interest and consumer groups that has made
extensive use of the Internet, kept the proposed legislation banning circumvention
technologies stalled in committee for over two years.283 During that time, the coalition and its
members worked with sympathetic legislators to submit competing legislation and to propose
amendments to the opposing bills — steps that they would not have been able to take in the
consumer mass market.284 As a result of this input, the anti-circumvention legislation
ultimately enacted differs significantly from that originally proposed.285
Nonetheless, the fact that consumers may have slightly more power, or a different kind
of power, in the legislative arena than in the market does not take us very far toward
286
   See Elhauge, supra note 102, at 49-52.
287
  See id. at 53-56; cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 98-104 (discussing public choice theorists'
presumption of inefficiency in "political markets"); supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
288
  Nor, I would argue, can one do so in most other cases. See BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 175-83;
Ve1janovski, supra note 104, at 19.
289
  See Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 81-89, 94-106; see also BROMLEY, supra note 36, at 224 ('[I]f
markets do not perform well in a given situation, is it valid then to judge nonmarket processes by market
performance indicators?"); Leff, supra note 36, at 468 ("[I]t is at least plausible that the 'weaknesses' in the political
system, such as its frustration of allocational efficiency, are really complementary to, or even corrective of,
'weaknesses' in the economic system, such as its tendency to distribute power in proportion to wealth . . . ... );
Steams, supra note 102, at 1240-45 (showing that legislatures are better suited than markets to correct for some
types of market failure); cf. Goldberg, supra note 79, at 481 ("The voting power of the poor might be relatively
stronger than its financial power.").
290
  Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Exchange on Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 840, 842 (1990) ("It is easy to
begin with the observation that policyrnaking is indeterminate, and conclude by finding fault with the democratic
institutions or procedures that we use for making policy decisions. But often the failure is not in the institutions or
procedures, but rather in our inability to produce objectively correct answers to policy questions.").
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understanding whether their influence on the legislative process is "undue." Deciding how
much influence is "proper" for a particular group requires reference to what Einer Elhauge has
described as "normative baselines" concerning the rules of decision in social choice
situations.286 For the cybereconomists, as for public choice theorists generally, the implicit
normative baseline is that legislative outcomes should not differ from those obtainable in the
(existing) market, and that the efficient outcome in either venue is that which maximizes
private wealth.287 Thus, should consumers manage to obtain legislation that limits copyright
owners' "liberty of contract" or derogates from their control of their property, the
cybereconomists probably would find a prima facie case of abuse. But, as section ILB
discussed, in the case of copyrighted works one cannot simply assume that private wealth and
social welfare are equivalent.288 Once one allows for a broader conception of overall social
welfare than that reflected in markets, it is at least possible that nonmarket mechanisms for
collective choice may bring us closer to achieving it. The legislative process operates
differently than the market by design; it is intended to maximize votes, not wealth, and reflects
a considered judgment that vote-maximization is often the better test of a policy's validity.289
Whether the legislative process or the existing market is the better arena for determining the
scope of rights in digital works depends on how the societal goals of access and progress are
understood.290 To that question we now turn.
B. Information and Social Welfare
Because the cybereconomists assume that maximizing the monetary reward to
copyright owners will produce the greatest gain for society as a whole, they leave unexplored
the question whether social interests and social welfare might be better served by a limited-
291
  In keeping with the metaphor of Newtonian physics, and in the spirit of efforts to move beyond it,
perhaps we might characterize externalities as electro-magnetic emanations arising from (and undermining) the
assertedly frictionless interactions of online commerce.
292
  See supra note 50.
293
  See Demsetz, supra note 121, at 348.
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entitlements regime that enables some uncontrolled access to and use of digital content. In
fact, there is reason to doubt that the cybereconomists' market-based model captures the total
social value generated by transactions in creative and informational works. Recent work in the
economics of information suggests that these transactions generate shared positive
externalities that must be considered when comparing the existing limited-entitlements regime
with possible alternatives. Many of these benefits are experienced as public goods and likely
would be underproduced under a private-law regime of rights in digital works. Thus, under
such a regime, the mix of benefits and costs generated by creative and informational works
would be different than it is now.
To value these alternatives accurately, we must define the applicable social welfare
function. How should "access" and "progress" be understood, and why? Which combination of
benefits and costs is optimal? A more comprehensive understanding of individual preferences
and motivations requires that we consider both market and nonmarket answers to these
questions. Creative and informational works affect individual and social self-determination in
a variety of ways, many of which are not registered, much less measured, by markets. It would
be reasonable and entirely legitimate to conclude that the current limited-entitlements regime,
or something like it, is best-suited to promote our society's distinctive blend of market and
nonmarket values.
1. Externalities in Information Markets
Assessment of the social value produced by a given digital intellectual property regime
would be incomplete without inquiry into the externalities generated by transactions in
creative and informational works. Yet the cybereconomists' market model for digital property
rights leaves the topic of externalities almost entirely unexplored.291 In part, this may be due to
a curiously circular approach to analyzing externalities that has emerged within the
neoclassically-grounded branch of the new institutional economics.292 In his pioneering work
in the study of property-based institutions, Demsetz argued that private institutions will evolve
in the way that maximizes overall efficiency, and defined externality as any activity the
internalization of which is precluded by transaction costs.293 As Papandreou observes, "[i]t
would seem then that externality poses no efficiency problems, since taking beneficial and
harmful effects into account where transaction costs are too high would lead to efficiency
losses. In fact, at any given time, the economic system would seem to be tautologically
294
  PAPANDREOU, supra note 132, at 198.
295
  See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 38-40, 139-46; Demsetz, supra note 121.
296
  Although there is a substantial political theory literature addressing these questions, economists
studying the effects of information have tended to focus more narrowly on information about the objects of
transactions, rather than on information as the object of transactions. See BOYLE, supra note 168, at 29, 35-41
(discussing the conundrum that the neoclassical "perfect-information" model for market transactions presents for
transactions in information). But see R.H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods
and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1974). For recent efforts to address the unique theoretical
problems posed by an information-based economy, see DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 40; Danny T. Quah, The
Invisible Hand and the Weightless Economy, London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance,
Occasional Paper No. 12 (Apr. 1996) <http://cep.Ise.ac.uk/papers/occasional/download/op0012.pdf>.
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  See BOYLE, supra note 168, at 29, 35-41; see also DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 40.
298
  See PAPANDREOU, supra note 132, at 13-68 (describing debate over correct definition and summarizing
the leading approaches).
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efficient.”294 Thus, one might expect new institutional scholarship in the Demsetz mold to
devote scant attention to the question whether a particular externality (here, uncompensated
benefits to information consumers) might require or justify a particular institutional structure
(here, divided or "incomplete" entitlements) despite higher transaction costs.
Possibly, though, the cybereconomists may have failed to consider externalities
relating to a pure property-and-contract approach to digital works because it is difficult to
understand what externalities in information markets might look like. The externalities treated
in the economics literature tend to be the kind that have perceptible effects on the physical
world — pollution, overfishing, and so on.295 Information, by contrast, is intangible; as a
result, its effects on society and social structure are poorly understood.296  In addition, as James
Boyle has observed, because the neoclassical market model presumes perfect information, it is
particularly unsuited to analyzing transactions of which information is the object.297 Might
there be identifiable externalities in information markets, and if so, what can they tell us about
the appropriate institutional structure(s) for such markets?
These questions are complicated by the fact that the precise definition of "externality"
is unclear. Leading candidates include the failure of markets to form, the Demsetz transaction-
cost approach (which modifies the market-failure test), coercion (in the sense of costs or
benefits imposed upon third parties in an interdependent system), and what Papandreou terms
a "phenomenological approach" that focuses on specific events such as pollution or over-
harvesting of a natural resource.298 Papandreou distills from these definitions two potentially
conflicting senses of "externality": (1) a consequentialist sense, which he interprets as
identifying the failure of a current system/institution to optimize an agreed-on social welfare
function; and (2) an intrinsic-characteristic sense, which he interprets as identifying only those
failures to optimize that flow from the absence of an intrinsically valued institutional structure
299
  See id. at 169-81.
300
  See id. at 200-02.
301
  See Samuels, Welfare Economics, supra note 36, at 9, 11-15; see also BARTLETT, supra note 102, at
43-44.
302
  See BARTLETT, supra note 102, at 43-44; Ezra J. Mishan, The Effects of Externalities on Individual
Choice, 1 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 97 (1981); Samuels, Welfare Economics, supra note 36, at 52-53; cf. Victor P.
Goldberg, Production Functions, Transactions Costs and the New Institutionalism, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY
MICROECONOMICS 395, 399-400 (George Feiwel ed., 1984) (defining "transactions costs" as "a shortfall from what
could have been achieved if [existing] institutions worked perfectly").
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— for example, the absence of private property rights.299 He demonstrates that both senses are
present to some degree, and in tension, in each definition.
Returning briefly to the Demsetz approach, it should be obvious that, from a societal
perspective, whether entitlements should be reconfigured to internalize a particular externality
depends on much more than the parties' perception of the tradeoff between the externality and
the transaction costs. Concluding that private assessment of transaction costs will produce the
optimal institutional structure requires at least two counterfactual assumptions. One must
assume that overall or social benefits and costs are simply the sum of private monetary
benefits and costs, and that private parties will not engage in rent-seeking behavior designed to
alter the rules to their advantage.300 As the discussion in Part II and section III.A suggests, in
the context of copyright each of these propositions is debatable, to say the least. That
copyright owners have discovered a way to reconfigure transactions that currently generate
significant uncompensated benefits in order to capture those benefits for themselves says
nothing about whether the result will be efficient from a societal perspective; indeed, there is
good reason to believe otherwise. Moreover, rent-seeking behavior by copyright owners is the
rule rather than the exception. The cybereconomists, like Demsetz before them, escape the
uncertainties that these observations introduce into the efficiency analysis by resorting
(implicitly) to Papandreou's second definition of "externality," and positing the normative
superiority of private property and contract rights.
The pure (non-neoclassical) institutionalist approach to externalities avoids these
difficulties, but at the price of indeterminacy. Institutional theory begins by recognizing that
individual choice is constrained by both the individual's resources and the menu of op-
portunities presented by existing legal institutions. In this sense, individual choice is always
(to a degree) coerced.301 Externalities, therefore, are the costs and benefits that a particular
regime of entitlements and resource distribution imposes on individuals via the constraints it
places on their choices.302 Because institutional theory expressly acknowledges the
contingency of costs and benefits, it is ultimately less contingent and broader in scope than the
Demsetz approach; rather than taking the existing legal and market framework as given, it
allows consideration of alternative entitlements structures and distributive concerns. One
cannot choose between different systems of entitlements and their corresponding externalities,
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  See Samuels, Welfare Economics, supra note 36, at 61.
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  See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225, at 6 (citing Katz & Shapiro, supra, and Joseph
Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985)); see also
S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994,
at 133 (arguing that the concept of "network externality" should be narrowed to exclude so-called "pecuniary"
externalities or indirect network effects, which merely reflect the ordinary functioning of markets).
306
  See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 305, at 424-25; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225, at 496-97; Mark
A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255, 287 (1997); Peter S. Menell,
Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1340-45, 1357-58 (1987). It is worth
noting that consumers also may experience negative network effects if "lock-in" perpetuates a particular software
platform or standard even after more desirable alternatives have emerged. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225,
at 505-06; Menell, supra, at 1342-43.
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however, without some a priori notion of value.303 Thus, an agreed-on social welfare function
— as required under either of Papandreou's two definitions — becomes central to further
analysis.
Finally, Papandreou's two senses of externality raise a definitional problem of their
own concerning the concept of positive externality, or uncompensated benefit. Using
Papandreou's consequentialist formulation, one might define a positive externality as
overperformance, or optimization to a degree that exceeds expectations, by a current
system/institution. Using his intrinsic-characteristic formulation, one might say that "positive
externality" refers to the presence of an intrinsically valued institutional structure even where
that structure is not necessary to optimize social welfare. It is hard to see how either of these
definitions differs from a conclusion that the current system/institution is performing well with
respect to the agreed-on criterion of social welfare, even though the benefit in question is not
the subject of a market exchange.304 If so, perhaps the social-welfare function requires modi-
fication to encompass nonmarket indicia of satisfactory performance. With these definitional
issues in mind, I turn to the specific problem of externalities in information markets.
It has long been recognized that certain types of high-technology informational works
create a species of externality characterized as "network effects." Network effects arise when
consumers derive increased utility from a good as other consumers purchase the same or
compatible goods.305 Computer operating systems are one example of such a good. As a
particular operating system becomes more prevalent, software developers write more
applications for that operating system, which in turn gives consumers a greater range of
options.306 Computer applications programs and user interfaces also generate network effects
as they become more popular. Consumers benefit from the ability to share files and migrate
307
  See Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods, 20 J. PUB. ECON.
231, 231-32 (1983); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225, at 497; Lemley & O'Brien, supra note 306, at 287; Peter
S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045,
1066-71 (1989).
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often been associated with 'nonmonetizable' values for which market situations do not exist or with ‘external
benefits' for which compensation is difficult to realize." (footnotes omitted)); M.B.W. Sinclair, Fair Use Old and
New: The Betamax Case and its Forebears, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 269, 282-83 (1984) ("Taking into account the
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them between platforms, and from decreased retraining costs as applications and interfaces
become standardized among employers.307
Less attention has been paid to the question of whether other types of creative and
informational works also generate network or other externality effects. From time to time,
judges and scholars writing about fair use have referred to the "external" or societal benefits
generated by a particular use of copyrighted content.308  However, until very recently, none has
attempted to develop a more detailed economic model of these benefits.309 As a result, the
understanding of the positive externalities generated by creative and informational works
remains vague, in contrast to the seeming elegance and precision of the cybereconomists'
"Newtonian" model of a frictionless trading environment.
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It is possible, however, to conceive of an economic model in which the shared benefits
of information are the central focus rather than a peripheral concern. Technologist Philip Agre
notes the importance of discursive spaces within which cultures define values and set policy
agendas.310 He observes that, in addition to facilitating Newtonian markets, information and
networked information technologies constitute, and are constituted by, knowledge
communities.311 (In fact, this phenomenon has always existed — consider, for example, The
Wealth of Nations, The Federalist Papers, Das Kapital, or Mein Kampf — but it is quite
possible that digital networks amplify its effects.) It is through this irreducibly reflexive
process, manifested in the public sphere as well as in the market, that the social meanings and
structural roles of information are created and defined.312 Agre's analysis of the role of
information and the centrality of the public sphere in the process of social selfdefinition
suggests that where information is concerned, the neoclassical market model gets notions of
value exactly backwards. Societal benefits (and costs) from the dissemination of information
and the spread of information networks are not “an artifact of marginal ‘externalities’”; rather,
they are central elements in the social welfare equation.313 What is needed is an economic
model that takes these elements into account.
One place to begin constructing such an economic model is a provocative theory about
the externality effects of information advanced by media scholar Benjamin Bates.314 Bates
takes as his starting point the generally-accepted observation that information goods fail to
satisfy "basic economic and optimality conditions" such as the equality of marginal cost and
marginal revenue.315 Bates argues that this observation results from failure to identify all of the
costs and benefits associated with information exchange. In particular, the use of information
creates "ancillary value" for parties other than the immediate user, and Bates contends that this
value should be factored into an economic model of the information market. The model should
include not only "ancillary private value," but also the "ancillary social value" that accrues to
316
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the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 400 & n.284 (1995); Netanel, supra note 36, at 347-51.
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society generally.316 Examples of the latter include the benefits to society that flow from the
use of information goods in education.317 Bates suggests that markets recognize certain types
of ancillary value, but that ancillary social value generally is not recognized by markets, and so
is realized as a positive externality.318 If so, then absent some form of government involvement
in information markets, "firms and individuals are more likely to overconsurne information
goods with high ancillary social costs and underconsume those with high ancillary social
benefits.”319
A second source of insight into the diverse kinds of value generated by transactions in
information is C. Edwin Baker's pioneering exploration of the patterns of supply and demand
in mass media markets.320 Baker identifies ten categories of externalities produced by mass
media products, including the "quality of public opinion and political participation"; recipients'
interactions with others; recipients' impact on the information products available to others;
"exposing and deterring abuses of power"; diffusion of information to nonpaying recipients;
and positive and negative effects on the information's subjects and sources.321 Some of these
externalities accrue to distinct third parties, but many constitute ancillary social value (or loss).
Nor should this surprise us. Logically, the nature and quality of the information available
within a community' will affect the nature and quality of human choices and interactions,
individual and collective, in both the market and the public sphere.322 Like Bates, Baker
reasons that mass media products that generate net social benefits will tend to be
underproduced. He also demonstrates that the demand for mass media products is shaped by
323
  See Baker, supra note 320, at 328-29, 333-37, 336 (showing that "the success of advertiser-supported
media will result in failure of more differentiated, competitive daily newspapers, of some general audience
magazines, and of magazines that appeal to groups whose interests do not overlap with use of any particular set of
consumer products" (emphasis added)); id. at 337-46 (showing that, in advertiser-supported media, competition
among media products designed for the same demographic group wastes resources, drives out media products that
might appeal more strongly to diverse groups, and thus produces less overall value); see also BAGDIKIAN, supra note
226, at 111; BAKER, supra note 226.
324
  Baker is skeptical about the value of the market as a measure of social value in any event.  See Baker,
supra note 320, at 385-97; infra text accompanying notes 337-51.
325
  See Bates, supra note 314, at 81 ("The use of information changes the system, not only for the
individual using the information, but for others as well. Clearly, such changes in the system can result in changes in
the status, relationships, and opportunities of others within the system . . . .”); Baker, supra note 320, at 349
("Many, probably most, of the media's effects on third parties occur through media content's effect on its audiences'
thinking, beliefs, preferences . . . .").
326
  Lemley, supra note 6, at 1056; see also Loren, supra note 111, at 51-53; Weinreb, supra note 104, at
1242.
327
  See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1056-58; Loren, supra note 111, at 51-53; see also Gordon, supra note
128, at 1042.
328
  See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1057-58; see also Lemley & McGowan, supra note 225, at 71-73
(describing social benefits accruing from reverse engineering of industry standard software platforms).
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the priorities of advertisers and thus presents a distorted picture of actual audience demand
even without regard to externalities.323 He concludes that the demand expressed in mass media
markets cannot possibly be a reliable or complete indicator of information products' value, or
of audience needs and desires.324
These arguments about the importance of "ancillary" effects are based on the inherently
transformative nature of information.325 It is likely, however, that some ancillary social value
also results from the current common-ownership structure of creative and informational
content, which facilitates cross-pollination — which in turn amplifies information's
transformative effects. In a related vein, both Mark Lemley and Lydia Loren have suggested
that certain uses of copyrighted works that produce uncompensated social benefits "may not be
efficiently produced under a property rights licensing scheme.”326 This is so, they argue,
because the would-be user cannot capture the full value of his or her use as revenue. Ac-
cordingly, he or she will tend to undervalue the use, and will be unwilling to pay the price that
the copyright owner demands.327 A particularly clear example is the reverse engineering of
copyrighted software, which benefits competition in the abstract.328 In other cases, such as
news reporting, public criticism and comment, scholarly research, and classroom instruction,
users may be disinclined (or simply unable) to pass increased license fees through to their
customer base because of limitations imposed by other institutional and social values — for
329
  See Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 111-13; Lemley, supra note 6, at 1056-57; Netanel, supra note 36.
330
  See Agre, Public Discourse, supra note 310; Agre, Mixed Metaphors, supra note 310; Baker, supra
note 320, at 350-66; Cohen, supra note 248, at 1006-07; Elkin-Koren, supra note 322, at 400; Fisher, supra note 38,
at 10-12; Fisher, supra note 26, at 1768-74; Netanel, supra note 36, at 347-51.
331
  Consider, as well, public television, public radio, and public arts funding programs — all of which are
perennially challenged by those who believe the market is the best determinant of public benefit. Bates's theory casts
additional doubt on that view. See generally BAKER, supra note 226; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (2d ed. 1995); Baker, supra note 320.
Indeed, for these reasons, Baker suggests that the incentive system established by copyright is perverse. He
contends that by placing a premium on entertainment value and affording low protection to primarily factual works,
copyright encourages the production of works with low social value. See Baker, supra note 320, at 326; see also
Breyer, supra note 26, at 286-87 (suggesting that other, nonmarket systems for funding original expression might be
better tailored to encourage the production of "serious" works); Lunney, supra note 6 (arguing that strong copyright
protection for works with primarily entertainment value creates an unacceptable opportunity cost for society);
Weinreb, supra note 104, at 1240-41 (noting the potentially market-distorting effect of the legislative grant of
copyright). That result is less a consequence of copyright's protection of original expression, however, than of the
market- and advertiser-driven system that (as Baker so well explains) rewards popularity more highly than critical
acclaim. See Baker, supra note 320, at 328-46. Moreover, as Baker realizes and as this Article attempts to show,
extending property-like protection to facts and ideas in an effort to right any perceived imbalance would most likely
make matters worse. See id. at 327.
332
  See Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 98-99; Fisher, supra note 26, at 1700-04.  
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example, the value placed on the free exchange of ideas in education, scholarship, and public
debate, or the value placed on access to free public libraries and schools.329
In sum, the foregoing analysis suggests that the current market for creative and
informational works generates at least two different kinds of ancillary social benefit. First,
society — and all of the individuals who comprise it — realizes benefits from the content of
certain works. Creative and informational works educate and inform the public, shape
individual and community perceptions of the world, and set the parameters of public debate.330
Because positive externalities, by definition, are not compensated in the market, one would
expect most of the demand for many works that generate positive externalities — most
scholarly books and many specialized or technical journals, as well as the textbooks and other
materials used in elementary, secondary, and university classrooms — to arise in the public
and educational sectors.331 Second, social benefit accrues from the rights to access and use
unprotected, public domain elements of existing works, and to re-use and transform existing
works in certain settings and circumstances. These rights and practices lead to the develop-
ment of creative and scholarly talents and, ultimately, to the creation of new works — from
which society may benefit further.
In part, of course, information goods fail to satisfy what Bates identifies as "economic
optimality conditions" because of the existence of intellectual property rights, which are
expressly designed to allow pricing above marginal cost.332 Thus, the intellectual property
333
  See Elkin-Koren, supra note 6, at 99; Fisher, supra note 26, at 1700-04.  
334
  Cf. Meurer, supra note 38, at 881 (arguing that consumers will pay more for copyrighted works if they
know that they can share them with family and friends).
335
  See Hardy, Proper Legal Regime, supra note 46, at 1025-26 (characterizing private copying as an
uncompensated externality); supra text accompanying notes 152-79; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 178-79;
John Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other Than for Profit or Sale
Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 647 (1984); Gordon, supra note 28, at 1630-32. See generally Netanel, supra note 36, at 323-24. This
perspective underscores the institutional economists' point that coercion is in the eye of the beholder. See supra text
accompanying note 301.
336
  See supra text accompanying note 34. See also supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
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system accepts as inevitable a certain amount of "deadweight loss.”333 The argument that
monopoly pricing is sufficient to explain the peculiarities of information economics, however,
begs the question. If the public is willing to pay the prices set by copyright owners, we must
ask what the public believes it is paying for, and what copyright owners believe they are
selling. Any answer to that question must take existing statutorily-mandated public access and
use rights into account. Individuals do not buy copyrighted works out of an abstract sense of
economic efficiency or authorial desert; they buy them for the benefits they expect to receive
under the existing entitlements regime.334 Public and university libraries and school systems
purchase works that they believe will generate benefits for their user communities, and count
among those benefits those that the public law of copyright guarantees. Copyright owners
consider both types of demand and the full range of expected uses of their works when setting
prices. In short, both types of uncompensated positive externality are woven into the fabric of
the existing market for creative and informational works; they are the background conditions
against which the market operates.
The cybereconomists recognize that creative and informational works may generate
benefits that are not captured by market transactions. From their point of view, that is precisely
the problem with the current incomplete-entitlements regime. Digital CMS, in contrast, will
allow copyright owners to internalize benefits that are properly “theirs.”335 The above analysis
suggests, first, that public access and use privileges do not in fact represent a tax on copyright
owners to subsidize the reading public, as copyright owners have claimed.336 If anything, they
represent a tax on the reading public to subsidize the creative public, both present and
337
  Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 15 (characterizing the fair use doctrine, when applied to
"transformative" uses of copyrighted works, as "a hidden tax for critical creativity"). Ginsburg argues that the
"hidden tax" is unjustified when fair use is invoked to excuse purely "consumptive" uses such as private copying.
See id. at 15-16. She overlooks, however, that there may be a real, though indirect, relationship between present
consumption and future creativity, that even purely consumptive use may produce valuable social benefits, and that
it may in any case be difficult to differentiate ex ante between those consumptive uses that will generate future
creativity and those that will not. See supra text accompanying notes 117-28.
338
  Cf. Baker, supra note 320, at 316 n.14 ("[N]onexcludability as an aspect of a public good is usually
thought of as referring to situations where any purchaser and each nonexcluded beneficiary get roughly the same
type of benefit from the good, while the concept of externalities is more commonly used where the benefit or burden
on nonexcluded third parties is of a different sort than that which enticed an individual purchase."). For that matter,
so is a negative externality that corresponds to a social loss. The analysis in this Part focuses on the need to identify
"social" externalities, or public goods, that inhere in the existing regime of entitlements in creative and
informational works, and assumes some basis for distinguishing between "good" and "bad" public goods after they
have been identified. For consideration of the latter question, see infra section III.B.2.
339
  See supra note 25 (defining "public goods"); Baker, supra note 320, at 316 n.14.
340
  Cf. Cohen, supra note 248, at 999 (applying public-goods analysis to the right to remain anonymous
when accessing and viewing online material, and noting that "the perceived costs of forgoing access to desired
reading material will rise, and the likelihood of reader hold-out will fall, as more reading material is technologically
protected"). On the endogeneity of consumer preferences, and their responsiveness to norms inculcated by legal and
political institutions, see infra text accompanying notes 351-55.
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future.337 More important, it sheds further light on the discussion in section ILB, above, of the
relation between public goods, private goods, and progress. 
I have argued that the shift to a private-law model of intellectual property may
substantially change the nature of progress. Consideration of the ancillary or externality effects
of information suggests why. A positive externality that corresponds to a social benefit — as
opposed to an uncompensated benefit to a distinct third party or parties — is simply a public
good by another name.338 The same public good analysis that is conventionally applied to
creative and informational works applies equally to the access and reuse privileges afforded by
the public law of copyright. These privileges are non-excludable; if the law and the "state of
the copying art" afford them to one, they afford them to all. They are non-rivalrous; one
consumer's exercise of his or her right to reverse engineer software or parody a creative work
does not prevent others from doing so.339 Within the market arena, the ordinary consumer is
unlikely to value the privileges provided for future creators highly enough to pay for them —
particularly if he or she has been reeducated to believe in the importance of paying for the
right to use intellectual property, whatever the circumstances.340 But the ordinary consumer
benefits immensely from these and other privileged uses — from access to creative and
informational works in public schools and libraries, from increased competition and greater
product variety in software markets, and in countless other ways.
It follows that allowing copyright owners to internalize uncompensated benefits, as the
cybereconornists recommend, would not simply reallocate a fixed, immutable surplus from
341
   See Bell, supra note 5, at 587-90, 601-08; Hardy, supra note 5, at 242-52, 254-58; O'Rourke,
Copyright Preemption, supra note 5, at 62, 70-71; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 178-79 ("The logic of
property rights dictates their extension into every corner in which people derive enjoyment and value from literary
and artistic works. To stop short of these ends would deprive producers of the signals of consumer preference that
trigger and direct their investments.”). 
342
  Even assuming that some degree of proprietary protection is needed to induce a work's creation, my
analysis has suggested that, above a certain level of proprietary protection, market value and nonmarket value are
inversely related. Basic mathematics dictates that where two variables are inversely related, it is impossible to
maximize for both at the same time. Thus, another way of framing the problem is that we should set the level of
proprietary protection for digital works in such a way as to maximize the sum of the market and nonmarket or public
good value that would result. If. at some point, a further increase in the scope of protection would produce a drop in
public good value that exceeds the increase in market value, we should decline to allow the increased protection. I
am indebted to Phil Agre for suggesting this train of thought.
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consumers to producers. Instead, the property-and-contract-based model proffered by the
cybereconomists would fundamentally alter the social welfare equation. The change would be
both (re)distributive and qualitative; some shared social benefits would be replaced by
privately-appropriated ones. The cybereconomists contend that their model would increase the
value realized by both producers and consumers of information by enabling the formation of
markets .341 That may be so. The analysis offered here suggests, however, that the correct
question to ask is not whether the proposed changes in digital intellectual property rights will
increase the value realized by markets. Rather, the question is whether the changes will
increase the overall value realized by society — including the value realized both within and
outside markets — under the current system.342
If society believes that the continued existence of certain public access and use rights is
necessary to promote access and progress most effectively, and that the gains to society are
thus greater under a regime of limited entitlements in digital works than they would be under a
regime of "strong" private-law rights, then digital rights management technologies and digital
shrinkwrap licenses are a market failure waiting to happen. In that case, we might plausibly
conclude that divided ownership (or some equivalent adjustment) is necessary to offset private
parties' failure to internalize fully the ancillary social value of information. More simply, in
Papandreou's terms, we might conclude that given the special nature of creative and
informational works, the current institutional structure does a better job of optimizing social
welfare. At any rate, without a better understanding of these nonmarket effects and their
relation to our conception of social welfare, we cannot say with any confidence that the
cybereconomists' proposal is the right one.
2. Defining Social Welfare
Regardless of whether we begin the effort to model the market in digital works by
positing the inefficiency of common ownership, by inquiring into the distribution of
bargaining power, or by focusing on the ancillary value generated by creative and
informational works, we discover that the model is indeterminate without an underlying
343
  See, e.g., G. PETER PENZ, CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN INTERESTS (1986) (summarizing
nonmarket interests); Baker, supra note 36, at 34-35; Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The
Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1206-12 (1997); Amartya K.
Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317
(1977); see also Ian Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 999, 1001-08 (1987); Ve1janovski, supra
note 104. "Law and economics" scholarship in the neoclassical mode recognizes these preferences, if at all, as
anomalies that need not be built into economic models precisely because the market is incapable of measuring them.
See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 5, at 221-22 (arguing that nonmonetizable motives for creativity need not be factored
into the copyright incentives analysis); Steven Shavell, Contingent Valuation of the Nonuse Value of Natural
Resources: Implications for Public Policy and the Liability System, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 371 (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993) (arguing that economic models for public decisionmaking should not
include the nonmonetizable value placed on natural resources because such value is difficult to measure accurately).
344
  See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (rev. ed.
1984); PENZ, supra note 343, at 41-58; Sen, supra note 343, at 313-15; Baker, supra note 320, at 401-03; Sen,
supra note 343, at 335-44; Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in NOMOS XXXI: MARKETS AND
JUSTICE 279, 285-87 (John W. Chapman J. & Roland Pennock eds., 1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1133-35, 1140-45 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal
Interference].  An example is a preference for affirmative action in hiring or school admissions.  Individuals might
support affirmative action policies precisely because they believe that without such policies, they would tend —
either consciously or subconsciously — to favor candidates of the majority race.  See id. at 1153-54.
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conception of social welfare or utility. Something must be optimized, but what? And how
should it be measured? The neoclassical model holds that overall utility is determined by
aggregating the preferences expressed through the market, and is optimized when goods and
resources are thereby allocated to those who value them the most. However, the notion that the
market affords a comprehensive and reliable account of all relevant human desires and
supplies an accurate measure of their fulfillment has been thoroughly and convincingly
discredited. In particular, creative and informational works implicate preferences about
individual and collective self-definition that are fundamentally external to the market.
As an initial matter, the neoclassical market-based lexicon of personal preferences and
interests is radically incomplete. Numerous scholars have demonstrated that people have
preferences and interests concerning many matters — including (for example) working
conditions and interpersonal interactions — that are nonmonetizable and wholly external to
the market.343 It follows that the market is not capable of registering these desires, let alone
measuring the extent to which they have been satisfied. Moreover, consumers qua citizens
may recognize hierarchies of preferences. That is, citizens may have preferences about the
sorts of preferences that the law should privilege or burden, even though (or because) they
would not act on these preferences as consumers.344 In other words, citizens may have
preferences about what constitutes a just, fair, and equitable system of social ordering. The
public process of lawmaking, which neoclassical economists view as interference with market-
345
  See Baker, supra note 36, at 34-40 ("A right to define and determine one's being must include equal
and real opportunities to participate in collective constitutive decisions as well as certain liberties pertaining to
individual development and expression."); Baker, supra note 320, at 400-01; Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra
note 344, at 1140-45. Of course, reaching a policy decision requires a method of aggregating these preferences,
which in turn requires some way of making interpersonal comparisons. Neoclassically-oriented economists are right
to regard this task as difficult, and public-choice theorists are right to see the potential for bias. Nonetheless, the
method employed by the neoclassicists — using dollars as evidence of consumer preferences — does not seem
prima facie more accurate or unbiased than the legislative method — using the votes of elected representatives as
proxies for constituent preferences, and then aggregating the votes. See Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 81-89, 94-
106; Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2145-83 (1990); supra text accompanying notes 273-
90. The two methods are simply different, and might reasonably be expected to be useful in different sets of
circumstances. In particular, given the constraints on positive consumer action discussed in section III.A, supra, and
given that the market does not register certain preferences at all, voting seems a more useful method for making
collective decisions based on the second-order preferences discussed in the text. See Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at
81-89, 94-106; Pildes & Anderson, supra, at 2145-86; id. at 2187 ("Voting aggregates individual choices — not
individual preferences."); Steams, supra note 102, at 1240-45. If the current system of voting is imperfect, looking
for ways to improve it would seem a better route than abandoning entirely attempts to respond collectively to
preferences of this type. See Pildes & Anderson, supra, at 2188-213.
346
  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997)
(summarizing the insights of behavioral theory into human preference formation and decision making).
347
   See PENZ, supra note 343, at 69-77.
348
  See id. at 63-68; Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law & Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 35-40 (1989); Sunstein, Legal Interference,
supra note 344, at 1166-68; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalmeman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,
59 J. BUS. S251 (1986).
349
  See Bell, supra note 5, at 580-81.
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based expression and satisfaction of preferences, in fact affords citizens the opportunity to
express and satisfy preferences that the market ignores, undervalues, or disserves.345
In addition, individual preference-formation and decision patterns are subject to
multiple sources of error and inconsistency.346 Since the future is unpredictable, individuals
may miscalculate when deciding how to act on their preferences, or be unable to forecast how
their preferences will change over time.347 Alternatively, due to incomplete or incorrect
information or to "framing effects" produced by context-dependent reference points,
individuals may, be mistaken about what their own preferences are, or how strongly they are
held .348 Bell's argument that consumers who want to retain the current fair use rules are
simply mistaken as to their cost seems to be offered in this spirit.349 Bell, however, does not
consider that individuals might prefer the current fair use structure for nonmonetizable
reasons. The consumer, it seems, is right except when she wants to modify existing or
emerging market institutions, in which case she is wrong. Without better information about
why people feel as they do about fair use, that conclusion is premature. It is worth noting, too,
350
  See Nussbaum, supra note 343, at 1199-1203; Pildes & Anderson, supra note 345, at 2145-75. Radin's
"incomplete commodification" proposal, see supra text accompanying note 109, with its commitment to a broadly
defined conception of "human flourishing," addresses the incommensurability of market and nonmarket values. See
RADIN, supra note 64, at 62-75.
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  See, e.g., George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De gustibus non est disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV.
76 (1977).
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  See BARTLETT, supra note 102, at 84-89; BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note 205, at 92-120; GALBRAITH,
supra note 205, at 24-37; CHOMSKY & HERMAN, supra note 226; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7, 22, 42-43 (1990); PENZ, supra note 343, at 89-113;
Baker, supra note 320, at 404-11; Dugger, supra note 205; Lessig, supra note 312; Sunstein, supra note 312.
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  See NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 201-10; see also Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75
OR. L. REV. 299 (1996); Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 100.
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  See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 226, at 223; BARTLETT, supra note 102, at 89-97; BOWLES & GINTIS, supra
note 205, at 128-35; GALBRAITH, supra note 205, at 131-43; Baker, supra note 320, at 408-09; Bowles & Gintis,
supra note 245, at 206-07; Dugger, supra note 205; Goldberg, supra note 104, at 125.
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  See supra text accompanying note 234. 
356
  At least one economic theorist, Peter Penz, has concluded that subjective measures of consumer
preferences — including the neoclassical "revealed preferences" criterion, which holds that whatever consumers
want, defined by what they actually buy, is what will maximize their welfare — are suspect. As a way out of the
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that citizens' preferences also may be inconsistent due to the perceived incommensurability of
different, sometimes competing, goods.350
Finally, neoclassical theories of consumer sovereignty take consumer preferences as
given.351 Modern economic theorists, in contrast, recognize that preferences are endogenously
determined by a variety of factors, including imitation of others, advertising, and a variety of
workplace, social, and political institutions that seek to inculcate particular behaviors.352 A
particularly salient example of the latter, in the context of digital works, is the recent call for a
program of elementary and secondary education designed to expose children to the importance
of intellectual property and of asking — and, presumably, paying — for permission to use
it.353The distribution of power in a contested exchange also will affect preference formation
and expression. To the extent that transactions produce or constitute people, those who wield
power will be able to shape the wants and habits of those who do not.354 It is this dynamic —
altered preferences followed by altered behavior — that the Software Publishers' Association
was hoping to trigger when it threatened to sue its members' licensees who engaged in
unauthorized copying.355 This suggests, further, that the costs of collective action noted in
section III.A, above, may be exacerbated by acculturation to the status quo.
In sum, markets are not only incomplete indicators of what people want, but there is
also reason to be skeptical of what markets tell us about the fraction of human interests that
they can purport to describe.356 Also, the term "market failure" is inescapably contingent. Its
thicket, Penz advocates reliance on an objective, or "human interests," criterion of consumer welfare. See PENZ,
supra note 343, at 139-225.
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  See BARTLETT, supra note 102, at 195 ("Markets may be driven by an invisible hand, but the hand is
attached to an arm of socially defined rights."); supra text accompanying notes 104-08; cf. Baker, supra note 166, at
786-88 (“[I]f the market controls resource use, human freedom requires that we be able to control the market
structure. Because laws and societal norms are key elements in any market structure, the ability to control the
structure, and hence freedom, requires collective decisionmaking.").
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  See Baker, supra note 320, at 402-03; Cohen, supra note 248, at 1006-07, 1014; Elkin-Koren, supra
note 6, at 112; Netanel, supra note 36, at 347-51; Phan, supra note 175, at 208-10; cf. BOWLES & GINTIS, supra note
205, at 121-51 (arguing that individuals are not simply the rational "choosers" recognized by liberal economic
theory, but also, and more fundamentally, “learners” through the iterative processes of market choice, interpersonal
association, and democratic self-governance); Nussbaum, supra note 343, at 1203-06 (arguing that economic theory
must acknowledge human agency). 
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  See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 98, at 19 (citing JON ELSTER, RATIONAL CHOICE 19-20 (1986)).
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meaning depends on the indicia of social welfare that a market is supposed to optimize, and
these goals are not predetermined and may change over time. Market failure, properly under-
stood, encompasses not only cases in which the parties fail to transact, or find it too expensive,
but also cases in which consensual, relatively costless transactions nonetheless fail to produce
particular outcomes that have been defined to be socially valuable. When, market institutions
fail, use of the public process of lawmaking to reshape them is entirely appropriate. Market
institutions are in and of human society, not a fixed axis around which human society re-
volves.357 Their structure, like the structure of nonmarket institutions, is necessarily a matter
for collective choice.
How might these insights apply to the problem of rights in digital works? First, since
information is so crucial to the construction of preferences (as any advertiser knows),
transactions in information may have especially significant influence on the construction of
both first- and second-order preferences. Information — including the information contained
in works of art, fiction, and popular entertainment — mediates not only perceptions about
what one wants to buy, but also beliefs about what sort of person one wants to become and
what social outcomes one values.358 Access to information, in short, is important for both
individual self-actualization and collective self-definition.
Self-actualization is an unpredictable process, however, for both individuals and
societies. It is a truism that the desire for more information will depend on whether the
perceived benefits of the information outweigh its costs, but it is difficult to assess either
benefits or costs before the fact.359 'Ihis is particularly so in the case of more complex creative
or informational works. The process of discovery and retrieval of information introduces
additional complications. The human mind does not always, or even usually, proceed in a
linear fashion, but exploits chance discoveries and pursues unexpected links. The first person
to imagine a web of information interconnected by associational. (now hypertext) links — an
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information resource at once so sophisticated and so intuitive in operation that very young
children can use it — did so with these characteristics in mind.360 It is possible to begin a
search without having any idea what will prove important, and to end it with a collection of
materials suggested by connections made along the way.
The existing public-law regime of copyright mitigates the uncertainties and path-
dependencies that attend the discovery and acquisition of information by allowing individuals
to browse before or instead of purchasing and to share and re-use acquired information.361 The
cybereconomists, in contrast, suggest that individuals should be required to search for and
evaluate creative and informational resources with the meter running. Individuals might
plausibly believe that a degree of fortuitous, nonmetered access to information advances their
development, both as consumers and as citizens, better than Bell's system of "fared use" or
Hardy's regime of strong, undivided property entitlements.362 Certainly, there is insufficient
evidence to conclude that they do not, or that such a preference would be irrational.
Second, in the case of copyright, there is an express constitutional mandate that the
chosen system of exclusive rights promote “progress." As has been frequently observed, the
degree to which any particular arrangement of rules is better or worse than any other
arrangement at promoting progress, objectively defined, is an empirical question that may be
inherently untestable.363 That formulation, however, begs the question whether progress is a
wholly measurable quantity. As the recent debates about the desirability of cloning higher
mammals attest, progress is at least in part a socially-determined construct.364 In addition,
supra note 192, at 114-34 (1993) (rejecting the view that "progress" consists of accumulating objective
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365
  See 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3515b (1994); Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Litman, supra note 6.
366
  See John Browning, Excerpt from "What Is the Role of Libraries in the Information Economy?," in
INTERNET DREAMS: ARCHETYPES, MYTHS, AND METAPHORS, supra note 24, at 55, 57 ("[I]f the books on a library's
electronic shelves are not free ... what is left of the library's traditional raison d'etre: namely, making information
available to those who cannot afford to buy it?").
367
  See supra text accompanying notes 330-42; cf. Cohen, supra note 9, at 182; Elkin-Koren, supra note 6,
at 110; Madison, supra note 49, at 6-7 & n.14 (developing "open space" metaphor for this noncommodified aspect
of the public law of copyright).
368
  See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 210, at 58-64 (discussing academic community norms regarding
photocopying of copyrighted works); cf. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Revenge of Homo Economicus:
Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy, 7 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 83, 95-96 (1993); Sen, supra
note 343, at 331-32. This appears to be exactly what advocates of the private-law approach intend. See, e.g., NII
WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 201-10 (recommending education as to "what is 'mine' versus what is ‘not mine' "
beginning at the elementary school level); supra text accompanying note 355.
89
progress refers to, a journey as well as a destination; hence (for example) the stringent rules
regarding informed consent in medical experimentation, and the doctrine that precludes
copyright protection for facts and ideas in order to ensure a robust public domain.365 The
definition of progress in these latter two senses is something that individuals and the
community constituted by them may have legitimate preferences about.
The resolution of the digital copyright problem will affect progress in unquantifiable
ways. If libraries may not make digital works available to the public free of direct charge, there
are some potential creators who will never see them.366 Similarly, some would-be authors who
wish to use digital works in ways that copyright law considers fair uses will not do so, either
for economic reasons or because the license that governs usage rights forbids it. The locus of
control over progress will shift slightly, toward existing authors and away from poorer (or
simply younger) authors. One could believe, as do the cybereconomists, that the system is
simply adjusting to cure a pervasive and troublesome market failure, or to allocate future uses
of digital works to those who are willing to pay for that privilege. As discussed above,
however, one could also conceive the noncommodified "breathing space" the current system
allows citizens for browsing, public domain use, and fair use to be a public good worth
preserving — notwithstanding the fact that most consumers do not plan to reverse engineer
software or publish a parody or critical essay directed at a literary work and would see no need
to bargain in the market for the right to do so.367
Finally, instituting a regimented system of usage rights may undermine societal norms
that have developed over time to mediate, the boundary between private and public rights in
creative and informational works.368 Two examples of such norms are the practice among
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research scientists of photocopying colleagues' professional journal articles that are relevant to
their current or contemplated research, and the practice among university professors of
preparing coursepacks for their students that contain photocopied excerpts from a variety of
academic sources. Both norms currently are threatened as a result of appellate court decisions
that the copying is not a fair use of the copyrighted content.369 According to both courts, this is
so regardless of accepted practice in scholarly and research communities, because there now
exist market mechanisms to license photocopying rights.370 Thus, both decisions rest on the
same narrow view of the fair use doctrine espoused by the cybereconomists; their implicit
premise is that the fair use doctrine is a cure for market failure and nothing more.371
Norms favoring information-sharing in research and classroom settings are valuable
both instrumentally, in that they advance thriving traditions of scholarship and social
commentary, and intrinsically, in that they foster a climate of openness and intellectual ex-
change.372 The switch to a system of strong property rights might jeopardize these social
accomplishments and values by rendering them superfluous given the practical realities of
access to creative and informational content.373 In addition, of course, a private-law regime of
rights in digital works would make many information sharing practices unlawful.374 It would
be legitimate and entirely rational for the public to decide that these practices and the values
they serve are, instead, important and worth preserving.
The question what preferences the public has regarding rights in digital works has
many possible answers. It is plainly incorrect, however, to foreclose many of these answers at
the outset, on the ground that we cannot look to markets to measure their importance. The
cybereconomists' proposal would have us do precisely that. At worst, this approach ignores or
trivializes important public values and priorities. At the very least, it is simply premature.
Before adopting a private-law regime of rights in digital works on the ground that it would
best promote social welfare, we must reach a considered, collective decision about what social
welfare means. Contrary to the cybereconomists' arguments, there is ample basis from which
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to conclude that a public-law, limited-entitlements regime is best-suited to promoting our
individual and collective development.
IV. CODA: OF MARKET FAILURES AND TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES
As this Article has shown, the neoclassical market model for digital property rights
ignores or assumes away issues of immense theoretical and practical significance. A realistic
model for the market in digital works should explore the effect of legal rules on the formation
of market institutions, as the cybereconomists (in particular Merges) do. However, it also must
attempt to understand the ways in which the existing distribution and social construction of
property rights, and the convenient presumption of particularized assent to standard form
contract terms, are themselves institutional choices that shape market outcomes. In addition, a
model that attempts to relate "property" to "progress" must consider the public-good nature of
creative and informational works, and cannot assume equivalency between private wealth and
social gain. Like the jurists of the Lochner era, the cybereconomists assume too much and
prove too little about the rightness of their desired regime.
The broader spectrum of economic research and theory suggests that in order to
determine the optimal system of rights in digital works, we must inquire into the potential
asymmetries of power that may inhere in technologically-mediated transactions in usage
rights. In addition, we must attempt to assess all of the benefits and costs — including
externalities — generated by our current regime of incomplete property entitlements in
creative and informational works, in order to determine whether a digital CMS regime would
result in a net gain or a net loss for society, as distinct from a net gain to participants in
markets. And we cannot do either of these things without a considered, societal decision
regarding the market and nonmarket purposes a system of rights in digital works is supposed
to serve, and the extent to which author/owner control furthers or disserves those purposes.
It is worth reflecting, finally, on the role of technology in effectuating an economic
vision of digital intellectual property rights — whether it be the simple, Newtonian model
proffered by the cybereconomists or the more complex, post-Newtonian model for which I
have attempted to lay the groundwork. I have argued that the choice between more flexible
access policies and digitally metered, fully-commodified usage rights is not a simple choice
between market failure and (by implication) market success. Digital technologies, and in
particular digital CMS, unquestionably have the potential to eliminate certain market failures
recognized as significant within the neoclassical market-centered paradigm. Yet by
maximizing the economic return to the digital content owner and externalizing the costs of
decreased accessibility to members of the public, digital CMS may create or exacerbate other,
arguably more significant, types of market failure. 
For the cybereconomists, however, the move to a digital CMS regime is both desirable
and technologically inevitable. Digital technology enables the complete determination of
property rights and facilitates their exchange in relatively frictionless Coasean markets not just
375
  I  include myself in this group. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 177.
376
   See ELLUL, supra note 7; MUMFORD, supra note 7; LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY:
TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CONTROL AS A THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1977); supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
377
  See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors, 66 U.
CIN. L. REV. 352 (1998).
378
  See BOYLE, supra note 168; Agre, supra note 310; Lessig, supra note 264, at 96; Lawrence Lessig, The
Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 629 (1998); cf. Stefik, Shifting the Possible, supra note 24, at 156 ("Trusted systems do not exist in
a vacuum. They exist in a social framework. The search for balance involves the design of appropriate social
institutions.”).
379
  See supra text accompanying notes 100-16.  
380
  See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
92
because it should, but because it must. Critics of private-law models for digital intellectual
property rights have largely acceded to this description of the direction in which digital rights
management technologies will take us.375 This is so, I suspect, because the cybereconomists'
"technological imperative" resonates with deeply-held social beliefs in the inexorable,
rationalizing force of technical advance — beliefs that, like so much else in our economic and
political theory, trace back to the period of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution.376
The power of this narrative is such that one hears surprisingly little about the
possibilities of designing technological alternatives for managing rights in digital works.
Digital technology is theorized as politically neutral and developmentally linear; the problem,
if there is one, lies in humanizing its presumptively inhuman face.377 Yet.surely that is too
simple; technology is not destiny. Rather, our perception of possible technological solutions is
colored by our approach to market and legal institutions, and vice versa.378 The fully-
commodified approach to digital rights management gains normative force from the narrative
power of the neoclassical market model, and the neoclassical market model demands, in
return, to be implemented via technologies that minimize friction and internalize
uncompensated benefits. The economic ideology that produced Lochner has embraced digital
CMS as a means of achieving fruition. A social commitment to "incomplete commodification"
or to reconceiving fair use privileges as publicly-owned property rights would suggest a
different approach to structuring technologically-mediated transactions in digital works.379
The question what a different, more multi-faceted rights management system might
look like is a subject for another article. The problems involved in the design of such a system
are complex — all the more so because existing rights management systems have been
designed to preempt the flexible, equitable, context-sensitive judgments that constitute our
current system of fair use.380 Effectuating a noncommodified or incompletely-commodified
approach to digital intellectual property rights requires a new trajectory for policy and
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technology alike. Digital systems capable of making or assisting such contingent,
nonprogrammatic policy judgments are a long way from reality, and we have at best an
imperfect understanding of what such systems might look like.381 This does not mean,
however, that digital rights management technologies and equitable access rules are
necessarily incompatible. It simply means that there is much work to be done in creating the
discursive space within which the desired regime can flourish.382
The notion of designing digital systems to incorporate a degree of superficial
transactional inefficiency is less unusual than it seems. One notable recent example is the
installation of "circuit breakers" in the trading systems at the New York Stock Exchange
following the October 1987 stock market crash. Investigators concluded that the crash was
caused in part by automated "program trading" by high-volume investors, in part by existing
computer systems' inability to handle the large volume of orders, and in part by the panic and
communications breakdowns that ensued when the market began to drop rapidly as both
individual traders and automated trading programs tried to sell and found no buyers.383 The
circuit breakers are designed to "slow the action on turbulent days and give cooler heads a
chance to prevail";384 they accomplish this by halting computerized program trading for a
preset time period when the Dow Jones industrial average falls a specified amount in a single
trading session, and by halting all trading if the Dow falls too far.385 The market has fallen far
enough to trigger the circuit breakers on several occasions since their installation, and none
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have become panics.386 This example suggests that "friction" in human transactional systems
may sometimes serve valuable collective ends.
It is clear that some hard thinking is needed to tailor intellectual property paradigms to
the digital world. It also should be clear, however, that the most commodified solution is not
necessarily the best one, and that the search for the best solution should involve all affected
interests. Technological changes that will have distributive consequences are a proper subject
of attention for policymakers and the public as well as for owners and technologists. The
appropriate entitlements structure for digital works should be chosen not just because
technology enables it, or because it comports with a familiar story about the nature of property
rights and markets, but because it represents a sound and wise policy for managing our
society's creative capital.
